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ABSTRACT 
Certain developments and applications of science and technology 
are often seen as a problem for society. The first chapters of 
this work concentrate on what technology actually is, its relation 
with science and the problems it creates for society. 
Two questions are asked: 
1. Is democratic control of technological research and 
development necessary and possible? 
2. Is democratic control of the applications of this research 
and development necessary and possible? 
A broad definition of technology brings out the relation of 
science and technology. The key concept is: control over nature, 
non-human as well as human. 
The theories of Marx and Engels show that technology and 
science are an integral part of society and cannot be seen as 
separated from it. This obvious point is taken by the Frankfurt 
school which discusses the ideological aspects of technology and 
science. This culminates in the notion of technology as ideology 
itself (Habermas). These ideas can be used in relation to 
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information technology and its dangers and uses for the 
protection of privacy. 
The issue of information technology in relation to privacy and 
personal freedom is used (i) to demonstrate the possibilities of 
democratic control and (ii) because the problem of privacy and 
dataprotection is generally recognised in many countries. 
Because of the defects found in a number of legislative 
implementations of dataprotection a proposal is made for a more 
complete and effective control of information technology in 
relation to dataprotection. 
This proposal rests on two related concepts: 
1. Democratic control through citizens committees (as a kind of 
jury duty), 
2. The extension of the division of power to a fourth data 
controlling power, controlled not only by a legislative power but 
a separate citizen's committee. 
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The problem which is addressed in this work is the problem of 
democratic control of technology, or better technological 
applications. The way in which such a problem is approached 
usually is different from the approach used here. 
The problem of technology is, to my view, best described in terms 
of rationality and alienation, a combination of the views of Marx 
and Weber as presented by The Frankfurt School, notably 
Horkheimer and Adorno. Their analysis of reality confronts us with 
underlying tendencies in modern industrial society: the ideological 
impact of the combination of science and technology. The goal of 
this combination is the control over nature. This attempt of control, 
seen in the light of school of thought called 'enlightenment 
philosophy', does not merely stop at the relation man - nature, 
external nature, but extends itself to the inner realm, man itself. 
Therefore the ideological aspects of science and technology are 
made problematic by The Frankfurt School. Old ideologies have 
come to an end, mankind has lost its grip on (human) reality and 
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translates its relation with nature end fellow man in scientific and 
technological terms. 
This bleak picture leaves for thinkers like Horkheimer and Adorno 
not much room for change. Other exponents of the Frankfurt 
School, like Marcuse, Fromm and later Habermas, struggle with this 
picture and sometimes propose rather extreme ways out. 
This study, be it in a different way, proposes in certain respects a 
no less extreme solution. The solution is extreme certainly when 
looked at from the viewpoints of Horkheimer and Adorno, since 
every attempt to come to terms with the false reality of our 
everyday experience is doomed to failure. Therefore the only 
possible critical praxis is for them critical philosophy. 
Proposing solutions has beside the contribution to a 'way out' also 
the function of establishing the limits of what is humanly possible. 
And in such a way we may be able to come to terms with ourselves, 
our institutions and our whole society. 
The emphasis on information technology has two reasons: 
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1. It serves as an example, an exercise in finding solutions in a 
concrete situation. If elements of this discourse are valuable in the 
search for applicable solutions much is reached, although unhoped 
for. My intentions are more modest. The problem of control over 
the application of technology is only presented in yet another way 
by going to an extreme and finding that this is as much as we can 
do. The extreme itself may be subject to heavy criticisms, and may 
be itself not desirable. 
2. The Frankfurt School as a whole distinguishes itself in a negative 
way. They, so to say, do not make themselves vulnerable in 
attempting to come up with concrete proposals. They do not search 
for solutions which may be present in our 'false' society itself. To 
my mind democracy as theory and praxis is still not exhausted where 
solutions for real and concrete problems are concerned. 
Here, I hope, I have explained the break which exists in 
this study. One could argue that another more traditional approach 
would be better. But such an approach lacks the necessary critical 
content, to which I feel I am committed. 
In the next chapter the reader will be confronted with a general 
discussion of the problem of science and technology in our society. 
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Then the issue of information technology and more precisely the 
issue of data protection will be addressed. 
The issue of data protection is discussed because it implicitly 
addresses the problem of the anonymous control of an institution 
like the state, and other interested agencies, over the individual by 
means of a technology which may prove itself disastrous. Until a 
true free society emerges, the danger of authoritarian control will 
always exist. 
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1. The problem of Technology. 
A central technology in our time, perhape the central technology, 
is information technology. The computer is the central device in 
this technology. I have chosen this subject because I believe it 
constitutes a break with earlier developments. It is a break, not 
so much from a pure scientific or technological point of view, 
but because of the enormous influence it has on the average 
citizen. 
The influence is two-fold. First, information technology establishes 
the belief that non-human entities can think in the way human 
beings do. This cannot in itself be an especially serious mistake. 
We can all imagine the possibility of extra-terrestrials, non 
humans, who possess the capacity of thought, emotion, creativity, 
etc. Even on our own planet the existence of intelligent non-
humans in the form of intelligent whales, is not all that unlikely. 
A problem arises when intelligence is attributed to our own 
creations, machines. It all depends, of course, on what we think 
intelligence actually is. When it is merely some formal problem 
solving capacity, then the idea of intelligent or even thinking 
machines is not so far-fetched. 
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But intelligence is more than that. It includes certain capacities 
of problem solving which go beyond the capacities of formal 
problem solving systems. What about the element of intuition, 
which makes us choose from sometimes an enormous number of 
seemingly equal directions? Brain research still cannot identify 
the mechanisms which are responsible for creativity, intuition, etc. 
Moreover we do not even know what these things exactly are, so 
we can scarcely copy such activities in machines. 
Aside from these considerations many people believe that 
machines can think, or ultimately are able to do so. This is, I 
believe a grave error. An error, because it invokes a 
complementary notion which reduces human beings and other 
beings with 'real' intelligence to biological machines. And 
machines have, per definition no rights. They can be manipulated 
and controlled. This brings us to the second influence that 
information technology works upon us. 
Although this second influence is not necessarily directly related 
to the first it is seen as a real problem. It is the problem of the 
enhanced possibilities of a government or of one of its 
institutions to manipulate the lives of citizens to an extent that 
they are not free any more. This enhancement means that all 
kinds of overt tyranny can be replaced by covert manipulation 
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through threats or harassment on the basis of what is known 
about one's actions and beliefs. 
Private beliefs and behaviour concern the individuals themselves 
and do not in itself concern or harm others. The selection of 
individuals for reasons that their private behaviour or beliefs 
which are held to be potentially undesirable for a given regime or 
seen as potentially disturbing for the security of a nation, is an 
important and serious problem. We all know that the Nazi regime 
in Germany and the occupied territories in the Second World 
War tried to control citizens in this way. Another example was 
the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union. 
Aside from these clear examples we also experience the 
possibility of this danger in the democratic societies of Western 
Europe and North America. There are numerous examples of 
abuse of private information by police forces and security 
organizations. The problem of privacy and interference already 
existed before computers were invented. Also classical, manually 
operated bureaucracies in the hands of a totalitarian regime 
performed such functions, be it less complete. I will argue later 
in this chapter that technology, and therefore information 
technology, is a broader notion than merely the methods of 
construction of devices important to it. 
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The possibilities of computers and data base technology makes 
tyranny more efficient and less overt. To give an example, it is 
much easier to detain potential demonstrators or 'convince' them 
not to take part in a demonstration before the demonstration 
takes place than having to arrest them during a demonstration. 
Moreover, these actions may remain undiscovered, and if 
discovered hard to prove. 
In this work I will try to look for a democratic solution for these 
problems in the light of more general views on technology, its 
place in society and its ideological effects. The case of data 
protection and the control of information technology concerned 
with data protection is the focus of this study. 
1.1. General Considerations. 
The old values of previous periods of our society slowly disappear 
and make place for a growing cynicism. However, the 
identification of the development of science and technology and 
the progress of mankind is still an existing view. It is used often 
in advertisements for the products of especially the electronic and 
aerospace industries. This view is related to early positivist 
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philosophy of de Saint-Simon and Comte, but as we shall see is 
also supported in the works of Marx and Engels. 
Since the first industrial revolution there has always been 
resistance against the increasing application of science and 
technology in the production process as well as in other parts of 
society. This resistance took place in the form of spontaneous 
labour movements, such as the English Luddites \ and in 
intellectual romantic trends. More recently (since the 1950s) there 
has been the development of a more or less left-wing oriented 
critique of science and technology, which centers around the 
issue of the suppression of people by means of science and 
technology. An attempt is made to identify especially those sides 
of science and technology which prevent further human 
emancipation. 
The development of scientific thought, however, was a necessary 
contribution to the liberation of mankind from superstition and 
powerlessness in the face of nature. Yet the victory over nature 
seems to have gone at the expense of human freedom, in so far 
as people have become slaves of the technologies which they 
themselves have developed. However, the development of the 
forces of production is often seen as a condition for a socialist 
(Marx) or, as Marcuse later calls it, a pacified society. 
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Not only human freedom is at stake. The technological 
application of relatively recent scientific discoveries in the field 
of nuclear physics has led to the development of all kinds of 
nuclear weapons which, if used, can wipe out human existence. 
If not used, they can at best, as defenders of the balance of 
(nuclear) power want us to believe, avert war. However, their 
mere existence and the ease with which they can be made creates 
an international political climate that by itself may be 
counterproductive to real progress, for instance in the field of 
underdevelopment. 
There is, however, an important consideration. Technology can 
be liberating as well as repressive, sometimes in one and the 
same application. 
Let us consider as an example the automobile. It does not need 
much explication that the automobile gives the owner a large 
freedom to move over greater distances than he could do on 
foot. An automobile is not limited to preset routes and schedules 
like trains. It can be used at any time of the day and is only 
limited in its reach by the capacity of the petrol tank and 
consequently the owner's purse. 
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On the other hand there are a number of limiting and even 
rather repressive effects of the use of automobiles. We are all 
familiar with traffic jams and queues on highways. The kind of 
engine that is used causes pollution with great effects not only 
for human health but also for the well-being of the rest of 
nature. This small example serves merely to illustrate this 
paradox. I will treat the matter in more depth in chapter three. 
In this work I want to review several theories of technological 
development and its effects. I want to do this in search of an 
answer to the question: Is democratic control of technology 
possible? If so, how can it be done? 
This question consists of two parts: 
1. Is democratic control of technological research and 
development (R&D) necessary and possible? 
2. Is democratic control of the applications of the outcome 
of this R&D necessary and possible? 
It remains to be seen what we want to control and why. Is 
control of research and development necessary or control of 
technological applications, or both? In order to find an answer 
to these questions we have to define what technology actually is 
and how it comes about. I will deal with definitions later in the 
chapter. 
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For the time being I will pose two other related questions. 
Technology cannot be simply seen as only superficially related to 
the society that makes use of it. It may be assumed that 
technology and the society that brings it forth and uses it have 
many intricate relations. Terms like 'technological society' or 
'industrial society' are often used for the societies we live in. 
Since we are interested in the relation between technology and 
democracy, two as yet undefined notions, we have to consider to 
what extent democracy is influenced by technological 
developments, in which way it is stimulated or hindered. 
Secondly to what extent has technological research and 
development and its applications been limited or stimulated by 
democratic decision-making? 
The purpose of this exercise is to arrive at more or less concrete 
proposals about democratic control of technology. After a more 
general discussion I think it is interesting to look at a particular 
problem of our society, which is pushed to the fore by the 
applications of information technology and the use of computers: 
the problem of gathering and using information held about 
private individuals. 
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The registration of data about individuals was invented in our 
industrial society and is relatively new in history. The arguments 
in favour of it are many, but usually boil down to arguments 
about the improved possibility of distributing goods and services 
by governments and other organizations in mass-societies. With 
the advent of the welfare state this gathering of information has 
only increased. 
But not only beneficial effects can be attributed to this 
registration. We have already seen regimes in the twentieth 
century which have made wide abuse of personal data, without 
the use of computers. 
Numerous debates have been held about the problem of 'Big 
Brother'. In principle absolute control by the state is made 
possible because of the increased use of computers by 
governments. And this possibility is no longer fantasy. Where 
Orwell's book 1984 was some time ago a bad fantasy about 
perfect control of a government over the individual, it may now 
be realized with modern technology. 
In the face of the promises of great wealth, brought to us by 
modern technology and science, we can also see despair and fear. 
This fear, not only for technology but also inspired by the general 
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development of our societies, is to be taken seriously. It is a sign 
that technological developments are not under control and that 
undesired side-effects are being felt. 
Because of this possibility of destruction and complete control by 
an evil-minded government or even only an evil-minded part of 
a government or other organizations, the optimism about 
technology is diminished today. The importance of information 
technology is not confined to the use as an instrument of 
repression, and nuclear power is not the only danger for human 
life. Both have their 'right' applications or at the very least that 
potential. Decrease in the quality of life, in spite of possibly 
benevolent intentions, can be and sometimes is brought about by 
other quite diverse technologies. I will deal in later chapters with 
information technology especially because I perceive it as an 
issue. However, aside from a proposal for the establishment of an 
institution which can exercise control over large databases in 
relation to privacy and can assess the possibilities of information 
technology in that respect, the discussion about democratic 
control of technology and its applications may be taken as more 
general. 
Before I do this I would like to make some remarks about some 
views that are expressed by several writers about technology and 
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science and their effects for human life, society, etc. Then I will 
try to find definitions for the central notions I deal with. 
Technology is obviously in need of a definition, and so is the 
notion of 'ideology'. Not only is technology connected to our 
society in an productive or material sense, it is also connected in 
a non-material or 'ideological' sense. This means that our thought 
is somehow influenced by technological activities. But these 
statements are too vague to have a real meaning. Hence the 
need of definition. 
Although I cannot here fully deal with the question of to what 
extent science and technology can be seen as part of one and the 
same thing, it is a very important matter. An easy and 
unambiguous answer cannot be given, but a tendency can be 
seen. At least two levels need to be considered and explained, (i) 
the level of the individual scientist (or technologist) and (ii) the 
level of society where the results of scientific or technological 
practice are experienced, whether in industrial production or for 
the life of the citizen. 
The structure of the discussion will be as follows. 
First, I will discuss possible notions of technology in the rest of 
this chapter. Then, in chapter two, I will discuss in the light of 
16 
the notions that I adopt the theories of the Frankfurt School (i.e. 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas) concerning technology and 
ideology. In chapter three I want to use Habermas' discussion of 
technological reason and practical reason to find what elements 
in a technology are liberating and what elements are repressive. 
In order to give more than only general answers to these 
questions it will be necessary, in chapter four, to deal with 
democracy and how we can control technology in a democratic 
way. In chapter five I will discuss some current notions about 
privacy and personal freedom in connection with surveillance and 
dataprotection, and the remedies which are proposed by various 
writers. 
Given parliamentary democracy as it is experienced in the west 
I will devote chapter six to how in several countries technology 
is actually controlled. Then a technology which in my mind is 
exemplary in its possibilities of liberation and at the same time 
suppression, information technology will be discussed at greater 
length. 
Following this discussion I will, in chapter seven, make some 
proposals concerning the control of this particular technology and 
how it can be used in a way as to stimulate the democratic 
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process, enhance freedom of communication, free access of 
information for the citizen and to limit the possibilities of abuse. 
In chapter ten I will conclude and evaluate the discussion. 
1.2. A principal position. 
First of all I do not share the pessimism of many writers about 
our modern technological (or industrial) society. Writers like 
Marcuse, Ellul, Adorno and Horkheimer predict a dark future for 
humankind if nothing radical is done. Sometimes the prospect of 
a radical act is closed and we are left with the expectation of 
hell. 
I believe that when we are dealing with apparently undirected 
and unintended phenomena as a result of human activities, this 
does not mean that mankind will never be able to control these 
phenomena or at least check their undesirable effects. As in any 
development, human development is not without difficulties. 
Every heightening of powers goes along with loss and destruction 
of older accomplishments. This process can lead to crises as can 
clearly be seen for instance in human development when a child 
reaches the stage of adolescence. It strikes me that the expression 
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of bewilderment and a sometimes quite violent reaction to this 
state of mind has parallels in our society. 
The development of the collective powers of humanity through 
the development of science and technology coincides with a 
society where the human being finds him/herself an individual, 
basically alone and equipped with moral convictions which seem 
out of date and without value. This phenomenon of individuality 
in a negative sense (i.e. the individual without the experience of 
the group) and the despair that results from it is in my view also 
responsible for the deterministic theories which we have seen in 
philosophical and sociological literature. This determinism can be 
traced back to the theories of Marx and Engels (and of others 
in the nineteenth century, like Nietzsche) who observe that 
economic and social developments unfold behind the backs of 
people, capitalists and workers alike. For them, as we shall see 
later, this was not a reason to assume that humankind could not 
take its destiny in its own hands; on the contrary capitalist 
developments enhanced the forces of production in such a way 
that just this 'self-control' is possible. 
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1.3. Views on society and technology. 
It is interesting to observe that many critical studies about 
technology and industrial society claim a deterministic approach 
and yet have a tendency to talk about industrial society and 
technology as though they are the results of conscious choices 
(sorcerers apprentice).' 
The point of the discussion here is that there are autonomous 
social processes, and that the development of technology is 
among them. For many reasons, political and economic, the 
development of technology is and has been only partially subject 
to conscious control and so is scientific development. Saying that 
a process is autonomous is not a value judgement, it may be 
maintained that some mechanisms in human society have to be 
autonomous and that the attempt to control them will lead to 
disaster. The attempt to give direction to human destiny includes 
the judgement of what is to be controlled and to what extent. 
Althusser, who claims a Marxist viewpoint, asks the question 'Who or what makes 
history?' This, of course, will not do. It is the same question as 'Who or what makes life?' 
or 'Who or what makes the universe?'. They belong to that range of questions which in 
the positivist philosophy are categorized as meaningless, because no answer can be given, 
unless a religious position is taken. (In RArentz, cs. Was ist revolutiondrer Marxismus? 
Kontroverse ilber die Grundfragen Marxistischer Theorie zwischen Louis Althusser und John 
Lewis (What is Revolutionary Marxism? Controversy about the basic notions of Marxist 
Theory between Louis Althusser and John Lewis), in an article Antwort an John Lewis 
(Answer to John Lewis), p.47.) 
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Ellul says in his foreword to The Technological Society that he 
uses his deterministic view in a sociological way, because he 
believes that there is a 'collective sociological reality, which is 
independent of the individual'.2 Therefore the individual plays no 
role in Ellul's story. The individual is a 'bearer' not an 'agent' of 
society, as Althusser puts it. As far as I know the works of both 
Ellul and Althusser I can only say that these statements are 
axiomatic and do not rest on actual demonstration. 
Moreover, these theories take as a consequence a mechanistic 
form. Ellul thinks about social processes in terms of mechanisms, 
on a very large scale: 
Keeping in mind that sociological mechanisms are always 
significant determinants - of more or less significance - for the 
individual, I would maintain that we have moved from one set 
of determinants to another. The pressure of these mechanisms 
is today very great; they operate in increasingly wide areas and 
penetrate more and more deeply into human existence. Therein 
lies the specifically modern problem.3 
The above citation gives the impression that in earlier times 
mankind was less bound, more free. Though Ellul says that he 
does not want to give this impression, he nevertheless gives no 
analysis of the origin and growth of his sociological mechanisms.' 
It would be hard to deny determinism on logical grounds, because in the 
complexity of history it is difficult to isolate independent actions of the individual will. 
Elster gives a formal definition of determinism: "Determinism is the postulate that any 
event has a cause: a determinate set of causal antecedents that are jointly sufficient and 
individually necessary for its occurrence."(Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change, A Case 
Study in the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge 1983, p.27.) One of the main denials of 
(continued...) 
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It seems that part of the problem also lies with the notion of 
nature the structuralists, especially Ellul, have. EUul nowhere 
defines the notion of nature, but distinguishes nature from the 
human being and its products. There is the somewhat romantic 
pessimism of the human being who, as the erring sorcerer's 
apprentice, is intruding on the areas which were reserved for 
nature, and cannot stop what he has started after the desired 
tasks were magically completed. 
* 
(...continued) 
determinism is the theories of statistically random events and of objective indeterminacy. 
The first says that there is a "probability distribution over the range of possible outcomes". 
The second says that in some cases there are no probabilities to be ascertained. 
Dealing with causal explanation in the social sciences Elster continues by saying that the 
role of the individual in society is a pseudo-issue.(ibid., p.32-33.) For him it is only possible 
to explain society and history in terms of individual action, because it is individual action 
that 'determines' history and society. This issue may be important from another point of 
view. It may be that there is evidence that history cannot be influenced by the action of 
a single individual. Society may temporarily change its course but eventually return on its 
former course. "If society is stable in this sense, and if any action by an individual counts 
as a 'small* contribution, then the individual has no proper role in history." 
The theories put forward by the French structuralists (if we can use this term for a quite 
diverse group ranging from Althusser to Ellul) are then challenged to give a detailed 
explanation for each case they discuss of the 'dynamic stability' of social groups. Since the 
groups they are usually discussing are large and quite abstract entities like 'capitalist 
society' or 'technological society' it is difficult to show this kind of stability without 
postulating it as an axiom in the theory. 
If such demonstration can be given then we can predict future states of whole societies by 
using only macro-variables. According to Elster explaining macro-variables using macro-
variables, in most cases dealt with in the social sciences, is impossible. 
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1.4. Definitions. 
There are two ways to describe a concept. One is to give a new 
name to it in the hope that this new definition will point to a 
more precise characterization of the phenomenon or notion. The 
other is the use of the old term, perhaps extended in its original 
meaning. As an example of the first way of defining, EUul 
describes the 'old' term 'technology' as 'technique' which seems 
to be the organized aggregate of single techniques. I choose the 
other option. For technology this means that we rethink the 
notions behind it. 
Webster's Dictionary gives the following explanation of the word 
Technology: 
1. the science or study of the practical or industrial arts. 
2. the terms used in an science or an art, etc.; technical 
terminology. 
3. applied science.4 
The first two explanations are for us not very important but the 
third is. This explanation leads to what may be called the limited 
or classical definition of technology: 'Technology is the systematic 
arrangement and application on the basis of the natural sciences 
of manipulations and executions (techniques) in order to process 
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and control the raw materials delivered by nature and the 
phenomena which occur in nature, directed towards industrial 
production." 
Technology in this limited meaning occurs, except in some cases, 
only after the industrial revolution. A true combination of science 
and technology begins only at the end of the 19th century in the 
electrical and chemical industries. The early mechanization of 
industrial techniques (in contrast with the pre-industrial 'crafts') 
is autonomous in respect to the sciences (as separated from 
technology) and proceeds as a practical trial and error process. 
This situation took place in the first half of the 19th century. 
After this period the development of modern (natural) science 
and technology results in an intensification of the development 
of science. 
The notion of 'rationality' when applied to the understanding of 
technology indicates that the term 'technology' can be used in a 
non-physical sense. The earlier limited definition was about the 
physical or more direct aspect of technology. 
The more direct or physical aspect of technology points at the 
control of materials and equipment in order to reach certain 
goals in the form of products. This is the ability to control nature 
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in a strict material sense. It involves specialized knowledge of 
tools, properties of materials and methods of construction. This 
knowledge has become more complex more specialized and finds 
its application in mass production of goods, large projects like 
space-travel and helps greatly complex and subtle natural 
scientific research. 
This notion of technology is often taken for granted. And not 
without reason. Such a limited definition allows for the 
explanation of the role of techniques (or technology) play within 
a greater area, for example the economy. The economist 
Giovanni Dosi therefore defines technology as: 
...a set of pieces of knowledge, both directly 'practical' and 
'theoretical, know-how, methods, procedures, experience of 
successes and failures and also, of course, physical devices and 
equipment...Technology in this view, includes the 'perception' of 
a limited set of possible technological alternatives and of 
notional future developments.5 
This definition limits our attention to the process of strict 
technological development and research, because also these 
pieces of knowledge are straightforwardly directed to the 
manipulation of physical devices and equipment. Technology is, 
according to definitions like this, not immediately seen as 
integrated in society as such. It can be argued that defining 
technology on a broader basis gives rise to confusions and 
moreover would lead to definitions which lose the possibility of 
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fruitful explanation of technological developments and its effects 
on society. One of the objections against the broadening of the 
notion of technology is that it becomes vague and that explanans 
and explanandum cannot be separated clearly anymore. 
The narrow definition allows us to state the problem of 
technology in relation to society by separating, at least in 
principle, technology from society and treats them as two 
different things. It describes the work of technologists and how 
they achieve their goals. It leaves untouched the organizational 
and social basis of the practice of technology. 
Technology, however, is not only a set of pieces of knowledge in 
the service of material production. There are a number of aspects 
which do not immediately result in physical products but which 
are a condition to it. 
Thus the increasing manipulation of nature in an industrial 
production process demands more than knowledge about material 
things which is directly to be operationalized. It demands also the 
organization of the labour process. But not only that, such 
organization has large consequences for society. This means we 
have to attempt to widen our notion of technology, without 
making it all encompassing and hence useless. 
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This broad notion should not contain only the scientific- technical 
transformation of nature, but also the 'scientific' techniques of 
organization such as 'scientific management' and bureaucracy. 
Now it is possible to make a division between 'production 
technology' and 'organization technology'. The first is related to 
the 'real' labour process (the manipulation of nature) and the 
second to the relations of labour. 
In this sense it is possible to understand not only industrial 
organization but also bureaucratic or administrative organization 
as a form of technology. It is, so to say, a non-physical aspect of 
technological development. 
A possible objection against it is that such a notion would stretch 
the definition of technology too far. This definition is stretched 
especially because other elements than a straightforward 
purposive or means-end rationality come into play. Human 
organizations do not only exist in order to reach a formal goal 
but tend to live a life of themselves. Often there is a tendency of 
the leaders of these organizations to define new goals and other 
justifications for the existence of their 'bureaus' when the old 
goals have disappeared. Elements like 'power' and self-interest 
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play a great role in the formation and maintenance of institutions 
and organizations. 
But even when organizations are not fettered by the self-interest 
and desire for power of their leaders (and most likely other 
members), there is still the element of rigidity which is brought 
about by the formalism of their activities.6 This is most clear in 
administrations especially state or government organizations. But 
a certain amount of formalism is present in industrial or 
productive organisation. On the workfloor the work is not merely 
directed by the organization of work (Taylorism is always a 
popular example) but also by administrative considerations, 
perhaps to a lesser extent. The original goal, in some cases, may 
easily be displaced by the goal of formal conduct.* Then the 
organization becomes from a substantive point of view empty and 
hence inefficient. 
Against this it can be argued that in principle (ideal type) 
bureaucracy and administrative organizations are directed towards 
the control and organization of people, certain processes in 
In case of production we do not see this very often in the capitalist West. But it 
is common knowledge that it occurs very often in the Soviet Union and its satellites. 
There production is 'bureaucratized', in the bad meaning of the word, that the original goal 
of production units is replaced by formal goals. See for a detailed discussion, Voslensky, 
Michael S., Nomenklatura, Die herrschende Klasse der Sowjetunion, Vienna, 1980, especially 
ch. V, pp.229-261. 
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society and production. If they fail to respond to their substantive 
goals it can be said that we are dealing with an imperfect or 
sometimes altogether failing 'organization technology'. 
This means that the notion of 'nature' also has to be extended, 
to the human sphere. Technology can now be understood as a 
principle of control, though still as a principle of control of 'nature) 
including that part of nature which is human, society and the 
individual. 
To return to Ellul's pessimism about the interaction of man and 
nature, lies in an absolute division of nature and humankind 
which is, I believe, a mistake. It can only be made in terms of 
relationships, which is for instance, rightly made by Karl Marx 
and John Dewey. Mankind has to interact with a non-human 
environment, nature. This is not principally different from other 
life-forms. The only difference lies in the way mankind interacts 
with the non-human environment. The human being uses tools. 
Hence technology, also in the limited definition, is its mode of 
interaction. This interaction, granted, may be destructive for that 
environment but also beneficial. Symbiosis belongs still to the 
possibilities. 
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If we still want to keep a limited definition of technology, a 
destructive interaction with nature is not necessarily the result of 
a too much technology but may be the result of a too little 
technology. The whole issue of environment pollution, 
deforestation, etc., can be seen in the light of bad side effects of 
rather incomplete technologies. These technologies are the result 
of a limited view of the desired effects that they are supposed to 
have. 
In a further advanced technological society the view may develop 
that direct effects desired cannot be seen isolated and out of 
context of further effects on society and nature. Therefore the 
development of more advanced technologies without all kinds of 
side-effects together with social institutions deciding about their 
application would lead to more complete mastery of technology. 
This surely does not mean that when a certain technique is given 
up as unsatisfactory in a wider sense is actually admitting that 
technology itself has gone too far and that mankind has 
developed too much technology. 
Using the extended definition, the same can be said about the 
technology that we call social organization, the interaction with 
the environment which is human (internal nature), like division 
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of labour, existence of social classes, management and the 
influence of governments on society. 
Dictatorships, totalitarian regimes may be the result of a too 
much 'social technology' or a too little 'social technology' or an 
altogether failing technology which rests on wrong insights about 
human nature.* 
The control of organic and inorganic matter is important for 
production of commodities on the one hand and citizens in the 
state on the other. We arrive now at an important point 
concerning the question of how far we can extend our definition 
of technology. 
1.5. Rationality and the rationalization process. 
Max Weber developed a broader notion behind technological (or 
instrumental) thought as an aspect of western civilization. This 
broader notion is purposive or goal-rational thought and action. 
Purposive rational thought is a broader notion because: 
The above gives perhaps the impression that I think that all this can be objectively 
established. This is not the case. I merely want to signal a problem which is overlooked by 
Ellul and also by the writers of the Frankfurt school like Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) 
and others like Eugene Schwartz (1971) who wrote an influential book on the influence 
of science and technology on society appropriately called 'Overskill.' 
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a. it is the basis of technological-scientific thought in general and 
rooted in 
b. the philosophy of enlightenment which deals with scientific 
problems as well as with society. 
The notion of purposive rational action takes us towards an 
important historical discontinuity, industrialization, which at the 
same time embodies the rise of capitalism. Not only the 
organization and technique of the production process go through 
radical changes, but a totally new social, political and ideological 
superstructure comes into existence. This process of change, 
which embraces the whole of western society, begins already far 
before the industrial revolution. It was analyzed by Marx as the 
transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production. 
Weber used for this process the term "rationalization process". 
Production and labour previously took place under direct political 
rule which had to be legitimized ideologically. In modern 
capitalism it now becomes the domain of the self-regulating 
market. The new production system is no longer static but 
becomes dynamic. The dynamics of the ongoing growth of 
production, innovation and concentration, bring forth more and 
more problems on the social level and in relation to the 
conditions of accumulation, which can no longer be solved by the 
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market mechanism. This is why the period of late capitalism is 
accompanied by a growing intervention of the state. 
In early capitalism, at the beginning of the industrialization 
process (between 1820 and 1850), it is still possible to make a 
distinction between technology and the natural sciences on the 
one hand as examples of rationality and the free market and 
social institutions (the state in so far as it contains elements from 
a bygone age together with religious institutions) on the other. 
This distinction (made among others by Marx) does no longer 
apply for late capitalism. The process of rationalization has 
pervaded society beyond its strictly economic and scientific level, 
by entering the political and ideological levels. In the words of 
Lukacs: ...a society rationalized through and through 
(durchrationalisierte Gesellschaft).7 
1.6. Legitimation and Ideology. 
In order to be able to assess more specifically the impact of 
technology and science on society we have to consider some 
aspects of ideology and legitimation connected with the process 
of application of science and technology. We have already 
explored the ideological possibilities of technology earlier in this 
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chapter. Now a more in depth social and cultural analysis of its 
results is appropriate. In the next chapters I will then consider 
some theories about technological and scientific development, and 
its effects. Especially the thinkers of the Frankfurt School have 
devoted much thought to it. 
The traditional society knew a political domination which had to 
legitimate itself in terms of the interpretation of the 'good life', 
which beyond a Christian notion of duty is also used by the 
utilitarians in their notion of "the greatest good for the greatest 
number." Modern society with its self-regulating commodity 
production has a tendency of not needing goals and authorities 
to legitimate its political and economic organization. Productivity 
itself becomes the main legitimation, especially if this productivity 
also brings improvement of material welfare for the direct 
producers. The original basis of capitalism, the exploitation of the 
productive labour force, is affected by the process of 
technological development, as Marx predicted. 
Where technology becomes the crucial factor of production, a 
change in the relations of production (the relation labour and 
capital, or workers and machines) seems impossible without a 
change in the organization of science and technology. Those who 
pursue the socialization of the means of production cannot avoid 
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the problem of technology. It is obvious that this problem was 
still invisible to Marx in his analysis of pre-technological 
capitalism. In hindsight there remain a few gaps in the work of 
Marx in this respect. The class theory of Marx and his economic 
and political theories about the transition from capitalism to 
socialism are insufficient for an analysis of late capitalism. 
An important notion in the theories about the relation 'man and 
nature', 'labour and capital', 'classes and the development of 
production power', is alienation. Alienation as a result of the 
capability of the knowing subject to objectify is prevalent in the 
works of Hegel. Marx continues to use the notion of alienation 
by introducing the concept of alienated labour. Moreover he 
turns the Hegelian scheme upside down and states that alienated 
labour is the cause of alienation in general. This means that 
alienation in the production process pervades all layers and 
institutions of the bourgeois industrial society. 
Dewey does not go that far. Alienation is a notion remarkably 
absent in Dewey's work, although it is possible to formulate the 
ideal of pure science in terms of alienation, but then it is an 
alienation of the scientist from the society where his knowledge 
is used for class interests (see above). The effects of technology 
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for the lower classes Dewey does not discuss, certainly not in 
terms of alienated labour. 
Marx saw this alienated labour as a result of technological 
progress which in its turn is brought about by the division of 
labour. Alienation is not only destructive but also a precondition 
for future development of mankind. That is why the question 
whether or not industrial production is liberating, must be 
answered affirmatively according to the theories of Marx and 
Engels. Alienation as a result of the continuous rationalization is 
connected with the development of private property and political 
institutions in the form of the state or using a different term, the 
bureaucracy. 
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2. Technology in the Critical Theory. 
In my view the 'Frankfurt School'' stands as a model of a whole 
stream of technology critique which can be found on the 
European continent." It is a critique which tries to uncover the 
ideological aspects of science and technology, and which signals, 
because of this 'technological ideology' an impoverishment of 
thought and culture. 
This stress on ideology is important when we want to discuss the 
possibilities of democratic control of technology. If there is an 
unassailable ideology present which favours indiscriminate 
development and application of technology then the notion of 
control becomes meaningless. 
Before I depart on a discussion of the for this work important 
elements of thought in the Frankfurt school, I would like to 
make a few remarks about Marx and Engels. They are important 
because the Frankfurt School has the works of Marx and Engels 
The Frankfurt School (Frankfurter Schule) was founded in 1928 as the Institute 
for Social Research (Institut fur Sozialforschung). The most important thinkers of the 
Frankfurt School have been Max Horkheimer, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, Erich 
Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and their heir Jiirgen Habermas. 
This stream includes among others influential writers like Jacques Ellul and 
Michel Foucault. 
37 
as departing point. Further Marx and Engels stress the dynamics 
of what they call the capitalist mode of production in terms of 
technological development, aided by science, and the exploitation 
of labour, expressed in class-struggle. Marx even predicts in the 
Grundrisse that it is possible that labour gets replaced in a fully 
mechanized production. 8 
The development of capitalism has a number of effects. The first 
is that modern methods of production, i.e. division of labour and 
production planning, alienate the worker from his product, and 
also from his fellow worker. This alienation is, so to say the 
solidified effect in the working circumstances of modern industry, 
of the increasing individualism of capitalist society, with its liberal 
ideology. 
Nevertheless if a new society is going to come about, after 
capitalism, then it has to make use of the devlopments of 
capitalism. Marx uses the german word 'aufheben' which means 
at the same time, to abolish as 'to lift up to a higher level'. The 
at the same time abolished and uplifted capitalist society, makes 
use of fully developed methods of production which have to be 
industrial. It also gives the possibility for the human being to 
emancipate himself, and to become fully developed. This ideal of 
the fully developed human being is of extreme importance for the 
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thinkers of the Frankfurt School, who want to analyze, further 
than Marx, the inhibiting ideological consequences of modern 
industrial capitalist society, where science and technology seem to 
replace labour as the direct force of production. 
The interests of the Frankfurt School were, inspired by 
Horkheimer, directed towards a neo-hegelian interpretation of 
historical materialism. This resulted in the publication of studies 
in social philosophy. A social philosophy which, according to 
Horkheimer, should be undogmatic and not part of the search of 
one indubitable truth, should be a materialistic theory 'enriched' 
with empirical research. 
As with other marxist-inspired theories in the twentieth century,9 
the study of the 'superstructure' was stressed in the works of the 
thinkers of the Frankfurt school. They want to deal with the 
'superstructure' from within as a form of self-critique.10 The 
traditional politico-economic Marxist approach was considered 
insufficient as a basis for the explanation of the success of 
Fascism and Nazism and the conformism of the workers after the 
Second World War, especially in the United States. 
A re-orientation was based (i) on an integration of psychoanalysis 
and the relation man-nature and, (ii) the study of the role of the 
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development of the forces of production (in a Marxist sense) in 
western civilization as the main aspect of the development of the 
relation man-nature*. 
Horkheimer and Adorno observe that in the period after the 
First World War a polarization took place which urged 
intellectuals to take a position at the side of capitalism 
(Schumpeter and, notably after the Second World War, Popper) 
or at the side of communism (Lukacs). According to Horkheimer, 
neither direction gives sufficient opportunity for the development 
of a humane society. Taking a position implies that intellectual 
labour is made subject to politics. Horkheimer and Adorno 
separate themselves explicitly from taking an explicit position. 
Their political practice, as they themselves saw it, was the 
continuous critique of the modern industrial society. It is against 
The first can be found in the collective project 'Studies about Authority and 
Family' (Studien iiber Autoritat und Familie), which later resulted in 'Eros and Civilization' 
from Marcuse and the works of Fromm, and in their quite violent disagreement. Fromm 
denied the validity of the concept of 
'death-wish' (Thanatos) from Freud, although he agreed that Freud rightly placed the 
emotional drives outside social control. Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse found in the 
concept of the death-drive an expression of the destructive traits of modern man. Marcuse 
accused Fromm of entertaining the illusion that happiness is possible in present society. 
The second element can be found in The Dialectic of Enlightenment' (Dialektik der 
Aufklarung) from Horkheimer and Adorno and 'Minima Moralia' from Adorno. Both 
elements, however, penetrate the whole of the work of the Institute under the leadership 
of Horkheimer. 
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this background that they place the notion of 'theory as the only 
possible praxis'. In this chapter I will try to deal first with 
ideology in general then give an account of their contents in a 
sympathetic way. After that I will express my criticisms about 
them. 
2.1. Elements of Ideology. 
Very often the control over human beings is seen as a process 
that proceeds externally by force and internally via the 
internalised norms and behaviour patterns. The control over 
human beings as an external process does not require in this 
context more explanation. But the control over human beings 
through internalised norms and behaviour patterns does. 
It is the problem of ideology. Especially in Marxist and Marxist 
oriented studies the problem of ideology is seen in terms of 
control. It is the control of the ruling class over the proletariat. 
Elster in his Making Sense of Marx says about ideology in the 
Marxist sense the following: 
One ... definition is to consider the ideological as a function, 
more specifically the function of providing legitimacy for the 
existing state or affairs or of the rule of a given class... The 
ideological... would be the non-coercive equivalent of the 
political, if the latter is similarly functionally defined in terms of 
repression. This would enable one to speak, for instance, of the 
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"ideological functions" of the representative political system, 
which by creating an "appearance of independence" or a "safety-
valve" to let out steam, disguises the fact that it is basically a 
tool for the ruling class. Or again one might point to the 
ideological functions of the formal freedom of the worker under 
capitalism.11 
Ideology can mean much more than that. It can be explained in 
terms of the absence of beliefs, or as unconscious beliefs. As far 
as the absence of beliefs is concerned, we enter an area of 
endless speculation which can never be empirically checked. 
Taken to an extreme, an unconscious belief is a belief a person 
has but does not know about it. This is, according to Elster, 
clearly absurd. A belief is always known. But not so the reasons 
for the belief. It could be observed that, if a belief is always 
known one could list all his beliefs. This seems equally absurd. A 
belief is often nothing more than an assumption which becomes 
more clear when a person is confronted with a situation in which 
this assumption seems to apply. A technological orientation in 
society may be such an assumption, or give rise to assumptions 
or beliefs which explain the world in a technological or 
mechanistic way. 
I do not want to enter in a psychological discussion about it, 
since I lack the knowledge and expertise to do so. But it is 
possible to avoid this by calling the underlying reasons for a 
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belief, a meta-belief. With a meta-belief I mean a personal, 
psychological or social disposition which make that a person is 
likely to accept certain beliefs and to reject others. 
One of the first who attempted research in this area was 
Theodor Wisengrund Adorno, with his famous 'Berkeley-study'.12 
Ideology in this sense is not so much straightforward propaganda 
but an appeal to these meta-beliefs. An example of this is the 
Nazi-propaganda of the thirties and forties. They appealed to 
what can be called in a Freudian sense 'anal' personality traits. 
'Griindlichkeit', discipline, order and a higher calling for the 
German people were used in this propaganda.' The idea of a 
higher calling for the German people is clearly a belief which 
already existed before the Nazi-period. It was however not always 
present as a conscious belief but emerged, so to say, in people's 
consciousness from time to time. 
Elster remarks about ideology as unconscious beliefs or attitudes 
that 
this proposal is unappealing both on conceptual and 
methodological grounds. Conceptually, it does not seem to me 
that we have any clear notion of what it means to have an 
unconscious belief. Methodologically, the difficulties of finding 
out what beliefs people hold explicitly are so large that it would 
These aspects are of course not typical German. Aside from the 'higher calling* 
they are cherished attitudes in our society for many reasons, certainly not all evil. 
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be ill-advised to take on the further task of identifying their 
unconscious beliefs, assuming that we knew what we meant."13 
Technology as a basis for the formation of beliefs seems to be 
fruitful to explain what can be meant with the notion 
'unconscious beliefs' or better the unconscious formation of 
beliefs or assumptions about the world. Let us look, in this 
respect, at an example about information technology, namely 
computer games. Joseph Weizenbaum, a well known computer 
scientist writes in the preface to the Penguin edition of his book 
Computer Power and Human Reason the following about 
computer games: 
To understand the content of most computer games, one has 
only to sample the main stream of...television to know that it 
consists mainly of what would in German be called Unsinn, 
Bloedsinn, Wahnsinn, that is, nonsense, stupidity, and insanity. 
Inane so called situation comedies relieve the otherwise almost 
constant stream of violence... The mass of computer and arcade 
games present precisely the same fare translated, of course, to 
take advantage of the new medium. However, whereas the 
television viewer passively receives, the computer game player 
actively participates. In concrete terms, this means that, while 
the television viewer watches, say, U-boat commanders launch 
torpedos against "enemy" ships and shout with joy as their 
targets disappear beneath the waves, the computer game player 
launches torpedoes and himself experiences the thrill of the 
torpedo run. I almost wrote "the thrill of killing," and an 
important point hangs on this near slip of the pen: I dare say 
very few actual submarine captains experience killing in 
connection with pushing a button that initiates a torpedo's rush 
towards its target, nor do bombardiers in airplanes have that 
experience when they launch their bombs. Most human beings 
would be incapable of such actions if they were not able to 
maintain what physicians call a "clinical distance" from the 
ultimate consequence of their actions. A less euphemistic way 
of saying the same thing is that much intensive training in 
psychic numbing is required before an ordinary person can 
44 
launch torpedoes that sink ships or release bombs that vaporize 
people several miles below.14 
I believe that the observations have some significance for the 
notion of unconscious beliefs. By 'psychic numbing', a 
phenomenon which may be quite unintended certainly as far as 
the average citizen is concerned, the 'belief that ones actions 
have no direct harmful consequences for other human beings or 
that the ones harmed belong to an abstract 'enemy', is confirmed 
or fostered through these processes. I do not think that this 
'belief is an explicit conscious belief. I agree with Elster that the 
'unconscious' is hard to determine. But without actually saying 
what 'unconscious' exactly is, we may approach the problem from 
another viewpoint and say, at least, that the basis for beliefs is 
not necessarily wholly conscious. 
Again, I think that for the greatest part there is not necessarily 
even a conscious agent who tries on purpose to 'numb' people.* 
The companies selling for instance computer games may have no 
particular interest in establishing beliefs among the citizens. They 
It must be said that there are many computer games which are quite ingenious. 
Granted there are many of these games concerned with some form of warfare. They have 
lately (1988) become so advanced that they actually give some insight about the techniques 
of modern warfare. Without any accompanying understanding they may have the effects 
which Weizenbaum fears, but they may also enhance the average citizens understanding of 
certain aspects of what modern warfare is about, given the existence of accompanying 
information. 
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merely enter areas where they perceive a market.' One of these 
markets, be it a small market, are rehabilitation centers for 
handicapped children. Some computer games help them to 
develop their movement capabilities. 
I do not want to enter here in a full-fledged discussion of 
ideology in general." What is important, in my view, is that 
beliefs and attitudes of people can be influenced by the 'tools' or 
instruments they are using. In this sense technology influences 
human thought and beliefs, but does not do that in a way 
necessarily conscious for the subject. 
Especially important where the ideological role of technology is 
concerned is the concept of reification (verdinglichung), first used 
There exists a computer game called 'GUNSHIP* which is distributed by 
Microprose Corp. This game simulates, very cleverly, the behaviour of the McDonnel 
Douglas AH-64A Apache gunship helicopter. This helicopter is, so to say, an airborne tank, 
and can be used to destroy enemy tanks, bunkers, troops, etc. The battlefields that the 
player can use are Southeast Asia (Vietnam), Central America (Grenada, Nicaragua and 
Cuba), The Middle East (Lebanon) and finally Western Europe (To stop the red 
steamroller from the East). It leaves no doubt that someone who likes to play computer 
games also has to swallow quite a bit of what right-wing circles in the US believe about 
the world. 
An interest in high-tech and exciting colourful and flashing computer games provide a basis 
to plant a belief. The real rationale for it is not present and is nowhere to be found. There 
is the meta-belief or attitude about war-games. Usually it comes with the belief that, since 
it is a game, no-one will be hurt. The excitement may well be a reason for young people 
to be interested in a career in the armed forces. 
See Elster's Making Sense of Marx Ch. 8 for a quite complete discussion of 
Marxist ideology theory and possible objections against it. 
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by Lukacs. Lukacs uses the term 'reification' in History and Class-
Consciousness in order to denote the false consciousness of the 
bourgeoisie and consequently the proletariat. The bourgeoisie has 
no interest in understanding the nature of capitalism (crisis) and 
its own limitations in time. In the words of Kolakowski, reification 
occurs: "In a society which subordinates production entirely to 
the increase of exchange value, and in which relations between 
human beings are crystallized in object-values and themselves 
take on the character of objects."15 The concept of reification, 
as presented by Lukacs, is problematic because it is tied to class-
existence.' 
Weizenbaum signals a general mechanism which creates the 
illusion that technology is encompassing and cannot fail. 
[T]he belief that an otherwise faultless and probably 
enormously powerful technique is cramped by some single 
limitation tends to lead the devotee to put effort into removing 
that limitation. When this limitation seems to him to be 
entirely computational, and when a computer is offered to help 
remove it, he may well launch a program of intensive, time-
consuming "research" aimed simply at "computerizing" his 
technique. Such programs usually generate subproblems of a 
strictly computational nature that tend by virtue of their very 
magnitude, to increasingly dominate the task and, unless great 
care is taken to avoid it, to eventually become the center of 
attention. As ever more investment is made in cracking them, 
an illusion tends to grow that real work is done on the main 
problem. The poverty of the technique, if it is indeed impotent 
to deal with its presumed subject matter, is thus hidden behind 
a mountain of effort, much of which may well be successful in 
its own terms. But these are terms in a constructed context 
Kolakowski's discussion in his Main Currents of Marxism Part III, is quite complete 
in dealing with LukScs notion of reification. 
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that has no substantive overlap with, or even relationship to, 
the context determined by the problem to which the original 
technique is to be applied. The collection of subproblems 
together with the lore, jargon, and subtechniques which 
crystallized around them, becomes reified. The larger this 
collection is, and the more human energy has been invested in 
its creation, the more real it seems. And the harder the 
subproblems were to solve and the more technical success was 
gained in solving them, the more is the original technique 
fortified.16 
In this way technology may influence decision-making about 
technological applications for at least two reasons: 
1. technologies are maintained because of the large investments 
that have already gone into them. Giving them up is then costly 
and leads to the loss of prestige of their promoters. 2. They 
create their own world of thought (lore, jargon, etc.) where they 
can be successful in their own terms. 
The ideology of technology is not merely the result of the 
activities of a 'superstructure' but comes also very much from 
technological practice itself. If we look at Weizenbaum's analysis 
then we can make the distinction between 'cold' and 'hot' 
theories of cognitive causation. Elster uses this distinction in his 
Making Sense of Marx in order to find micro-foundations for the 
theory of ideology, something which he doesn't find in Marx. 
The 'hot' theory of attitude foundation and attitude change 
explains attitudes by some motivational or affective drive. The 
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'cold' theory explains distortions of attitudes by a number of 
failures in the cognitive development process. The 'hot' and the 
'cold' theories of attitude formation are respectively proposed by 
Leon Festinger and Amos Tversky.17 
In our case the use of the 'cold' theory is obvious. As far as the 
formation of attitudes and beliefs is concerned the use of, for 
instance, computers can in Weizenbaum's sense be explained with 
the 'cold' theory. The use of computers leads to a failure in the 
cognitive development process of human beings because it does 
not only strengthen their belief in techniques which, as all human 
creations, are fallible, but also strengthens their belief in the 
quantifiability of the world and everything in it, which is an 
aspect of reification/ This cognitive belief presents itself in 
...the tendency to believe that causal relations that are valid 
locally, or ceteris paribus, retain their validity when generalized 
to a wider context. More specifically, there is a natural cognitive 
tendency to believe that statements which are true from the 
point of view of any individual agent remain true when applied 
to the totality of all agents.18 
It remains to be seen if the influence of technology on human 
thought always works this way. I will deal with this in the 
following chapters. 
An example of a 'hot' element in the formation of attitudes can be found in the 
believe that the interests of the bourgeoisie contains the interests of all classes in capitalist 
society. It is for the bourgeoisie, according to Elster, an example of wishful thinking which 
constitutes a motivational drive. Ibid., p. 486. 
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I think that to connect these effects of technology on individual 
thought with the 'evil' intentions of the state in the service of a 
ruling class takes us perhaps too far. It would mean that there is 
a conscious design to influence the thoughts of citizens 
(belonging to one class or another). I do not believe that such 
designs are there. It may be so that the way science and 
technology are presented to us actually confirm the status quo. 
That means that the cognitive factors operate in an conserving 
way, but that remains to be seen. 
Cognitively based ideologies do not always operate to the 
benefit of the ruling classes. We may expect them to do so if 
the victim is an exploited class, but not when the exploiters 
themselves are subject to the same mechanism. Hence it is not 
true as a general proposition that ideologies - in the sense of 
beliefs derived from the interest or the position of the believer -
always work to the benefit of the economically dominant class 
and the existing relations of production of society.19 
Therefore Weizenbaum's belief that on the contrary modern 
technology (and science) work solely in the interest of ruling 
elites of classes (he is not very precise on this point) is not 
necessarily true. 
2.2. The roots of technological rationality. 
Two important books about technological rationality are 
Dialectics of Enlightenment and Eclipse of Reason. They are also 
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the main sources of inspiration the Frankfurt School, as 
mentioned above. Both works deal with the contradiction of a 
society where the philosophy of enlightenment is dominant and 
where the values of liberty and equality are considered as of 
supreme value. These values are not only considered in their 
political shape but also in the shape of a direct attack on 
inherited myths from earlier historical periods and religious 
ideologies.* The philosophy of enlightenment is also qualified by 
a strong ideology of progress. The ambivalence of the idea of 
progress, i.e. the coincidence of progress in the form of 
technological development with the increasing dehumanization of 
society is the subject of these studies. 
Horkheimer and Adorno want to de-mystify present society with 
enlightenment means. They state that they do not have any doubt 
that the attainment of freedom in society is inseparable from 
enlightenment thought.20 On the one hand they choose for a 
continuation of enlightenment thought and on the other hand 
they see in enlightenment thought and the institutions that are 
It is clear that the differences between the various enlightenment philosophers is 
discussed. Horkheimer and Adorno do not deal with the question if it is possible to use 
the term 'enlightenment philosophy' for a period (from the 16th till the 19th century) 
where a large variety of philosophical views were developed. On the whole they concentrate 
on what they see as the most important aspects of philosophical thought from this period, 
rationality, materialism, anti-clericalism, liberty and equality. 
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connected with it the roots of destructive forces in modern 
society. 
2.3. The notion of enlightenment. 
For Horkheimer and Adorno, enlightenment is the attempt to 
arrive at the de-mystification of the world. This can be reached 
by progressive thought in the sense that man realizes himself as 
'lord of creation' and in that process loses his fear of the world. 
It is progressive also in the sense that through the discovery of 
the secrets of nature practical knowledge can be accumulated 
which gives power over nature. The results are increasingly 
greater technical and communicative possibilities.21 The de-
mystification of the world is also the battle against animism which 
sees in every phenomenon a conscious force, like spirits and 
demons or the substance of gods. 
Contrary to these animistic thoughts, enlightenment is 
nominalistic. Utility and calculability without any illusions or 
delusions are essential in this.22 Enlightenment does not stop with 
the battle against mythology, but also devours her own children. 
Early 'enlightened' thinkers like Plato and Aristotle are 
disqualified because of the metaphysical basis of their thought. 
The more modern conflict of Universals, which takes place 
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between positivism and neo-thomism, will be dealt with later 
when we discuss the notion of rationality. 
The old myths are seen as anthropomorphic projections into 
nature.* The method of enlightenment is the proposition of 
general laws in which all particular phenomena are expressed, 
without connecting them to anthropomorphic qualities. Its 
instruments are formal logic and a quantitative way of 
explanation. That which is qualitatively unequal is reduced to 
abstract values, in such a way that it can be counted. This is 
what Horkheimer and Adorno call control by means of the 
equivalent. Equivalence is only an illusion because every 
reduction declares only a part of a phenomenon as true, only 
that part that lets itself to be counted. Control through 
equivalents presents itself in the bourgeois society in the form of 
the encompassing principle of exchange of goods, to which all 
human relations are tendentiously reduced. In this way a new 
mythology is created, the mythology of positivism. 
Nature is made objective. It is an objective that can be controlled 
by human beings, who at the same time are alienated from it. 
The control over nature is not only paid for with alienation. In 
These methodologies are in fact the products of the powerless of the unenlightened 
mind in the face of nature. 
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order to gain this control the organization of human beings is 
necessary. The price paid for this is that the human being is 
alienated from himself.23 
That which happens has no value in itself, the result is important 
and that only in repetition. The effect of quantification is 
equalization. This equalization under the dominance of the 
abstract turns everything in nature to something repeatable. 
According to Horkheimer and Adorno this last can be clearly 
seen in modern industrial production which is taken as a result 
of the enlightenment movement. 
Positivism has, as an aspect of enlightenment, like myths a tabu. 
It is the same tabu as the myths, because it is the thought that 
outside the myth there is nothing else to be found. The proposed 
description of reality is the only true description. 
2.4. Rationality as central to enlightenment. 
It follows from the above that enlightenment thought resists 
speculative, emotional and intuitive thought. Reason is the only 
means by which truth can be found. 
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Reason, however, is a broad notion. But an important part of 
reason is rationality. Arrived in this stage of his analysis, 
Horkheimer makes a distinction between means and ends, in his 
view respectively subjective and objective rationality. This 
distinction is comparable with the distinction between formal and 
material rationality which Weber introduces.24 The point for 
Horkheimer and Adorno is that nowadays objective rationality is 
sacrificed to subjective rationality. Ends are not any longer 
objective but the result of a conflict of interests.25 
The original sources of objective rationality, tradition and religion 
are replaced with a rational methodological philosophy. The 
Catholic and rationalistic philosophy agree as far as they see 
rationality as objective. Protestantism and empiricism deny this 
objectivity respectively through the doctrine of "Deus absconditus" 
and the implicit (later explicit) notion of empiricism that 
metaphysics is only concerned with pseudo-problems. According 
to Horkheimer and Adorno, with the philosophies of Berkeley 
and Hume the process of enlightenment has reached the stage 
where the notion of reason itself is disqualified. Notions like 
reason, spirit and cause are opposed by Berkeley and Hume 
because they express a kind of mythological meaning. 
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Traditionally the church was the institution which supplied social 
norms in every field of conduct, also in politics, and legitimated 
these norms by appealing to theology and revelation. Through 
the attack on religion Hume provides a basis for a rational 
theory of society. Kant extends the notions of Hume in a 
bourgeois ethical theory based on reason. This theory forms the 
rational foundation for the struggle between the bourgeois class 
and the feudal system. Kant, however, denies the skeptical 
conclusions of Hume, which imply the impossibility of a 
rationalistic metaphysics. 
The political implications from the rational metaphysics are 
nationalism in place of religion. This goes together with the 
emergence of private interest, the essence of the liberal ideology. 
The original principles of justice, happiness, democracy and 
private property serve as the rational basis of politics. Later the 
autonomy of reason disappears. Purposive rationality which puts 
the possibility to operationalize in the place of truth becomes the 
ruling principle. Language is reduced to a tool serving the 
intellectual element of production or the manipulation of the 
masses. Horkheimer and Adorno conclude that the connection 
between value and reason is severed. The only remaining 
authority is science, which rests on quantitative facts. Probability-
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accounting is the best example of this. Qualities in the sense of 
experience, meaning and sense are lost. 
Horkheimer and Adorno introduce Lukacs' notion of reification. 
All human activities and the results coming from it are reduced 
to commodities. Only things which generate income, like 
productive labour, are important and enjoy respect. In itself 
nothing has value. 
The philosophy which is the basis of this is pragmatism.* 
According to Horkheimer, pragmatism does not distinguish 
between facts which confirm a judgement and the steps necessary 
for arriving at a verification. Pragmatism is an a-historical 
philosophy, which means that the present meaning of a 
proposition and its future verification are treated as being equal. 
In pragmatist philosophy science and technology have value only 
when they contribute to the production process. This is so 
because pragmatism gives action an absolute value. The 
experiment is the only kind of experience which counts. That is 
why all thought is reduced to the doctrine of control of the 
natural sciences. The pragmatist philosophy is for Horkheimer 
and Adorno 'scientism' and that means that it is a combination 
Horkheimer and Adorno attack here Peirce, James and Dewey. 
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of industrialism and conformism.* The satisfaction of the subject 
becomes a criterion of truth. The contradiction between 
satisfaction and truth is denied. Dewey is taken as the example 
of this thought. Horkheimer thinks that Dewey identifies the 
fulfillment of the desires of the people with the highest 
aspirations of mankind.26 
Horkheimer and Adorno admit that Dewey also saw the 
possibility of distinguishing between subjective desires and 
objective desirability. It cannot be possible that the successful aim 
to satisfy subjective desires is the only measure of intelligence.27 
If not then the subjective formalized truth turns into stupidity, as 
Huxley in his novel Brave New World demonstrates clearly. For 
Horkheimer and Adorno, stereotypical ideas replace real thought. 
Thought reduced in this way and directed towards industrialism 
and conformism has lost its critical position in relation towards 
class-society. Aside from the socialist overtones this statement 
has, it follows that democratic control of technological 
development in industrial capitalism is not possible. 
Only specific forms of class-societies which are in contradiction 
with industrial production and the division of income necessary 
Horkheimer, ibid, p.56-7. 
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for an industrial society are rejected. Horkheimer and Adorno 
thought that a production apparatus functioning on the basis of 
private property together with an owning class is not in 
contradiction with pragmatism and with positivism and neo-
thomism. 
2.5. Alternatives. 
One of the points of departure of the Critical Theory, of which 
Horkheimer and Adorno were the most important 
representatives, is that it is neither possible nor desirable to 
present a picture of an alternative society. In this the Critical 
Theory is in line with the viewpoints of Marx, who also refused 
to give a recipe for the attainment of the communist society. The 
Critical Theory can and wants to point out only that what is 
wrong in the existing situation. This theme is adopted from the 
Old Testament: 'Do not make a picture of your God...' 
...we can describe the bad, but not the absolute right. People 
who live in this state of consciousness are related to the critical 
theory.28 
Political action is viewed with great reserve by Horkheimer and 
Adorno. The use of philosophy for purposes of propaganda is 
seen as bad, even when it happens with the best intentions. 
According to Horkheimer one can see philosophy as a 
commandment against commandments.29 
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The only honest praxis is for Horkheimer and Adorno theory, 
which by referring to things with their real names has to uncover 
the negative in the existing world, in the form of ideology 
critique. Philosophical theory, however, cannot realize the 
humanistic position, but can function as the memory and 
consciousness of mankind. In this form philosophy can be a 
corrective of history, 
...and thereby help to keep the course of humanity from 
resembling the meaningless round of the asylums inmate's 
recreation hour.30 
It is in any case essential that enlightenment thought becomes 
conscious of its own regressive moments. Therefore Horkheimer 
ends Eclipse of Reason with the following words: 
If by enlightenment and intellectual progress we mean the 
freeing of man from superstitious belief in evil forces, in demons 
and fairies, in blind fate - in short, the emancipation from fear -
then denunciation of what is currently called reason is the 
greatest service reason can render.31 
Although Horkheimer and Adorno do not recognize any absolute 
value they appeal to the old humanist and liberal values like 
liberty and equality. The supreme good for Horkheimer seems to 
be the independent thinking individual as "the consummation of 
a fully developed society".32 The disappearance of moral 
consciousness is for the critical theory a great evil. 
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Horkheimer distanciates himself from revolutionary action, in 
later works, as is demonstrated in the following citations: 
...after the downfall of national-socialism the revolution will 
become again a new terror, and lead to a terrible situation, in 
the countries of the west. It is more valid to maintain certain 
moments of culture, that what is to be valued, like for instance 
the autonomy of the single person, the meaning of the 
individual, his differentiated psychology, without loosing 
progress. 
The liberal ideology is apparently not valueless. The revolution 
would do away with liberal values and instead greatly arrest the 
growth of the individual.34 
Therefore radicals are not to be trusted. Their revolutionary 
perspectives make them blind to the possibilities that present day 
society still has.35 True revolutionaries are according to 
Horkheimer very close to conservatives.36 
The Dialectics of Enlightenment and Eclipse of Reason are the 
marks of a discontinuity in the critical theory. The work of the 
Institute for Social Research was inspired in the thirties by a 
belief in the eventual unification of critical theory and 
revolutionary practice. In both of the works, which appeared in 
the forties, this possibility is much doubted like the possibility of 
a synthesis of different established social-scientific disciplines.37 
The position taken by Horkheimer in 1970 can be seen as a 
consequence of this discontinuity. 
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Except the rehabilitation of humanist values (which are not to be 
turned into a system) and the prohibition of prohibitions, there 
are almost no practical indications in the works discussed here. 
It must be said, however, that the critical theory has had some 
political influence after the war. Especially Adorno has had an 
important part in the discussions about education in Germany 
and the conscious assimilation in it of the fascist past of 
Germany, through his pleas for 'education towards adulthood', 
although it is especially the fascist past of Germany that still 
poses problems to the German education system. Now, it is part 
of a critique of technology that exists on the European continent, 
and to an extent in the United States, in the writings of Joseph 
Weizenbaum, to whom I will return later. 
It is clear that, according to the critical theory, reification and the 
abuse of nature must be eliminated. Mankind has to reconcile 
nature and rationality.38 How this is to be realized is far from 
clear. Except in the case of the philosopher who should tell the 
truth and name that what is negative in society. Art and 
especially music, about which Adorno has written much, seems 
the only isolated realm where the reconciliation of nature and 
reason can come about.' 
* Ibid., p. 127. 
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2.6. Problems with the views of Horkheimer and Adorno. 
The central notions in the works of Horkheimer and Adorno are 
enlightenment and instrumental reason. Technology and science, 
the notions which are important for an analysis of the effects of 
information technology, are important elements of these 
encompassing notions. 
Human history can be seen as the battle of man against nature 
in order to gain his means of existence (in the broadest sense). 
Knowledge of the processes of nature and the art of the 
construction of tools are the means with which this battle can be 
fought. If mankind starts to control nature, the era of 
'enlightenment' begins as the liberation from the forces of nature. 
The process of the development of tools and the process of 
learning how to use them in the service of self-preservation is the 
process of the development of instrumental reason. The 
introduction of instrumental rationality is at the same time the 
introduction of the division of labour, of social differentiation. 
The first forms of this difference are democratic tribes who know 
'enlightenment' in the form of animistic mythologies directed by 
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'sorcerers' or 'medicine-men' (these could be seen as the organic* 
intellectuals of this form of existence). 
The next step is the transfer of animistic to religious mythologies, 
the emergence of the rule of priests. From the animistic 
pantheism, oligo-theism and mono-theism are developed. 
Monotheism in the form of Christianity plays an essential part in 
the rationalization of the 'western' world. The process of 
enlightenment is completed with the rise of modern science. 
In the place of spirits, gods and revelation the laws of nature are 
placed, which do not seem to have anything mysterious anymore. 
They are the fundaments of purposive-rational thought. Scientific 
thought starts in classical history and develops in the middle ages 
via the clergy, in order to come to full development in the age 
of capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century. It is promoted 
to one of the most important forces of production after the 
completion of the industrial revolution. 
Enlightenment thought makes short work of all mythologies, gods 
and metaphysical 'absoluta'. These pillars of tradition formed 
severe limitations for the development of capitalism. Capitalism 
recognizes only the rationality of capital-accumulation and 
This expression is used by Gramsci. 
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efficiency, the rationality of the individual oriented towards 
utility-maximizing, and destroys objective rationality. 
Liberalism still knew, as pioneer of capitalism, absolute values 
like liberty and justice. In the administrated capitalism of today, 
Horkheimer and Adorno do not see these values anymore, 
because the economic basis of the autonomous individual is lost. 
The increasing scale of the modern firm and the concentration 
of capital are for a large part responsible for this. It is 
remarkable that where Schumpeter sees the inevitable emergence 
of socialism, quite peacefully as a result of industrial 
bureaucratization, Horkheimer and Adorno see the continuation 
of a class-society and the downfall of true culture and morality.' 
As far as the continuation of capitalism is concerned Horkheimer 
and Adorno have been right and Schumpeter wrong. 
Instead of objective goals as measure of rationality the power-
struggle between powerful companies and states has become a 
determining factor. The result of this struggle is defined in 
rational terms. In this way the cycle of enlightenment is closed: 
enlightenment, which destroys myths, has become a myth itself. 
« 
It must be kept in mind that Schumpeter did not see socialism as particularly 
liberating. Perhaps on the contrary. But socialism would emerge as an indirect result of 
entrepreneurial activities and the consequent bureaucratization of the economic sphere. 
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In the name of reason productivity, wage-labour, efficiency, 
consumption and planning became the new gods of humanity. 
The control of nature and connected with it material welfare has 
cost the freedom of the individual and the alienation of man 
towards nature, according to Horkheimer and Adorno. The 
difficulty with this statement is that it implies the idea that 
mankind has known times in which there was more freedom and 
less alienation. This is very doubtful. It is clear that the rigid 
systems of belief in the middle-ages, which legitimized the feudal 
system, were not exactly very liberating. Ignorance, strong 
religious ideologies (stronger than almost any ideology today), 
held mankind, not only in the west, in its bonds. 
This observation does not absolve us from a critical evaluation of 
enlightenment thought, but the bleak picture painted by 
Horkheimer and Adorno, although they state in some places that 
their views are not, is very pessimistic and seems to endorse 
romantic conservative ideals which are, of course completely in 
line with Hegelian thought. As an example we can take the 
observation that the loss of individuality and the conformism of 
the individual (however this may sound contradictory) is the 
result of the disintegration of the family. This is set against the 
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compulsion to adaptation of the group, which starts in school, 
and becomes the most important mechanism of socialisation. 
In civilizations and places where the (extended) family is still 
most important we see that individualism is not very far 
developed and that it is just there that all kinds of religious and 
political ideologies reign unchecked. The only civilization that 
allows, at least in the 'democratic' countries, critique of itself is 
just western capitalism. It is exactly in these countries that 
individualism is not only an ideology but can be seen in reality 
among all the foolishness of 'shining white teeth' and deodorants. 
True, there is the ideology of checks and balances and pluralism, 
but in any case it potentially checks the emergence of totalitarian 
ideologies which also may be the result of what the thinkers of 
the Frankfurt school imply*. 
Enlightenment thought produces rational institutions like industry, 
universities and the modern state and the rational notion of 
science founded in formal logic. According to Horkheimer and 
See for instance the essay by Herbert Marcuse Repressive Tolerance (in Wolff, 
Barrington Moore jr. and Marcuse A Critique of Pure Tolerance Boston, 1970 [1969], p. 
120.) where Marcuse proposes the restraint of the liberties of 'the right' and intolerance 
towards the principles of bourgeois society in order to bring out true freedom. Whatever 
critique on bourgeois society there may be, to me this seems the exhortation of the devil 
with the help of Beelzebub. For it is necessary then to establish a dictatorship, a 
totalitarian system, which redefines freedom and forces everybody in the true 'humanistic' 
education (p. 122). 
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Adorno, the rationalization process destroys the traditional 
institutions and with it the traditional (mostly religious) values. 
The only orientation that is left for the individual is the value 
of self-preservation, i.e. adaptation to his environment. 
Subjective rationality is based on the positivist notion of science. 
This means that truth, towards which subjective rationality is 
oriented, is made equal to the application of a set of formal 
methodological rules on objects regarded as given. 
Horkheimer and Adorno try to make visible the suppression of 
the individual in productive labour as the product of social 
relations of power and legitimated as determined by technological 
necessity (based on scientific truth) of a centralized apparatus of 
production. 
It can be said that this is only partly true. Nowadays (1989) there 
are strong movements towards the decentralization of production, 
made possible of exactly this technology based on scientific truth 
(development of micro-electronics and computers which give 
possibilities to small specialized firms and also the production of 
necessary goods on a smaller scale). This does not mean that the 
worker is through this liberated from the treadmill of capitalist 
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production, but a large part of the alienation of labour is and 
will be reversed through this process. 
In the sphere of consumption, in as well as material as cultural 
consumption, the seeming freedom of choice gives a false feeling 
of individuality, which compensates the objectification, reification 
and atomization of production. Again there is much to be said in 
favour of the analysis of Horkheimer and Adorno, but again it 
is only very partially true. It is true of the soulless television 
series that for instance show us the life of decadent Texas oil 
families, or unrealistic police adventures against criminals and 
communists. But on the other hand a BBC Shakespeare play may 
open a rich world for those who have never encountered 
Shakespeare before. Again technology opens possibilities of 
choice to an extent that conformist ideology is no longer in 
control of all channels of mass-media (like local radio and TV-
networks which often give access to critical groups, like squatters 
in The Netherlands, Greens in Germany, Communists in Italy, 
etc.). The attempt to control them in western democracies proves 
to be an exercise that is too expensive for the establishment. It 
remains true that there is no direct contact between producers 
and public, which exists in the theatre, but to me this alienation 
is a small price to pay, especially when theatres are still 
accessible. 
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Adorno tries to analyse culture industry with the aid of the 
Marxian theory of the fetish-character of commodities. According 
to Habermas the Marxian tools of the labour-value theory are 
not valid for the analysis of mass-media. These tools do not 
replace the commodity of communicative conduct but are a one-
way medium.39 
The general objection against the Dialectics of Enlightenment 
and Eclipse of Reason is that neither of these works is based on 
a true historical analysis of social developments. On the basis of 
partly theoretical interpretation of the development of 
enlightenment thought, the authors give a totalitarian view of the 
development of late-capitalist social relations. 
The chapter about the culture industry is very much a product of 
the period shortly after the war. The rightly signalled problems 
are made absolute. It is not true that our era is only an era of 
degeneration in relation to other periods. It is also not very likely 
that earlier periods had higher cultural standards than ours. 
So called 'higher' culture has not disappeared, but has become 
incomparably more accessible than ever before, and is 
undoubtedly enjoyed by more people: while it is highly 
unconvincing to argue that its dramatic formal changes in the 
twentieth century are all explicable by the domination of 
exchange-value.40 
70 
So, what misery the dialectics of enlightenment has brought us, 
if we have to believe Horkheimer and Adorno! The hopelessness 
of the situation as they see it is expressed in an aphorism of 
Adorno: "The whole is that which is false".41 
Some years after the Second World War he writes: 
After thousands of years of enlightenment panic is released over 
mankind , whose control over nature as the control over man, 
leaves behind the horror of what people have to fear from 
nature.42 
These lines express the horrifying experience of fascism and total 
war, which has a central place in the works of Horkheimer and 
Adorno. Fascism is not seen as an exception but as the direct 
result of enlightenment thought. This traumatic experience does 
not leave much room for a real analysis of the rise of 
totalitarianism, hence for the development of possible remedies. 
The absolute pessimism of Horkheimer and more so of Adorno 
is expressed in statements that laughter is, or has become, false. 
That laughter is a deception, an expression of a false society.' 
The critical theory, we can find it back again in Marcuse, 
implicitly forbids enjoyment, happiness and feelings of satisfaction. 
The monk Jorge in // Nome delta Rosa from Umberto Eco defends very much the 
same position. But this position is placed in the light of the true faith, which regards the 
world as a vale of tears where only religious devotion, for those who know, but not 
laughter has a place. 
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These emotions are the products of a false society, they mean 
that the one who feels them agrees with this society. 
The implication is that mass-culture has entered the innermost 
thoughts of the subject. If that is true, then there is no hope. It 
is exactly because of this that Lukacs invented the name 'Hotel 
Abgrund'. 
In our period industrial man is clearly re-evaluating his own 
society. The values of commercials, propaganda and ideology are 
not anymore accepted without criticism, both in industrialized 
capitalist and the once communist countries. The citizen has 
discovered that in some respects he is not free and becomes 
disobedient. These possibilities are entirely overlooked by 
Horkheimer and Adorno, in their very elitist considerations. 
Together with De Sade and Nietzsche they did not see that 
bourgeois society can summon other forces more rational than 
itself in the sense of the realization of alternatives forces which 
attempt to lift reason to a higher level. The bourgeois society has 
room for all kinds of forces not specifically tied with the interests 
of industry and bureaucracy. Therefore their critique of 
pragmatism is wrong. The thought that pragmatism identifies 
truth and satisfaction is plainly not true. Dewey, and also his 
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predecessors Peirce and James, have never stated such a thing 
and neither does it follow from their theories.* 
Through the ever increasing stream of information which can be 
freely generated, and is generated by those who take an interest 
in the fate of mankind, people can be influenced to act in favour 
of the preservation of life, for the enhancement of development 
of the individual but also of whole groups or countries. This 
potential is demonstrated quite often, paradoxically by using 
sometimes the same advertisement techniques as industry uses. 
This is not contrary to pragmatist views, on the contrary it can 
be argued that it is the right use of these techniques. 
* 
What is true is that they, especially John Dewey, have propagated a rational 
development of technology and also of society as a whole by means of rational and 
scientific methods. One can criticize this by saying with Horkheimer and Adorno that this 
leads to reduction of consciousness about society in particular and human life in general. 
Nevertheless, it can also be argued that science and technology have so far been successful 
as forces of production. The only thing Dewey wants to do is to use these forces to 
eliminate poverty and ignorance. If that is an evil goal what is it that Horkheimer and 
Adorno want? 
What Dewey shared with the Marxists was their critique of capitalism, though on different 
grounds. Certain parallels between the works of Marx and Dewey may be drawn. However, 
the style of Dewey's works is less polemic. On the one side his work expresses the strong 
conviction that 'negation for the sake of negation' is in the long run not sensible. Which 
is not the same as saying that 'negation of negation', a phenomenon in positivism much 
criticized by the Frankfurt School, takes place. 
Dewey does not present a blueprint for a future society, but states that education may help 
to establish the necessary consciousness needed for the construction of a better society. 
Science and technology are the instruments through which this can happen, but the attitude 
which determines the use of them is more than science only. John Dewey Experience and 
Nature (1925), in The Later Works, 1925-1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale, III., 
1981, p.28. 
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These forces could be the drive to self-preservation in a higher 
sense. The arguments used for mobilizing the population for 
altruistic goals are for a large part moral. Only a small part of 
the considerations to act or help are inspired by selfishness. 
Reason which is also the basis of thoughts about alternatives is 
possibly closer tied to morality than with its elimination. 
I have dealt with Horkheimer and Adorno because they are seen 
by many, not only philosophers and social scientists but also 
others as we shall see later, as important in relation to the 
problem of technology and society. And it can be rightly 
maintained that they point at dangers concerning this problem. 
The whole discussion shows however a disastrous lack of practical 
proposals. Horkheimer and Adorno recognize this, but choose to 
be only abstract and theoretical. In order to do something about 
the control of technology and its use for the benefit of mankind 
we have to look at a lower level of abstraction in order to arrive 
eventually at policy proposals. 
Before we do that let us first look at a more pragmatical 
oriented thinker, Jiirgen Habermas. I believe that his thought 
about technology and society give possibilities for a critical 
discussion which may give us clues as to what kind or use of 
74 
technology is beneficial and increases human possibilities and 
control and which not. 
2.7. Habermas and the Ideology of Science and Technology. 
The latest representative of the Frankfurt School is Jiirgen 
Habermas. His views have been and are still influential in the 
field of technology and society. That is why I think that it is 
necessary to deal with his views, especially because they have 
consequences for the later discussion of privacy, democracy and 
the use of information technology. 
2.8. Rationality as political power. 
Habermas takes position against Marcuse" who thinks that a new 
constellation in relation to the forces of production is established: 
Scientific thought leaves the critical standpoint it had in relation 
to the legitimation of the relations of production and becomes 
itself the basis for as new legitimation. 
In order to explain Habermas's views on rationality, science and technology, a 
brief discussion of Marcusc's theories is necessary. Habermas has developed much of his 
thought in a critical discussion with the works of Marcuse. The theories of Marcuse are 
important because he developed and in certain cases restated the theories of Horkheimer 
and Adorno. Habermas is of interest as a contemporary thinker who tries to develop the 
tradition of Horkheimer and Adorno via the theories of Marcuse. 
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Science and technology penetrate subconsciously and unintended 
thought and conduct in society.* 
Habermas objects that Marcuse is not only aiming at a new 
theory of science but a fundamentally different methodology of 
science. This new science should then not be placed in the 
functional cycle of instrumental conduct. Then a new rule should 
be established which is not repressive but liberating. This 
alternative science contains a new technology which is not 
instrumental. This can only happen, when science is not a single 
historical project, in which only one design is possible. For 
Habermas it is clear that, even if technology can be based on a 
design, it must be based on a project of. the human race as a 
whole and not on which can be superseded historically.43 
Marcuse, developing the thoughts of Horkheimer and Adorno, states that the 
process of rationalization in Weber's formulation is not rationality in general, but a specific 
form of political power. The notion of technological reason is itself ideology. Or, in other 
words: it is not that the application of technology is a sign of power, but technology itself 
is power. Technology is a socio-historical project. In it takes place the projection of what 
society, and the dominant groups in it, wants to do with people and things. 
The existing relations of production and their development are presented as a 
technologically necessary form of organization of a rational society. In this we see the 
double aspect of Weber's notion of rationality, (i) On the one hand rationality is nothing 
more than the critical measure of the situation of the forces of production. Through this 
critical measure historically backward relations of production can be eliminated. These 
relations of production are experienced as an objectively superfluous form of repression like 
feudal relations, slavery, etc. (ii) At the same time rationality functions as the apologetic 
measure with which the same relations of production can be legitimized in an institutional 
framework (The process of rationalization signalled by Weber is not only the process of 
change of social structures but also rationalization in the sense of Freud: a cover-up of the 
real motive, i.e. the maintenance of an objectively old-fashioned rule). See Herbert Marcuse 
One Dimensional Man, Boston 1964, p.157/8. 
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Marcuse wants to de-objectify nature, which means that nature 
is attributed with subjectivity and is therefore endowed with the 
possibility of communication. This view presupposes an organic 
view of society and an implicit integration with nature. The unity 
that humankind has with nature makes that communication within 
the human race, is at the same time communication with nature 
as a whole. The present state of affairs is marked by a restraint 
of communication and so by the impossibility to communicate 
fully with nature44 
What is concerned here, is a totally different structure of 
conduct, symbolic interaction, differentiations of purposive 
rational action. Both designs are projections of speech and 
labour, projects of the whole of mankind not based on the class-
interests of a certain period, which is transitory. 
A new science and technology are difficult to imagine because, 
like the old science and technology, they have to have a possible 
application. In other words they have to be operationalized to a 
certain extent. The difficulty is that Marcuse does not show what 
it means that the rational shape of science and technology - i.e. 
the rationality which expresses itself in systems of purposive 
rational conduct - extends itself to the historical rationality of a 
life-world. 
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2.9. The notion of rationality extended. 
We find in the works of Habermas a more precise description of 
the notion of rationality, especially in relation to the works of 
Weber and of modern theories like game theory and decision 
theory. Technological and scientific conduct is placed in relation 
to these ideas. 
Habermas uses the notion of rationality from Weber. He 
distinguishes two levels: 
1. Rationality as conduct in economics, civil law and in 
bureaucracy. In this respect one can see a growth of that domain 
of society which is controlled by the standards of rational 
decision-making. The central problem is that as a result of 
industrialization, instrumental conduct penetrates other parts of 
life. 
2. Social planning which is directed towards the establishment, 
improvement and extension of the systems of purposive-rational 
thought itself. 
On both levels the organization of means and the choice of 
alternatives in relation to ends is essential. In general one can say 
that, when technology and science establish themselves in society, 
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the old ideologies disappear. Secularization and de-mystification 
are result of a growing rationality of social conduct. 
Habermas discusses in his book Theorie und Praxis the relation of 
theory and practice in the European philosophical tradition.45 He 
distinguishes four levels of rationalization46: 
1. On the most elementary level, technological rationality in the 
strictest sense, techniques provided by science are used for the 
attainment of specific goals. Instrumental activity is rational 
insofar as it deals with the organization of means guided by 
technical rules based on technological knowledge. The 
information which is supplied by empirical science in the shape 
of laws is put in the place of traditional moral criteria and the 
rules which are developed in an unsystematic way in the arts and 
crafts. 
On this level Habermas approaches what I called the restricted 
definition of technology. In the same time the connection 
between technology and the production process is made clear in 
the sense of the relation man-nature. There are methods to 
realize the material control over nature based on the natural 
sciences. The further elaboration of this is consummated at the 
higher levels. 
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2. When a choice has to be made between two or more 
technically equal alternatives, we need a higher level of 
rationality. Decision-making theory clarifies the relation between 
alternative techniques, and given goals on the one hand and 
value-systems and decision-rules on the other hand. It analyses in 
a normative way the possible choices from the viewpoint of a 
rationality determined by 'efficiency' of the choice. What is 
important is that what is concerned here is the form or shape of 
a decision not its essential cohesion and the factual results. 
Values are no longer subject of discussion, because the discussion 
does not take place on the level of the establishment of a 
collective system of values by means of reason based on 
consensus, but through compromises or the combination of wishes 
and alternatives. Such a practice is related to the process of 
political decision-making in late-capitalism. For Habermas this 
demonstrates aspects of organization and rule in late-capitalism 
as we shall see later. 
3. The third level is concerned with strategical situations. In such 
a situation there are two opponents whose relation is rational (in 
the sense of the definition of interests and goals and the means 
to defend these interests and attain these goals) and whose 
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conduct is supposed to be rational. Both partners act from 
opposite interests and their relation is one of competition. 
This situation requires an even further rationalization. The 
conduct of the opponent cannot be predicted according to the 
laws of nature. Furthermore, there is always scarcity of 
information. 
Game-theory explains the strategies which can bring this situation 
under control. Habermas, however, is not so much interested in 
the game-theoretical solutions of the problem, but in the 
technical compulsion that is internally determined by it and 
influences value-systems. The value-systems that remained out of 
consideration on the first two levels are now made relative in 
terms of the supreme level of self-maintenance. 
4. The fourth level is concerned with the concept of a self-
regulating (cybernetic) organization of society. Habermas sees this 
as the highest expression of technological consciousness. The task 
of decision-making is then transferred to a machine. This stage 
has not yet occurred, and I think that it can occur only in a 
limited sense, when routine decisions are to be made. 
For Habermas this is a negative Utopia in which man not only 
objectifies himself, but integrates himself in his own technical 
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apparatus. Could we interpret this situation as a negative solution 
of the problem of thought and being? The decision making 
processes and possibly 'thought' about the direction in which 
society is to go, i.e. a parodie of moral thought when done by 
machines, is then left to automatons. The integration of human 
society and decision making mechanisms is the result. 
The traditional picture of a society as a system of interaction 
between human beings who consciously organize their lives by 
means of communication, is replaced by the instinctive or 
automatic self-stabilization of social systems, in which political 
consciousness has become superfluous.47 Such rational rule is not 
identical with the practical problems that history puts before us. 
It is the unlikely supposition which says that there is a rational 
continuum of possible technological control over objective 
processes directed towards a practical control of historical 
processes. 
The irrationality of history is founded on the fact that we 
'make' it, without being able until now to make it consciously. 
A rationalization of history cannot take place through people 
who manipulate the extended powers or control, but will be 
promoted by a higher level of reflection, a higher level which 
can be developed in the emancipation of the consciousness of 
acting people. 
This unconscious development of rationalised institutions in an 
irrational society is a result of technological rationality which 
influences the industrial society. Max Weber has tried to clarify 
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through the notion of rationality the influence of scientific and 
technological progress on the institutional frameworks of societies 
who find themselves in a 'process of modernization'. 
In capitalism we see institutionalized self-regulating economic 
growth. It brought about industrialization which is detached from 
the institutional framework of society and connected with other 
mechanisms, like the use of capital in a private form. The new 
aspect is not technology and the connected purposive-rational 
subsystems, but the destruction of the legitimizing framework of 
the (traditional) highly developed cultures. A legitimation is 
offered which is no longer idealistic, but arises from the basis of 
social labour itself. 
Traditional society was marked by immediate political rule. In the 
capitalist mode of production the institutional framework is not 
primarily connected with politics, but with economics. The 
ordering of property is legitimized by the rationality of the 
market and the ideology of exchange, it is transferred from a 
political relation to a relation of production. 
The superiority of capitalism consists of the existence of an 
economic mechanism which in the long term takes care of the 
extension of purposive-rational subsystems and provides 
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legitimation under which the system of rule can be adapted to 
the demands of the purposive-rational subsystems. It is this 
process of adaptation that Weber calls rationalization* 
Modern science expresses a knowledge that is technologically 
applicable, although the amalgamation with technology is not 
immediate, but took place at the end of the 19th century. 
Modern science has not contributed directly to the process of 
rationalization but indirectly. The new natural sciences have a 
philosophical meaning which defines nature and society as 
complementary to the natural sciences. This definition induced 
the mechanistic world-view of the 17th century. In this way the 
reconstruction of the classical concept of natural law was 
established, which destroyed the old forms of legitimation. 
Since the end of the 19th century we can see two movements in 
the developed capitalist countries: 
1. an increasing level of state intervention, which has to 
ensure the stability of the social system. 
Habermas distinguishes two tendencies: 
1. Rationalization from below, that is to say the organization of labour and economic 
traffic, rationalization of the bureaucracy and the state. 
2. Rationalization from above, which is the secularization of the world-view. Metaphysical, 
mystical and religious world-views lose their power when exposed to the criticisms of 
scientific thought which takes over the legitimation of society. 
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2. an increasing mutual dependence of scientific and 
technological research, by which science becomes the most 
important force of production. 
The result of the increasing state intervention is that the 
institutional framework of society is politicized. Politics is because 
of that tied to the economic level by means of this institutional 
framework and stops being simply a superstructure phenomenon. 
All this is contrary to early capitalism with its liberal ideology, 
which maintains that the state should remain on its own area of 
competence. The 'basis-superstructure' thesis of Marx can be 
seen as a criticism, in the form of a critique of political economy, 
of the situation of early capitalism. The theory of Marx was a 
criticism of the bourgeois ideology of equal exchange. Today this 
ideology is not valid any more, and this invalidates the theory 
which criticizes domination through the relations of production 
by means of the forces of production. State intervention throught 
its institutional framework has penetrated economic relations, 
where before the state tried to stay away from the economic 
level as much as possible. Now domination is exercised by means 
of a complex interaction of the institutional framework of the 
state and the forces of production, a domination which is not 
merely expressed in relations of production. 
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Another ideology is necessary now the liberal ideology is no 
longer valid, an ideology which takes into account the interest of 
a dominion in a system of capitalism regulated by the state. 
Because of the formally democratic character of this capitalism 
it is not possible to bring back the pre-bourgeois traditions. That 
is why the ideology of free exchange is replaced by a substitution-
program which as far as social results is concerned is not any 
more based on the institution of the market, but is oriented 
towards the state. The state tries to compensate the 
malfunctioning of the free traffic of exchange. 
These substitution programs are directed towards guaranteeing of 
the private form of the use of capital and to tie the loyalties of 
the masses to this form. Politics assumes a negative character 
because the state is directed towards the stabilization of the 
economic system. It is not the attainment of practical results, but 
the solutions for technological problems which are the main 
issues (especially the avoidance of stability problems). 
The solution of technical instead of practical problems is not 
dependent on public discussion. Public discussion can at the most 
decide about fringe problems. The new politics of state 
intervention needs the de-politicization of the masses, because in 
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so far as the expression of practical questions lasts public 
discussion becomes for the state useless, even dangerous. 
According to Marcuse, the de-politicization of the masses is made 
plausible because science and technology take over the role of 
ideology. 
The internal laws of the quasi-autonomous progress of science 
and technology, produce a framework of (im-)possibilities to 
which a politics which respond to functional needs has to orient 
itself. If this illusion has put itself in motion it can clarify the role 
of science and technology, in a propagandistic way. It can also 
legitimize the loss of the democratic process's function in relation 
to practical questions, and has to be replaced by plebiscitary 
decisions about policy-alternatives. 
The system of late-capitalism is characterized by the fact of the 
hiding of contradictions between classes. This is done by giving 
the lower classes more to lose than merely their chains. 
Habermas calls this the policy of avoidance of conflict.* At any 
rate the main aspects of capitalism remain untouched. 
One can, of course, also say that finally a society emerges that actively takes away, 
at least in one country, severe deprivation and poverty. It can be maintained that capitalism 
cannot exist when no new markets can be opened and old markets be extended, because 
of poverty. The state in late capitalism ensures, for a number of reasons among which 
ethical reasons, that a certain redistribution of wealth takes place so that capitalism can 
open and extent markets. 
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Habermas signals a paradoxical situation. Open conflicts about 
social interests present themselves more easily to the extent that 
they are less threatening for the system. Contradictions are not 
presented any more as class antagonisms, but let themselves be 
explained still as results of the dominant process of private-
economical use of capital. It is indeed the case that there is a 
tendency to invest in modern means of production and military 
equipment than in the organization of traffic, health-care and 
education. 
The avoidance of dangers for the late-capitalist system by a 
system of rule excludes 'rule' in the sense of social rule brought 
about immediately on the political or economic level, in the sense 
that a 'class-subject' approaches the others as a visible group. 
This does not contain the abolition of class-contradictions, but 
the latency of them. This also does not mean that there is no 
combined conflict-potential in relation to under-privileged groups. 
The conflicts emerging in this respect summon reactions which 
are insoluble by formal democratic means, but the system remains 
unchanged. Underprivileged groups are not social classes and do 
not represent the largest part of the population. Their poverty is 
not any more the result of direct exploitation. On the level of 
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under-privileging economic interests are replaced by politico-
military interests. 
The technological-scientific ideology is less susceptible to 
reflection and criticism, because it is not only an ideology. It has 
become a transparent background ideology (glazerne hintergrund 
Ideologic), which tries to turn science into a fetish, more 
irresistible and far-reaching than the old ideologies. That is why 
it settles better in the consciousness of the masses. It takes care 
of the emergence of self-objectivation. The reified models of the 
sciences penetrate the socio-cultural life-world and get the self-
evidence of an objective power. Practice and technology are no 
longer distinguished. As far as interaction is concerned an 
important matter is threatened, i.e. language or communication 
through speech. These interests includes the keeping of inter-
subjectivity and the establishment of communication free of 
restraints. Technological consciousness abandons these interests 
in favour of technological power of control. 
For Habermas, the process of growth and rationalization of the 
forces of production can only be a potential of liberation, if it 
replaces rationalization on another level. The rationalization on 
the level of the institutional framework can only be brought about 
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by means of the medium of language, i.e. by the elimination of the 
restraints of communication. 
Public unlimited communication free of restraints about the 
extent and desirability of conduct-oriented basic rules and norms 
related to the progressing subsystems of purposive-rational 
conduct on all levels of political discourse is the only medium 
that can be truly rationalized. It is a rationalization characterized 
by a decreasing level of repression, rigidity and the recognition 
of values accessible to reflection. 
2.10. Evaluation. 
The works of Habermas contain alternatively clear elements and 
statements and very obscure parts stated in a difficult language. 
No doubt part of the discussion of the works of Habermas is 
complicated because of this. It seems that there is more than one 
possible interpretation of his work. 
A central point seems to be that Habermas signals that the 
individual is burdened with a pattern of thought which he 
receives from the ongoing rationalization of society and which 
deflects his attention from practical and substantive problems. 
This is not a conscious process. The influence of science and 
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technology as ideology is very subtle. Habermas therefore speaks 
about an transparent background ideology. 
Intentionality is not present, on the contrary Habermas tries to 
explain why it cannot be present. However, the point for 
Habermas is that the result of real emancipation is exactly this 
absent intentionality expressed in free communication. Free 
communication results in a higher form of reflection (see above) 
which attempts to change irrational history into a rational 
process. Free communication has to bring about this higher form 
of reflection which is intentional. But how is intentionality be 
brought about when it is just demonstrated that it cannot be 
present? 
The way in which Habermas tackles the problem of technology 
and science is by means of epistemological critique of the current 
scientific, and social-philosophical theories. He tries to show that 
a part of these theories, i.e. the positivist philosophy, is part of 
the argumentation which is used to legitimize decisions on a 
social level. Their function is twofold: 
1. the presentation of the purposive-rational desires of actors in 
the late-capitalist system and, 
2. the covering up of the irrational elements in it. 
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For Habermas it is clear, as it is for Horkheimer and Adorno, 
that the roots of bourgeois thought are to be found in historical 
periods in which bourgeois society did not yet exist. Habermas is 
clearly less pessimistic than Horkheimer and Adorno about the 
future of modern society. There is no permanent negation. He 
evaluates science and technology positively to the extent that 
they have increased the powers of mankind. The problem is that 
they themselves have become an ideology. 
In his book Erkenntnis und Interesse, Habermas discusses the 
scientistic self-misunderstanding (Selbstmissverstandnis) of meta-
psychology. This purpose of this book is to revive 'the abandoned 
stages of reflection' in favour of scientism.49 For this he uses the 
psychoanalytic theories of Freud. Freud understood his own 
picture of the human mind as ultimately connected with the 
apparatus of the brain, although he tried to avoid direct parallels. 
Habermas signals this understanding of Freud as a scientistic 
misunderstanding.50 
It seems to me that both Freud and Habermas are making 
premature claims. As far as can be seen, there is as yet no 
knowledge of how the structure of the brain and the very 
complex intellectual and emotional expressions of the human 
being are connected. This seems at face value an argument in 
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favour of Habermas, but it is not. Although these relations are 
not yet known they may still be discovered! Habermas does not 
clearly distinguish between science as such and scientistic 
philosophy. 
In relation to the problem of the dehumanizing effect of 
computer models of mind Margaret Boden makes the following 
remarks: 
In sum, and paradoxical though it may seem, computer models 
of mind can be positively rehumanizing. Thanks to their 
influence, 'mind' and 'mental' processes are now respectable 
concepts in psychology (which in the days of behaviorism they 
were not). This is important not only for psychologists but for 
society in general. For, as counseling psychologists rightly remind 
us, how people think about themselves matters. Science will be 
dehumanizing only if it has no room for mental concepts, no 
vocabulary for subjectivity. The natural sciences, including 'pure' 
neurophysiology, do not. But psychology, computer science, and 
neuroscience insofar as it focusses on the brain's computational 
functions, all do. 
...Provided that they are properly understood, computer models 
of mind need not be socially pernicious.51 
The dehumanized aspect of the natural sciences is not necessarily 
itself socially undesirable, neither is the study of the human being 
as a natural phenomena. Problems seem to come about when 
such attitudes are applied to society and human behaviour. But 
as the above citation demonstrates there is a gap between 
scientistic philosophy which does exactly that, i.e. applying natural 
scientific standards to society and individual, the scientific 
endeavour itself does not necessarily fall. 
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Habermas's analysis is based on the distinction between practical 
and technical action. Practical action is concerned with 'real' 
communication between individuals and emancipation. It is, per 
definition, not alienating. To some extent it can perhaps be seen 
as the ideal of Adorno who stresses that 'mediated' 
communication is alienating, especially in expressions of art and 
music (see chapter 4, above). Probably Habermas means also by 
practical, the possibility to change society, or to subject 
institutions to the scrutiny of active subjects who communicate 
without restraint. 
If Practical discourse means that social problems are seen in the 
light of class-antagonisms (see above) then clearly science and 
technology have very little to offer. Perhaps with the notions of 
technical and practical reason Habermas wants to show us the 
limitations of science and technology. 
I still do not believe that the political and social discourse is 
'rationalised' in a negative sense. It is difficult to see that because 
of this 'rationalisation' politics and social discourse invariably 
hide, not only class-antagonisms but also moral issues (which 
certainly are 'practical' in Habermas' sense) so that all problems 
are reduced to mere technical questions. Moreover it is hard to 
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see that this discourse is pervaded with scientistic 
misunderstandings. 
The emancipatory effects of practical reason are somewhat vague 
in the works of Habermas. He does not define the word 
'emancipation' in any clear way. It follows, however, that 
emancipation has to do with the establishing of power-free 
communication, liberation of the individual from alienation, 
poverty, the mind-dulling ideologies of capitalist society, etc. 
These notions are very broad and cannot be seen outside of 
Habermas's notion of historical development. 
Language and emancipation are closely tied. Since emacipation 
can only be brought about through (power-) free communication, 
language is of extreme importance for Habermas. The relation of 
emancipation to communication, i.e. language, means that also 
the difficulties of the existing language to express the truth about 
reality are included in this communication. According to Harald 
Pilot, this means that language in itself is ideological, and carries 
the 'old' ideologies into the process of emancipation, hence in 
the idea of emancipation itself.52 
Then, however, the idea of emancipation itself would still 
contain ideological distortions which could only be eliminated 
through a critical praxis. Together with the ideological 
distortions of the unemancipated society, the distorted Utopia of 
an emancipated society would also disappear. It would be the 
actual 'domination-free dialogue whicn would be practiced 
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universally' which would make it possible to conceive of the 
'true' idea of emancipation. From this it follows, of course, that 
the idea of emancipation cannot directly initiate a critical praxis 
since it is itself exposed to the suspicion of ideology.53 
It seems to me that the development of a 'dialectic of Utopian 
reason' is not a fruitful undertaking. Practical action is, as is 
implied in the quotation above, at best an activity which is hoped 
to be fully realized in the future while at the same time it has to 
bring about this better future. 
We can however make a distinction between technical action, as 
a mechanic activity, and non-technical action as the actions and 
decisions concerning the interests of certain individuals or groups 
(even the whole of mankind). In this respect decisions about for 
example military expenditure are practical decisions. Habermas 
wants to see this in a different light, but it is difficult even for 
the most war-like elites in society to automatically decide on 
more expenditures, heavier armaments, etc., without weighing 
other factors concerning the relation of other interests in society 
and the interests of that elite. It is too easy to explain away 
unfortunate decision-making with the use of an ideological bias. 
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3. 'Good' and 'Bad' Technology. 
There can be no doubt that besides the ideological and 
restraining aspects of modern technology there is also a liberating 
effect. Communication is made possible, very much by 
technological means, and as I have said above there is a tendency 
for capital interests no longer to control this communication. 
Here is a Schumpeterian paradox. Industrial capitalism 
rationalizes society in the name of production and by means of 
science and technology, and at the same time this production 
makes the possibilities of science and technology accessible for a 
large public, who do not merely consume it. 
The development of micro-electronics literally brought home the 
possibilities of communication, education, computing and 
decentralized production. The old liberal values of the small 
entrepreneur are, to some degree anyway, restored in our time. 
At least in the western capitalist countries, a social security 
system takes away the large risks that in earlier times were 
connected with the setting up of a business. The relation between 
economic opportunity and personal risk is not any more so much 
biased towards risk, because of the protection social security 
offers. 
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From the above it is clear that technology contains opposing 
aspects. On the one hand we can see its use and development in 
order to alleviate the burdens of life, bringing wealth and making 
work easier. On the other hand there is the situation depicted 
among others by Habermas of domination of man by machines, 
of alienation and of technology as a misleading ideology. 
If we again consider Habermas's distinction between technical 
and practical reason, we can distinguish 'right' and 'wrong' use 
of science and technology. A 'wrong' use of technology is clearly 
those applications which do not enhance free communication 
between people or which even limit or prevent such 
communication. Military technology is an obvious example. 
Another is the use of information technology, especially the use 
of modern databases, in the hands of an authoritarian or 
dictatorial government which wants to gather information about 
all its subjects in search of possible enemies. The possibility of 
preventing such abuses by government (and also by private 
agencies) is the subject of Part II. 
But beyond the use of science and technology which is clearly 
intended to harm people the search of for examples becomes 
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more difficult. The tendencies observed by Habermas are vague 
and it is not easy to point at individual instances.* 
One important technological element of our age is surely 
telecommunication and the media. Both rest on the same 
technological achievements. As far as telephone communication 
is concerned, the issue is clear. It removes more alienation than 
it creates as far as human contact and communication is 
concerned. Of course it can always be maintained that it provides 
communication between people as individuals and not as groups, 
hence it has alienating effects. But I cannot see any difficulties 
with it except that telephone conversations can be tapped. 
More important are the mass-media, which have served so much 
in the service of governments, in order to disseminate 
propaganda. It is not always a monolithic apparatus to influence 
opinion. In many countries radio and television is not merely 
controlled by the government. 
A good example is Italy, where the monopoly of the 
governmental RAJ radio and tv stations was taken away in 1976, 
* 
There exists a technological world-view where the human being is seen as a mere 
machine, but it is a view of an earlier age, although in psychology this view is sometimes 
taken as a working hypothesis. One of the earlier materialistic views in that direction can 
be found in 18th century works like L'homme machine (1747) of La Mettrie. See also Ernst 
von Aster, Geschichte der Philosophic, Stuttgart, 1975. 
99 
as a result of Article 21 of the Italian constitution which 
guarantees 'liberty of expression'.54 Similar developments have 
taken place in other countries especially with the introduction of 
cable radio and television. In Great Britain there is the 
combination of the government operated BBC and a private 
network. Similar movements can be seen in other countries, 
notably the US where cable TV also invites small groups and 
organizations to engage in transmitting programs. 
The Netherlands is perhaps a strange exception. By law all radio 
and tv transmitters used for the dissemination of programs are 
owned by the government. But by the same law the government 
has nothing to say about what is transmitted. The transmissions 
are in the hands of membership organizations who represent 
certain political or religious groups. To get time for transmission 
is relatively easy. Every organization with more than 100,000 
members has the right to claim a fair share of transmission time. 
There is no control over the content of the transmission, beyond 
normal legal measures against slander and obscenity. Even these 
are not often used. 
Satellite broadcasting and cable TV (sometimes called 
narrowcasting) opens up cheap possibilities of various 
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organizations and groups to prepare and transmit programs 
directed at a more or less broad audience. 
Cable TV and connected possibilities opens the way for an 
enormous choice for the public. It has a very large potential not 
merely for one-way communication: 
Cable differs from broadcast television in three fundamental 
ways. 
Cable offers expanded channel capacity. Cable systems installed 
today promise upwards of 100 channels, offering local 
communities a varied, and unprecedented, communications 
menu. Not only do these channels offer today's mass-oriented 
broadcasting, but cable also offers "narrowcasting" - special 
programs going out to special interest viewers. 
Cable offers two-way communication. While the majority of cable 
systems are now limited to conventional one-way 
communication, newer systems also offer the option of 
consumer-originated messages. These may take the form of 
polling, emergency calls, or requests for information. Cable 
can easily be coupled with other communication technologies. 
Cable is one medium that can carry virtually all others: 
newspapers, radio, film, books, even still pictures. While cable 
can't really substitute for a visit to the movies or a museum, it 
can distribute images widely and inexpensively. Linking computer 
technology with cable -in transmitting data, for example - is 
especially powerful.55 
It can be argued that although an enormous choice is present 
most people will direct themselves to the big networks and leave 
the small media organizations with their particular approaches 
and opinions to their small audiences. These people will probably 
mostly talk to themselves. 
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The thinkers of the Frankfurt School deplore these developments 
because of the distance that is created between the spectators 
and the performance, or 'production'. I believe that the 
movement is actually reversed. Many pieces of creativity in the 
form of the performing arts, but also different other forms of art 
together with scientific information and various forms of news-
gathering are brought closer to a large majority of the people 
than it ever has been. It is true, a majority of the users of such 
systems will probably hardly use these possibilities. But still many 
more than in earlier times, where this information was not so 
readily available, will use it a lot, mainly because they can finally 
get at it. 
The fact, however, that program makers have possibilities to 
compete for an audience in liberal democracies is in itself 
important and valuable. One can come up with objections against 
the ideological aspects of such a socio/political system. But in 
such a system one is able to transmit these objections over the 
media and one has a fair chance to try and persuade people. 
The pernicious effects of propaganda through the media seems 
however limited. Early experiments showed that changing existing 
attitudes through propaganda is very difficult. 
Our distance from being able to measure adequately the effects 
of communications may be illustrated in relation to the most 
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substantial single empirical research work yet done in 
communications: Experiments on Mass Communication (Hovland, 
Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949). This report on experiments in 
the training and indoctrination by film of the American soldiers 
in the second World War shows that films were quite effective 
in imparting skills of the 'nuts and bolts variety but that for 
changing attitudes toward the war, films produced very little 
change in the intended direction. For altering motivation the 
films showed practically no effect.56 
This means that direct influencing of attitudes is difficult, but still 
people can be confronted with distortions of the truth and be 
misled about facts. 
Communications technology in no way prevents distorted or 
unreliable information from being transmitted. The dangers of 
misleading advertising and of persuasive claims with little truth 
are real, and require some degree of regulation... But the 
economic and social consequences of distortions are not, many 
believe, nearly as dangerous as the use of communications 
networks for political propaganda by authoritarian or totalitarian 
states, such as occurred in Stalinist Russia, or in the propaganda 
machine of Goebbels in Nazi Germany, or in the fictional 
nightmare of George Orwell's 1984. The dangers exist even in 
liberal market economies, that 'technological imperatives' may 
lead to increasing control over economic and social life, with a 
resulting loss of freedom to the individual.57 
But at the moment the movement is away from that. More and 
more small groups gain the possibilities of transmission of their 
messages. The use of cable systems and the like have not so 
much drawbacks in regard to alienation and the ideology of 
science and technology but for privacy.' But the prospects for 
The possibilities of two-way cable with its large selection of TV-programs and 
information services, for which has to be paid has drawbacks for the privacy of the viewers: 
Not everyone is enthralled with cable's two-way capabilities: the potential for abuse is 
considerable. Accounts of the pay-TV programs individual subscribers watch, from special 
entertainment events to pornography, are monitored routinely. Operators of two-way 
systems are privy to polling results, purchase decisions, personal schedules, and whatever 
(continued...) 
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political propaganda in the sense of Goebbels are diminished. 
This is certainly an aspect of modern technology that turns out 
to being able to give a multitude of information to the receivers. 
An interesting example is the popularity of the BBC Shakespeare 
series in a large number of countries. Not only violent films and 
series and soap opera's vie for the interest of the public. The 
picture is more complex than the Frankfurt School c.s. wants us 
to believe. 
Another feature of communications technology, which can be 
highly democratic, is connected with the telephone system. 
Modern telephone systems allow for the possibility of computer 
networks. The use of such networks by large database systems, 
and its dangers, will be discussed later. Computer networks allow 
for the quick exchange of information between its users. Already 
there are several networks operational in the US, Europe and 
Japan. They are created for a special public like academics, 
computer specialists, doctors, etc. They allow for ongoing 
(...continued) 
other household and commercial transactions subscribers make. Like the old-time village 
switch-board operator, today's cable operators could know more about us than we wish, 
with far more serious consequences. 
(Kahn, Robert D. and Ernst, Martin L., The Impact of Cable, in Forester, Tom, The 
Information Technology Revolution' Oxford, 1985, p. 149/50). 
The problem of privacy, which is so important in connection with information technology, 
will be discussed at length below. 
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conferences on many subjects. The user does not have to be 
physically present to be able to get information or to contribute 
information. 
One element of this is, of course, 'alienation' of people from one 
another, because they do not have to be physically present. On 
the other hand, it can be argued that one does not have to 
interrupt ones work in order to be present at a conference where 
much of what is been said is not really useful, so that much time 
is spent waiting for the useful information. Besides, it must be 
recognised that conferences have a social aspect, but are there 
not more pleasant opportunities to meet people than at 
conferences? 
The rapid development of communications and information 
technology may also have effects for politics. In a recent study 
about several projects which were set up in order to give the 
public a better ability to influence decision-making with the help 
of modern technology (teledemocracy) Christopher Arterton 
remarks: 
Technology can make teledemocracy, in the sense of pluralist 
dialogues, possible. In every case where communications media 
were used to allow citizens to interact with public officials, the 
results were beneficial. The citizens certainly became better 
informed. The number and breadth of those who could be said 
to be politically active was increased. In many of these cases, 
the available evidence suggests that citizen involvement has a 
tangible effect on the public policies enacted. And finally, in a 
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few instances, I tentatively concluded that the political system 
itself was modified by the expanded role of citizen 
involvement.58 
The possibilities of success of this application of technology are 
not without conditions. First, an equal access to the 
teledemocratic systems has to be guaranteed. Second, the free 
gathering of information about any subject at hand, and its free 
discussion has to be guaranteed. Without these conditions 
teledemocracy may turn into its opposite, an instrument of 
manipulation. But if they are fulfilled the relative insulation of 
government may be diminished and the position of unpriviliged 
groups may be improved because of the better possibilities that 
their complaints are heard. The setting of an political agenda 
away from 'practical' problems as seen by 'the people' through a 
ruling elite, as Habermas sees it, may become much more difficult 
as it already is. Technological developments and applications can 
change representative democratic systems into a more direct form 
of democracy. 
In relation to the bad effects of technology, a much debated 
issue today is the effects of nuclear energy for the environment 
and also for politics. Nuclear energy as we know it works on the 
principle of fission for which it needs a costly mineral, uranium. 
Moreover the waste produced by fission reactors is dangerous 
and cannot be easily discarded. The side products of fission 
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reactors give those who want it the material for the construction 
of nuclear weapons. This, in its turn is, is a reason for the 
countries trying to prevent this to step up police activities in 
order to be able to prevent the stealing of this material and the 
information necessary to make nuclear weapons. 
Such developments are certainly very serious. There is the danger 
that nuclear weapons will be used, not only by 'irresponsible 
states' but also by terrorist groups. Moreover, the security 
necessary to protect nuclear material and information from theft 
may lead us, unwillingly, to a police state. 
This example demonstrates more than all the others, that what 
we have to learn to control is the application of certain 
technologies. Nuclear physics and nuclear technology are in 
themselves not responsible for all the problems with fission 
reactors. The very practical decisions of governments (democratic 
governments in the beginning, to be sure) are responsible. The 
know-how found in nuclear physics and nuclear technology can, 
and probably will, give us the possibility of cheap, clean and 
easily to be decentralised energy production in the form of fusion 
reactors. 
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There is, of course, no doubt that these developments are the 
product of what Robin Clarke calls 'hard technology'.59 He 
proposes a table where 'hard' and 'soft' technology are 
compared. In comparing the results for, for instance, ecology, 
energy input, pollution rate, politics, social use, etc., he tries to 
show that 'hard' technology is bad and 'soft' technology is good. 
Such a distinction is, I believe, no longer possible. Information 
technology and the supporting technologies of micro-electronics, 
are not as large-scale as Clark believes 'hard' technologies are, 
but neither are they small-scale as 'soft' technologies. They hold 
threats as well as promises, because of the possibilities of 
communication and gaining of knowledge as well as the potential 
for social and political control. It is not necessarily true with the 
developments of modern technology that they only function on 
a mass scale, that they are necessarily dirty and pollute and 
alienate. Production with the help of information technology can 
be very small, producing small quantities for special applications 
which are not necessarily expensive.' This can be done completely 
decentralised. It is true that they can be that way in perhaps only 
The methods of Computer Aided Design and Computer aided Manufacturing 
(CAD/CAM) make these kinds of 'non-alienanetd' production possible. Although the 
human producer does not make the end product entirely with his own hands, he certainly 
produces them with his brain. The immediacy of the production clearly connects the 
producer with it in a way which is comparable with that of the crafts. Moreover the 
element of decentralisation makes this kind of production more responsive to demands of 
the community in which the production takes place. 
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certain applications. Let us look in the light of the critical theory 
at information technology and its effects. 
3.1. Information technology and the critical theory. 
Information technology is one of the most important, it not the 
most important technology we have today. It stands at the centre 
of all administrative, scientific and technological activities today. 
Almost everyday something about computers is mentioned various 
newspapers and magazines, radio and television. In many 
households computers have find a place in the form of personal 
computers or game computers. There has hardly existed a 
technology which has occupied people's minds so much. Its 
influence on society, dangerous or beneficial, is much wider than 
the problem of privacy and databases containing individual data. 
Information technology has existed, of course, much longer than 
the computer. Every civilization, in every period in history, has 
some method of gathering and keeping information that is 
considered important for that civilization. 
However, it is in Western civilization that information gathering 
and keeping has become systematized to the extent that we can 
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call it a technology.* This technology enhanced with the aid of 
the computer comes close to what Weber called a monocratic 
bureaucracy.60 According to Weber, bureaucracy is marked by 
precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files, continuity, 
discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction, 
material, and personal costs. One can argue that in practice the 
classical bureaucracy never lived up to this ideal (or ideal-type in 
the Weberian sense). 
Bureaucracy has also acquired notions like 'red-tape', slowness, 
stupidity and above all counter-effectiveness. The bureaucratic 
organization can degenerate, lose contact with their objects. Their 
only object is sometimes merely to continue to exist, they get into 
in a 'rigidity cycle'.61 
The 'ideal type' aspects are of course primarily beneficial for the 
one who rules this information system and not necessarily for its 
clients. In a democratic society, ideally, the rulers and the ruled 
(clients) are identical, but we all know that in reality this is often 
not the case. With this observation I have asked the question: 
"How can the applications of technology be controlled in a 
For Weber bureaucracy is the most important aspect of the modern Western state. 
Bureaucracy can be seen as institutionalized information technology. It can be called 
technology because it is a means/end oriented activity, hence guided by purposive rational 
thought. It fits in with the broad definition of technology. See Max Weber, Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft, TUbingen, 1976, p. 576. 
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democratic process of decision-making?" I will focus on the 
applications of information technology, as an example, for the 
following reasons: 
1. Information technology seems to be a key technology in 
industrial society. 
2. The repercussions of information technology are, although 
more silent than for example those of the automobile, decisive 
for the well-being of citizens in respect of freedom and the 
control and development of other technologies. 
3. Information technology enhances bureaucratic practice, public 
and private. More, it can change the real (and compared with 
Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, somewhat defective) bureau 
in the theoretical ideal type, because it reduces to a large extent 
human involvement in the internal procedures of the bureau. 
This question includes also non-technological aspects. These 
aspects may be summed up in questions about the use and 
domain of bureaucratic activity in a democracy. Computer 
enhanced information technology makes these questions merely 
more acute. 
Although, here if at all, I cannot deal with these problems on a 
large scale, I will, however, discuss some aspects of the influence 
of information technology which I believe to be important. First 
I l l 
I will describe the development of what is commonly known as 
information technology, namely information exchange through and 
with the aid of electronic devices mostly computers. Then I will 
evaluate some of the effects that information technology has and 
may have on society. 
In order to describe these effects I distinguish three levels: 
1. Aspects and effects of the application of modern information 
technology in the short term. 
2. The aspects and effects of it in the long term. 
3. The ideological aspects and effects. 
The third level actually cuts across the two others, which are 
more directed towards the 'hard' effects, while ideology can be 
seen as a 'soft' effect (not that this distinction means that the 
one is more serious than the other). 
3.2. The development of electronic information handling. 
The actual development of pieces of hardware and methods in 
history can be found in any book about the development of 
technology since the industrial revolution. I will therefore only 
give a brief outline in the light of Schumpeter's theory of 
technological development. 
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In the development of information technology we can see roughly 
three periods: 
1. The period of entrepreneurship, in the Schumpeterian sense, 
which lasted from the thirties until the fifties, when IBM became 
the major computer producing company. 
2. The period of institutionalization of computer technology 
development. This period lasts until the end of the seventies. 
Among computer people this period was sometimes referred to 
as 'the story of IBM and the seven dwarfs'. IBM reigns supreme. 
Here we can almost speak of a monopoly of IBM. Competition 
in the field of multi-purpose large computers is almost non-
existent. Only in specialized areas other computer producers have 
a chance of extending their market share. 
3. The re-emerging of a Schumpeterian entrepreneurial period. 
With the advent of the micro-processor very small firms develop 
micro-computers of increasing power, nowadays coming close to 
the power of super-mini computers (a kind of small mainframe 
computer). This development started, commercially, with the 
Apple micro-computer. 
This gave opportunity for renewed competition in which 
companies like IBM were initially very much behind in their 
market shares' and could only with great trouble gain some more. 
IBM had at that time already experimented with a micro-computer design. 
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We are' still in this period, although it looks, as if we shall in the 
near future enter again an institutionalized period in this micro-
computer development again, because of the increasing 
development costs. 
These trends will have serious effects for society, especially 
because their introduction is going very fast. I will now discuss 
some of the effects of information technology on society. 
3.3. Short term effects. 
Computerised information technology consists of the following 
aspects: 
1. Data processing 
a. calculation (scientific and administrative); 
b. data-base applications. 
2. Communications 
a. data communication (the communication between computers 
and between computers and users); 
b. telecommunication; 
c. mass communication; 





5. Computer aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM the 
immediate transfer from design to automatic manufacturing both 
with the help of computers/robots). 
6. Office automation. 
Some short term effects of the use of information technology are 
the gradual replacement of traditional human activities in 
production. Simple administrative and industrial activities will be 
taken over by small office computers and simple robots. This may 
almost certainly result in a gradual elimination of blue-collar work 
and simple administrative work. Because of the relative simplicity 
and the economic advantage of the use of modern information 
technology not only the gradual elimination of blue collar work 
will happen but also the gradual elimination of traditional goods 
and services production. 
Banks, insurance companies, and also the government are rapidly 
automating their activities. Together with industrial automation 
this may create in the near future serious socio-economic 
problems.62 However this is not yet the case. There are some 
examples of unemployment caused by the introduction of 
automation, but for whole economies this is certainly not (yet) 
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the case.63 There is still work that cannot be automated, and 
perhaps never will be automated. 
The automation of administrations has also effects for the 
exercise of power within the organization. In a study of urban 
information systems in the United States, Anthony Downs found 
the following effects: 
1. Lower- and intermediate-level officials tend to lose power to 
higher-level officials [and in government structures to] 
politicians. 
2. High-level staff officials gain power. 
3. City and state legislators tend to lose power to administrators 
and operating officials. 
4. The government bureaucracy as a whole gains power at the 
expense of the general electorate and nongovernmental groups. 
5. Well-organized and sophisticated groups of all kinds, including 
some government bureaus, gain power at the expense of less 
well-organized and less-sophisticated groups. 
6. Within city governments, those who actually control 
automated data systems gain in power at the expense of those 
who do not. 
Therefore, much of the controversy which is sure to arise 
concerning the proper design and operation of urban data 
systems will reflect a power struggle for control of those 
systems. 
7. Technically educated officials within city governments gain 
power at the expense of old-style political advisors.64 
A possible strategy against this trend, is nowadays with the 
advent of the micro- or personal- computer, decentralization of 
computer activities to the different departments in an 
organization together with the education of the employees in the 
field of computers. 
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But this can only be a partial solution. A large part of the 
information will be stored in central databases of networks, which 
are operated by specialists and ruled by high-level officials and 
experts. 
Nevertheless, there is also the prospect that work can become 
more interesting and less routinized just because of automation 
of certain parts of it. The work-place can become a place of 
learning and more creativity, especially when functionaries are 
consulted in the design phase of information systems. This is true 
for both administrations and manufacturing.65 
Another serious aspect of the application of information 
technology is the use of databases with their possibilities of fast 
retrieval and combination of data. The existence of large 
databases filled with personal data may give an opportunity of 
more government control of private activities. 
There is a rather academic distinction made between two types 
of records that a government may hold about an individual. One 
is the administrative record, which holds data about age, sex, 
income, tax, etc. And the other is the intelligence record, which 
hold data about the behaviour (political, sexual, religious, etc.), 
political orientation, and subversive activities of an individual. 
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This distinction is academic because, although the different 
records may exist in different databases in different government 
departments, they can be so easily be combined that it is better 
to speak of an government database which is merely 
decentralized. 
I will use this problem as an example for possible control of the 
application of information technology in the next chapter, where 
I will also deal with the question: Which data should be stored 
on individual citizens? 
On the whole we can say that information technology, up to 
today, has a conventional effect. It has merely replaced certain 
human activities in certain sectors, as other technologies have 
done before. It has greatly increased productivity, and certainly 
created dependence on information technology in the sense that 
society today is already unthinkable without computers. Still most 
of the work done in industry and administration can still be done 
without computers, even if at a much lower pace. 
The exception may be aerospace and military industry. Without 
the help of computers modern aircraft and spacecraft cannot be 
constructed. Modern military equipment is also unthinkable 
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without computers. One may conclude from this that also in a 
technical sense warfare is not human any more. 
One may expect that things will not remain the same. Already 
technological developments have caused great changes in work 
and private life, even to the extent that there are those, like the 
philosophers of the Frankfurt School, who believe that it has 
already resulted in an impoverished life 
3.4. The long term. 
This is clearly a good heading for some wild speculations, 
especially because our civilization does not yet know long-term 
planning on a broad basis. Only large firms and economics 
ministries attempt to do some really long term forecasting, which 
is different from planning because it only tries to predict. But 
their views are limited. Over periods of for instance twenty years, 
planning is impossible, except perhaps in the Eastern European 
countries where life seems to have a slower pace. But even their 
planning is limited to five-year plans. Long term planning is 
difficult because developments go very fast and the number of 
variables needed to make a reasonable forecast on which 
planning can be based is probably astronomical. Only educated 
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guesses can be made. But some of these guesses have been 
made. 
We have to take care that we do not describe a Utopia (or 
dystopia) in our guesses. Usually Utopias come more from wishful 
thinking, or great fear in the case of dystopias, than from reality.' 
3.5. Social aspects.' 
Information technology may take away boring and repetitive 
work, thus leaving more room for rewarding and creative 
activities. When no adjustment of society towards work and the 
work ethic takes place, and when no possibilities for other 
activities than work are created, then the taking away of work 
may lead to endless boredom and without good social security to 
poverty for those who lost their boring and repetitive work. 
Ralf Dahrendorf gives the following characteristics of Utopias: 
1. Utopias do not follow do not grow out of familiar reality or follow realistic patterns of 
development. 
2. Utopias characteristically have uniform consensus on values and institutional 
arrangements; that is they are very highly uniform throughout. 
3. Utopias are characterized by an absence of internal conflict; that is they are 
characterized by social harmony [voluntarily or brought about by extreme repression as with 
dystopias], which helps to account for their stability. 
4. All processes within Utopian societies follow recurrent patterns and occur as part of the 
design of the whole. 
5. Utopias are characteristically isolated in time and space from other parts of the world. 
Dahrendorf, Ralf Pfade aus Utopia; Arbeiten zur Theorie und Methode der Soziologie, 
Munchen, 1974, p. 243-6. 
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One of the most striking possibilities is what may be called 
telecommuting. It is the combination of computer and 
communication techniques that may lead to a massive 
decentralization of administration and production. If this trend is 
to take place then it is for many occupations no longer necessary 
to leave the home. Work can be done, given the fact that 
information transfer can take place without hindrance and 
waiting, at a distance. Vast computer networks can link the 
computer device that stands in the home, and so give the 
possibility of 'home-work'. The ultimate result may be that cities 
are no longer necessary as centers of production and distribution, 
so that other centers may come about. On the one hand this may 
sound very comfortable, but on the other it may lead to an 
impoverishment of human relations. Unless there are possibilities 
of enough and satisfying social contacts in the place where one 
lives, telecommuting may lead to isolation of the individual and 
the family.67 
The same technology may be used for education, since it is 
efficient in the sense that expensive school buildings are not 
necessary any more. The same effects as with telecommuting may 
take place. There may be less contact of children with other 
children, and moreover the contact of the teacher with the pupil 
is lost. Again, unless there is a community with rich social 
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contacts this technological possibility may easily lead to further 
alienation and isolation of the individual. 
The dissemination of important information for those who need 
it may be improved, especially for the weak in society: 
Whereas dissemination techniques have developed over decades, 
communication techniques seem to be at the beginning of a new 
wave. Microelectronics and complementary technology are the 
physical background to these innovations. 
...All [important] information is already offered by the different 
media, but its ad hoc dissemination means that it is a matter of 
luck whether one gets the relevant information of not. The 
information market is not overloaded, it is unstructured and like 
a jungle and therefore it offers services only to well educated 
and active searchers. The present information market does not 
help people who need it most badly. It can be argued that the 
information jungle leads to social injustice.68 
The structuring of the information market needs interactive 
contact with the databases in which the information is stored. 
Aside from the elementary know-how (depending on user-
friendliness) there is need for legislation that enable everyone to 
make use of essential information. Mere freedom of gathering 
information will not be enough, essential information should be 
free and also the means of getting it. 
On the other hand strict control of information together with an 
effective registration of personal information may lead to quite 
adverse results, as we have seen above. 
One importance of the new information and communication 
techniques is, that in annihilating distance, they can pave the 
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way for all kinds of decentralization, which is the obvious desire 
of many societies today, including the dispersion of points of 
power and decision-making. This could lead to new systems of 
power and decision-making. ...On the other hand, it has to be 
admitted that the same means could be used by the 
unscrupulous or power-hungry leader to consolidate and 
augment centralized power. The means may shortly exist for the 
control of the activities and perhaps even the thoughts of 
everyone ... individuals or societies.69 
It is not simply technical control that can fend off this danger. 
Political, social and above all moral decisions coming from an 
enhanced awareness of the possibilities of technology and the 
needs of society, are more appropriate elements of control. This 
brings us to the part of the ideological effects of information 
technology. 
3.6. Ideological aspects. 
In an interesting book Computer Power and Human Reason, 
Joseph Weizenbaum describes the shock he experienced when a 
computer program he designed seem to have 'undesirable' results 
on people. He designed a program in order to see to what extent 
a computer can handle human language and analyze it.70 
It happened that people, relatively uneducated in computer 
technology, used this program in order to be able to talk about 
their problems without having to go to a psychiatrist. The 
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program was so designed that it simulated a Rogerian 
psychiatrist. 
But not only 'relatively uneducated people' thought highly about 
the program's abilities to understand them but also psychiatrists 
themselves thought that through programs like this one, they 
could actually automate their practice as psychiatrists. 
Hofstadter remarks about programs like ELIZA the following: 
..this kind of program is based on a shrewd mixture of bravado 
and bluffing, taking advantage of people's gullibility.71 
But this seems actually to be the problem, when people are not 
sufficiently informed then mystification takes place. They are 
presented with phenomena they cannot interpret. At face value 
it really seem as though a computer program can understand 
human language in its full meaning. Because of this condition a 
false trust in the outcome of computer directed calculations and 
information comes about. A trust which exceeds the trust in 
human beings, which are fallible, because 'a computer never 
makes mistakes.' 
After having shown his doubts about the reception of ELIZA 
Weizenbaum asks three questions, which to my mind are 
important in their ideological context: 
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1. What is the nature of artificial intelligence? Apparently that 
is what makes the computer different from other tools. 
2. Why has man come to yield his own autonomy to a world 
viewed as a machine? 
3. People project into machines their own ability to think but is 
human thought similar to the internal processes m a computer?72 
He mentions that the belief in 'thinking' machines goes further 
back than the computer era. People believe also in the working 
of institutional machines, like the bureaucracy. 
The problem is that there exists a mechanical world view, not 
only in abstract theories but very much in the mind of the man 
in the street. Weizenbaum bases himself on the theories of 
Horkheimer and Adorno. As I have indicated above (chapter 
three) they see 'science' itself is causing the trouble. It is 
scientific thinking which has gone beyond its proper place. 
Reason, the important notion of the enlightenment, has turned 
into its opposite. It is the basis of the view that judgement can be 
exchanged for calculation. 
3.6.1. Critical Sociology. 
We have to remember again the notions of rationality as they are 
mentioned in the works of Weber. In modern society the 
organization of means and the choices between alternatives are 
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important. There is a 'means-end rationality'. This process of 
rationalization has put science and technology in the place of the 
old ideologies. This has as result the de-mystification and 
secularization of social conduct. Marcuse, I have indicated this 
above, adds to this that rationalization, in Weber's sense, is not 
rationalization in general but a specific form of political power. 
Legitimation takes place through technology and science. In a 
strict sense the repressive character of capitalist society becomes 
less. Greater production results in greater welfare. Nonetheless 
the individual is subordinated to the system of production. 'Free 
disposable time' is taken out of the private realm and 
constructive and destructive production have become one. 
But the interesting thing is that this repression disappears from 
the consciousness of the individual, because the legitimation of 
it has a new character. It can point at growing productivity and 
control over nature, which make life for potentially every 
individual comfortable. 
We may recall the four stages of rationalization, from Habermas, 
quoted above: 
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1. The most elementary level, strict technological 
rationalization. Instrumental activities are rational in the 
means-end sense. 
2. When the choices are between two or more alternatives 
rationalization of a higher level is necessary in order to be able 
to choose. Decision theory links alternative techniques on the 
one hand with value-systems and rules of decision. 
3. The third level is about strategic situations, where there is a 
rational relation with an equally rational opponent. Game-theory 
explains the strategies which can be used to gain control over the 
situation. 
4. The fourth level is about the self-regulating (cybernetic) 
organization of society. For Habermas this is the highest 
expression of technological consciousness. Decision making powers 
are transferred to machines. 
The human being is made an object to an extent that he 
integrates himself with his own technological apparatus. Where 
he also projects a reduced definition of 'intelligence' and 
consciousness in machines. De-mystification is reversed, the 
period of the new animism comes about. With this context in 
mind we can look at the vehicle of rationalization, language and 
concepts. 
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3.6.2. Language and Concepts. 
Here we enter upon one of the main aspects of rationalization 
in its mystifying sense: 
The computer has become a source of truly powerful and often 
useful metaphors. Curiously the public embrace of the computer 
metaphor rests on only the vaguest understanding of a difficult 
and complex scientific concept There, the theory ofcomrjutability 
and the results of Turing ana Cnurch concerning the universality 
of certain computing schemes). The public vajguely understands 
- but is nonetheless firmly convinced - that any effective 
procedure can, in principle, be carried out by a computer. Since 
man, nature, and society carry out procedures that are surely 
'effective' in one way or another, it follows that a computer can 
at least imitate man, nature and society in all their procedural 
aspects. Hence everything is at least potentially understandable 
in terms of computer models and metaphors. Indeed, on the 
basis of this unwarranted generalization of the words 'effective' 
and 'procedure,' the word understanding' is also redefined. [To 
understand X is to be able to write a program that realizes X.]73 
This means that we have arrived at a reduction, not only of 
reality, but of the meaning of words. Especially in certain 
branches of psychology the belief exists that 'computers and 
human beings are merely two different species of the genus 
called information or data processing systems.' 
It should be noted at this point, that the broad definition of 
technology of chapter two is not in contradiction with this. 
Certain social and bureaucratic ways of organizing are not 
separated from technology as such. Purposive rationality which is 
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essential to technology, understood in its narrower sense, is in the 
same way essential to administrative organisation and attempts of 
social 'engineering'. One of the important aspects of this, is that 
it results in a view of the human being which reduces him to 
whatever is important in the ongoing project, whether it is about 
administrative or social organisation or working with machines. 
The use of computers in their information processing capacities 
usually concentrates our attention to the information processing 
abilities of the human being, institutions, etc. Weizenbaum 
compares this with the attitude of a 'Fach Idiot.' This does not 
mean, of course, that psychology cannot profit from computer 
models in the research of cognitive processes that underlie the 
acquisition and memorization of information. The human being 
is also an information processing system. 
The notion that the human being is merely an information 
processing system is directly related to the exclusive notion of 
technological discourse, proposed by Habermas, as opposed to 
the inclusive notion of practical discourse which would include 
the information processing aspect of the human being to his 
other abilities. 
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The interesting aspect of these models are that they show what 
psychologists call interference. That means, the acquisition of a 
new association that interferes with the production of an older 
one when the syllables (it registers syllables) involved have closely 
similar descriptions. This aspect was not consciously programmed. 
So a computer does not always do what the programmer tells it 
to do. The complexity of programs often lead to unexpected 
results. This very often happens when an information system is 
designed of great complexity, and therefore the actual 
programming is done by many programmers. They all test their 
designs with known information and possibilities. But when a 
constellation of information shows up which is not expected, 
whole information systems may run amok, or at least produce 
'unexpected' results. Important are in this respect also the 
systems that produce themselves 'routines' (little programs) in 
order to perform their task. Such systems end up by having no 
authors, because the original designers do not know any more 
precisely how the system works. 
Some writers, like Hofstadter, see in this the explanation of 
creativity in the human being. They argue that we have such 
high-level and complex information processing programs in our 
brain that they produce, as side effects, unexpected results. The 
130 
undesired results are rejected, by a program called 'super-ego' 
and only the useful results remain as new input for the system. 
It must be mentioned, that the programs that produce these side 
effects are programs that perform a particular sort of 'intelligent' 
task, namely arriving at the right (logical) conclusion when given 
(abstract and detached) premisses. A large part of the efforts in 
Artificial Intelligence research is directed towards the 
'understanding' of natural language. The programs that should be 
able to understand natural language are programs which should 
be open ended. This means that they should be able to 'learn,' 
which in its turn means that they have to be able to store 
multiple meanings of words and sentences than mere rules of 
grammar. 
A system that does only computations according to 
preprogrammed rules is what experts call a 'finite automaton.' 
The systems that Artificial Intelligence research aims at are 
'infinite automatons' as opposite to finite automatons. They 
should be able to reconstruct language rules, which may not be 
limited in number. Language-understanding systems, which do not 
fully exist yet, should be able to even change the rules of 
grammar when they find out that in certain situations the old 
ones do not apply. 
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This is a very difficult problem. But research in this field has 
been proven partly successful, especially for so-called expert 
programs. It would be useful anyway, because then we do not 
have to learn people a computer language, but the computer can 
learn human language. 
The problem with human understanding is that people do not 
understand language or pictures in an analytic way, they can, but 
mostly they do not. They understand in whole pictures or in a 
contextual way. The definition of context is almost 
impossible. We have to give certain contextual meanings as 
preprogrammed information to computers. Otherwise the 
following conversation may occur: 
A computer program that simulates a hotel-clerk showing a guest 
the hotel room. 
Q: Where is the door to the bathroom? 
A: The door to the bathroom is opposite the bed between the 
TV-set and the entrance. 
The guest apparently seated and old, wants to get up: 
Q: Give me a hand. 
A: Do you mean that I have to detach my hand and give it to 
you? 
Q: No, just help me to get out of my chair. 
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This 'meaning' will be stored in memory. 
Next situation: 
Same scene: 
Q: Give me a hand. 
A: Do you want me to help you get out of your chair, or that 
I detach my hand and give it to you. 
Isaac Asimov, a well known science fiction writer, once remarked 
about robots and computers: ' [they] are logical, not rational'74. 
But this particular problem can undoubtedly be 
solved. Nevertheless it shows the tremendous problems in the 
definition of 'understanding.' Even in a reduced way as it is used 
here. 
The same problems occur in computer translation. The context 
in which text is placed determines often how it should be 
translated. It is not at all certain that we can make 'multi-
purpose' translation programs, since context requires 'real' 
understanding. Specialized translators are possible, of 
course. That means programs that work in a closely defined 
context area. 
Weizenbaum asks two questions: 
1. Are the conceptual bases that underlie linguistic under-
standing entirely to be formalized, even in principle? 
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2. Are there ideas that no machines will ever understand because 
they relate to objectives that are inappropriate for machines?75 
Artificial Intelligence research has today not more than 'touched 
only the tiniest bit of the relevant knowledge.'76 Therefore we 
must be careful with our predictions about what computers can 
and cannot do. Our answers may have to do with our ignorance 
not with real possibilities. 
Understanding of language has not only to do with context, but 
also with feelings, and this is where machine and human being 
part. Because, perhaps feelings can be simulated, but does that 
mean that the machine feels? 
3.6.3. Intelligence. 
In the context of computers and artificial intelligence it is 
important to know what we mean when we talk about 
intelligence? 
In psychology there is talk about I.Q. tests, where 'intelligence' 
is quantified in a quotient. It must be noted though, that 
intelligence in the sense of I.Q. tests is the measuring of abilities 
that are found to be necessary in our society (with its ongoing 
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'rationalization'), and very often determined by what is needed 
on the labour market. 
Weizenbaum finds that the concept of intelligence is reduced by 
those who are powerful (individuals or institutions). It is the 
result of an ideology with 'capitalist' interests backed by 
particular applications of science and technology. 
The idea that intelligence can be quantitatively measured along 
a simple linear scale has caused untold harm to society in 
general, and education in particular. It has spawned, for 
example, the huge educational-testing movement in the United 
States, which strongly influences the courses of the academic 
careers of millions of students and thus the degrees of 
certification they may attain. It virtually determines the success' 
people may achieve in later life because, in the United States 
at least, opportunities to 'succeed' are, by and large, open only 
to those wno have the proper credentials, that is, university 
degrees, professional diploma's, and so on. 
The impression is made that I.Q. tests measure something 
independent and unalterable, divorced from culture and 
environment. This notion is not in itself 'spurious but incomplete.' 
1. It fails to take into account that human creativity depends on 
intellect but also crucially on an interplay between intellect and 
other modalities of thought, such as intuition and wisdom; 
2. ...[it fails] in that characterizes intelligence as a linear 
measurable phenomenon that exists independent of any frame 
of reference.78 
So what we call intelligence in this respect is no more than a 
particular view on what it is. A view that leaves out anything that 
is not measurable in the test. 
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It is true that machines perform tasks which earlier we would 
have called exclusively human. The question is not so much if 
they can do better mathematics than we (what about developing 
new mathematical systems?), but that we must decide to what 
extent we let machines do work that we used to do. Especially 
where human relations, ethical decisions, aesthetic decisions (art, 
literature), etc., are concerned, machines have no role to play in 
decision making. 
But to go back to Habermas, the rationalization process seems 
to lead us away from this responsibility. Science and technology 
(in reality ambivalent things) function as a 'transparent 
background ideology'. Science and technology themselves are 
rarely questioned, although we have enough clues that the basis 
on which they stand are pragmatically effective but not at all 
absolute. 
The questions here are not so much technological, but they are 
ethical. It is ethically wrong to let computers decide which village 
in Vietnam was to be bombed and which not, or to limit the view 
on history only to those archive information that can easily be 
fed into a database system. 
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The question is not so much whether our privacy will be 
protected when we have the possibility to put everything into a 
database, but to realize that outside the (often necessary) 
reductions of reality that we need for the formulation of scientific 
concepts there is a world which may not be accessible by means 
of scientific and technological rationality. In other words to be 
less arrogant, and to admit that our powers of understanding are 
limited. 
This does not mean, of course, that control over nature is bad, 
it is not. But when it leads to dehumanization, in the form of 
reduction of also human nature to a quantifiable concept, we do 
ourselves harm if we let that happen. 
3.7. Conclusion. 
It is clear that if any public control must take place, the stress 
will be laid on application rather than on development. That is 
not to say that there can be no interference in R&D but that 
companies and research institutions need a certain amount of 
freedom in order to develop new technologies. 
At most certain types of research can become prohibited. But 
that can only happen in very rare cases. Subsidies can be granted 
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to certain research projects and certain projects can be initiated 
by public institutions. But overall control of R&D is impossible 
and undesirable. 
The discussion is therefore not so much about the principle of a 
certain mode of thought and its effects for society. There are 
many steps in between. One area is the difference between the 
development of certain technologies and its application. If it is 
left merely to the free market we may end up with very 
incomplete technologies. As I have argued in chapter two, certain 
technologies are not so much wrong or bad as well as 
incomplete. The fission reactor is a good example of an immature 
technology. Since its side effects cannot as yet be properly 
controlled, if they ever can. Nuclear technology can mature, 
however, beyond this point with the fusion reactor. 
It is applications and their use we most of all want to control 
and direct therefore we need a way of decision making which 
does not as such replace market mechanisms and other ways of 
choice, but which supplements and directs them. This can only be 
done in openness and via democratic mechanisms, so that a 
'practical' discourse can take place. 
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The above is not meant to be a song of praise of late-capitalism; 
there are still enormous problems with it. But it serves merely to 
show that the kind of very abstract analysis like that of Habermas 
has severe limitations. It fails to signal real movements in society. 
There is a problem of the difference between practice in real life 
and theoretical technique. Therefore I do not believe that in 
present day industrial societies democratic decision-making is 
merely a process of legitimation. It still has real possibilities for 
improvement. 
The outcome of capitalist development should be that there .is 
decentralized, smaller scale production, subjected to 'democratic' 
decision-making. The problem with parliamentary democracies as 
they exist in the west is that there is no real involvement of the 
people in actual decision-making. As we have seen above there 
is an alternative to that in the form of technologically enhanced 
citizen participating. I will deal with another alternative in 
relation to the control of technology and its applications later. 
Private initiative does not have to be abandoned, on the contrary, 
but that technology and science are used to bring production and 
social ordering under control of the people. Habermas is right 
that therefore restraints on communication on all levels should be 
removed a much as possible. 
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It is in the field of application that public control effectively can 
take place. For instance certain applications can be slowed down 
or speeded up according to need. A government may decide not 
to apply for instance nuclear energy, because of the risks involved 
given the state of the art of nuclear devices. 
The overwhelming problem with democratic governments and its 
subsequent methods of decision making is the element of 
expertise combined with moral capacity. Mere technological 
expertise is not enough to be able to make valuable decisions 
about anything. The classical notion 'virtue', is indispensable. 
But while the people and their representatives may have virtue 
they often lack expertise. Even a parliamentary representative 
who is more or less specialized in a certain field, is often not 
specialized enough to make a good judgement of a case, or to 
decide between several conflicting pieces of advice. 
Moreover there are the problems of alienation and ideology 
which go hand in hand with technological developments, 
especially with developments of information technology as I have 
tried to indicate in this chapter. These ideological elements often 
disguise possible roads to follow and it needs very much virtue 
to look through them. 
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This concludes the first part. The theories we have examined 
clearly show a number of problems which exist with technology 
and science today, especially with information technology which 
seems to be a center of technological and industrial development. 
As far as proposals for solutions are concerned, the level of 
abstraction and also the bias of especially the theories of the 
Frankfurters is such that no practical solutions are possible. 
Although the pernicious effects of technology can be controlled, 
according to these theories it is not clear how this is done. How 
can the effects of alienation, pollution and restraints of mental 
and physical freedom because of technological developments be 
diminished. An obvious conclusion, which is not entirely out of 
line with those who propose power- or domination-free 
communication (although they deny it as insufficietnt), is 
democracy. In the following chapters I will examine, with as an 
example information technology in relation to privacy and 
personal freedom, the possibilities of a 'critical practice' regarding 
the control of technological applications in society. 
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4. Democracy. 
4.1. The Problem of Control. 
Although some of the critisisms formulated in the critical theory 
as I discussed it above are sometimes overstating the issue of 
science and technology, they show some of the difficulties 
connected with an unchecked application of technological and 
scientific findings and above all they show the danger of a single-
minded belief in science and technological rationality. However, 
the critical theory gives us no direction to follow. It does not 
want to give any direction beyond the critical practice of theory 
itself, which was the only practice recognized by Horkheimer and 
Adorno, and domination-free communication. No direction can 
be found also because of contradictions in the intentions of the 
critical theory, which sometimes point at an ideal non-industrial 
society and sometimes point at a society which controls an 
unalienated technology. Therefore we have to look at the 
possibilities that modern western industrial society offers us. We 
remain in the realm of enlightenment and one of the most 
important critical methods of control is clearly democratic 
decision-making. We have here a method of decision-making 
which is based on expectations of communication as complete 
and free as possible and strongly appeals to the sense of 
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responsibility of the citizens themselves. Democracy implies that 
a step by step method is used in trying to reach human 
liberation. This method has two advantages: 
1. The meaning of the notion of liberation is left to the particular 
historical and social circumstances where decisions have to be 
made. In this way the problem of ideologically poluted language 
in respect to attaining domination free communication, hence 
liberation, is avoided. 
2. The democratic method provides us with practical advice as to 
how to improve the human condition. It does not promise 
complete liberation in the sense of Marx and the Frankfurt 
School but it provides society with the possibility of making 
conscious choices which may (or may not) lead to a higher level 
of freedom for its citizens. If democratic choice is in favour of 
less freedom, as in the German elections of 1933, this choice can 
never be a wholly unconscious one. 
It goes without saying that this is not without problems, but I 
believe that the democratic method and its underlying liberal 
theory are not yet exhausted. 
Democracy offers the only realistic way of controlling technology 
and its applications. Also outside of the problems connected with 
technology, it may be expected that when people have a greater 
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say over how society is going to be governed, they become less 
alienated, less cynical, more responsible and better informed. On 
the other hand we see in our society that political decision 
making is so far away from the daily life that the interest in 
voting and other democratic activities is diminishing. Political and 
social responsibility do not seem to touch the interests of the 
average citizen. This brings us to a central question concerning 
democratic control of technology: How can we have democracy, 
when people have no expertise, time and interest to be involved 
in democratic decision making? 
The problem of democracy is connected with that of social 
alienation. The problems of society cannot simply be solved by 
more democracy and more participation. But democracy in all its 
forms, whether limited or extended has at least the potential of 
dealing with the problems of society in a way which is not 
tyrannical and in which mistakes can, in principle, be corrected. 
We may expect that this potential is desirable also for the 
thinkers of the Frankfurt School especially Habermas. They may 
disagree with the prospects of democracy in present day society, 
because modern democracy is seen by them as a product of the 
capitalist society and its ideology, liberal political theory. Having 
said this does not immediately imply that democracy has no 
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influence in capitalist society, nor that it cannot change the basis 
of that society. According to the Frankfurt School it only means 
that the prospect of change and hence the construction of a 
better society is dim. 
It is dim because democracy is closely linked to ideology, first the 
liberal ideology and later, as we have seen above, according to 
Habermas, technological and scientific ideology. The political 
discourse concentrates on 'technical' problems and moves away 
from essential questions, such as how to change the basis of 
society, how to deal with problems of poverty and alienation, how 
to deal with inequality, in short ethical problems. It is clear that 
in our society these concepts are problematic in political 
discourse. 
Therefore I think it is useful to return to Habermas's concept of 
practical and technological conduct and thought. In the classical 
theory of democracy, expressed by early liberal thinkers like 
Rousseau, democracy was not only a means to gain equality and 
to divide wealth, besides gaining liberty, but also very much a 
way of introducing a discourse that goes beyond the mere 
technical, the automatic and inevitable, in political decision 
making. Elements of morality, and perhaps even vague notions 
like wisdom may come to play a role, even if it is a small one. 
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This comes close to the concept of practical conduct. Democracy 
leaves open the possibility of practical conduct and discourse. It 
is something decidedly different from Habermas's ideal of power-
free communication since power plays a great role in politics. But 
most democratic systems have the advantage that power is not in 
the hands of a unified body or a ruler; power is divided. 
In the following pages I will discuss the possibilities of democratic 
control of technology in general. As may have been clear from 
the above, I believe that when we speak about 'control of 
technology (i.e. how, when and where technologie are going to 
be applied)' we actually speak about democratic control of 
technology. If this control is not democratic than we can speak 
of autocracy, at least partly. It would be the autocracy of experts, 
technocrats, etc. Certainly, if we would decide that democratic 
control is not possible, perhaps we have to give extra thought to 
the nature of our society. Every policy, every decision taken by 
governments and large private companies, have effects for society 
as a whole. They almost always involve decision about technology, 
even if we use the limited notion of technology. But they 
certainly involve the rational organization of people and 
equipment, which fits in the extended notion of technology.' 
There is also the legitimate question of, how technology can make democracy 
(better) possible. Modern technology provides us with new possibilities. In the last chapter 
I have briefly mentioned the possibilities of teledemocracy. If such systems would be 
(continued...) 
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In order to be able to arrive at a more explicit proposal about 
how to establish a more (democratic) control of technology, the 
conditions for democracy must be evaluated. 
4.2. Conditions for democracy. 
In his book Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, Robert Dahl gives 
the following criteria for a democracy: 
...[A]n ideal democratic process would satisfy five criteria: 
1. Equality in voting: In making collective binding decisions, the 
expressed preference of each citizen (citizens collectively 
constitute the DEMOS) ought to be taken equally into account 
in determining the final solution. 
2. Effective participation: Throughout the process of collective 
decision making, including the stage of putting matters on the 
agenda, each citizen ought to have adequate and equal 
opportunities for expressing his or her preference as to the final 
outcome. 
3. Enlightened understanding: In the time permitted by the need 
for an decision, each citizen ought to have adequate and equal 
opportunities for arriving at his or her considered judgement as 
to the most desirable outcome. 
4. Final control over the agenda: The body of citizens (the 
demos) should have the exclusive authority to determine what 
matters are or are not to be decided by means of processes that 
satisfy the first three criteria. (Put in another way, provided the 
(...continued) 
implemented in the now mainly pluralist representative systems, it would signal a 
reemergence of direct democracy as a part of the total process of democratic decision 
making. 
But as Arterton remarks, also television held the great promise of 'a revolution of 
information for citizens', a promise which is unfortunately not fulfilled. (Arterton, ibid., 
p. 16.) Where informative debates were expected, political commercials emerged leaving the 
citizen with all but better knowledge. 
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demos does not alienate its final control over the agenda it may 
delegate authority to others who may make decisions by 
nondemocratic processes). 
5. Inclusion: The demos ought to include all adults subject to its 
laws, except transients.79 
These conditions are truly ideals. We all know that they are not 
fulfilled in our 'real existing' democracies. To take the quite 
obvious situation about the first condition. Equality in voting 
sometimes still offers some problems. In a country like France, 
for instance, certain areas have a proportionally lesser weight in 
elections (urban areas) than others (rural areas). 
The formal possibility of effective participation does not always 
lead to real participation, to say the least. Many citizens do not 
vote and do not look for ways to influence political decisions. 
The turnout for voting is declining over the last twenty years in 
most Western democracies.80 Basically the only moment of real 
influence is the moment of voting. In order to be able to speak 
of a democracy, participation should have a deeper meaning. 
That is why the proponents of teledemocracy advertise their 
technological systems of influence and referenda. They believe 
that such means give the average citizen better access to political 
leaders. 
The problem of apathy and lack of interest was first noticed in 
the United States. The so-called American 'popular image' of the 
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citizen is at odds with the real citizen. This popular image sees 
the average citizen as " a hard working individual of modest 
means and independent mind, attentive to public affairs, 
protective of his own interests but fair in balancing those 
interests against the interests of others and of the polity in 
general."81 
This picture is very far away from the truth. There was in the 
nineteen fifties an increasing stream of evidence that the 
American citizen was not as interested in politics as was 
presumed in the prevailing ideology of the day. 
As a result of these findings a new direction of political 
theorizing came about. It was directed towards the rule of groups 
or elites. "[T]he key characteristic of this model of democracy was 
that no single group or minority coalition of groups dominated in 
all important areas of political decision."82 The democratic 
potential of these ruling groups or elites is that they are more 
committed to democratic principles than the people they were 
supposed to represent. The process of government consists in this 
view in bargaining and compromise.83 
The opportunity to obtain an enlightened understanding of the 
issues at hand is difficult even for politicians. Sometimes the 
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problems connected to the current issues are so complex that it 
requires a specialised education in order to be able to choose 
between options. Economic issues are a good example. The ever 
ongoing discussion between economic schools as to how avert or 
ameliorate economic crisis shows us the difficulties experts have 
with such problems, even if we discount ideological biases which 
exist between the various schools. How then could the average 
citizen decide between the existing options? I will return to this 
problem below. 
Final control over the agenda is very difficult. Most citizens have 
only some control over the agenda again at the moment of 
voting. They vote for candidates or parties, and doing so they 
implicitly vote for an agenda as seen by these candidates or 
parties. Only through membership of a party agenda setting can 
be influenced between elections, if the party consults its members 
frequently enough. 
The condition of inclusion of all adult citizens in the demos is 
perhaps now fulfilled in most democratic countries. But then only 
relatively recent. In the United States, Negroes were excluded 
from voting for a long time. Moreover, also not so long ago in 
Switzerland women were excluded from voting. In 1971 a federal 
law was accepted which gave women the right to vote. However, 
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in some cantons and local communities women are still excluded 
from voting.84 
The problem of how to improve on the present situation, and 
how to establish true democracies which come close to the ideal 
is subject to intense discussion. I cannot and do not want to give 
final solutions. I believe, however, that there is a possibility of 
improving the mechanisms of democratic rule. 
4.3. The pluralist model. 
The 'plural-elite' theories of democracy have two advantages over 
other theories, according to Margolis. "1. Their empirical basis 
leads to realistic assessments of citizen's abilities to govern; 2. 
their emphasis on procedures to assure open competition among 
elites leaves citizens with a wide range of choices for 
leadership."85 
Margolis notes that these procedures are in itself a safeguard for 
democracy. He proposes five conditions which have to be 
observed when trying to improve democracy: 
1. ways have to be found to control the large public 
bureaucracy; 
2. the military's control of budgetary resources and technical 
knowledge has to be eliminated; 
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3. the concentration of wealth and income, especially in 
certain groups and powerful corporations (the ruling class?) has 
to be controlled; 
4. the society's resources which are assigned to the under-
privileged in society have to be increased to a level where these 
underprivileged have a change to participate in the political 
process on an equal basis with other groups; 
5. all of the above have to be managed "within the limits of 
natural resources available for development at reasonable 
economic and environmental cost."86 
A (marxist) point of critique would, of course, be that the 'plural-
elite' theorists have no attention for class-differences that actually 
explain the difference in possibilities in participation in the 
bourgeois democratic system.' 
In Western industrialized democratic countries the term 
democratic control is mostly understood in terms of controlling 
I think we do not have to go as far as that, but I believe that the above points 
should at least be taken into account by the 'plural-elite* theorists. The notion of class-
diferences would not only clarify the differences in the possibilities in participation in a 
democratic system but also explain, at least partly, the actual lack of motivation to 
participate. People belonging to lower strata or classes share often the experience of having 
no real possibilities of influence. They therefore do not vote or participate in political 
activities, or they tend sometimes to side with parties and groups which are already 
powerful. Two clear examples are the United States where clearly the Republican turn-
out for voting is higher than the Democratic turn-out, although the democratic party is 
estimated to have more potential supporters than the Republican party (mostly from the 
lower strata). And Britain where the conservative Thatcher government has been in power 
for more than ten years, thanks to support that came for a large part from the workers and 
lower strata in Britain. 
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the enormous government bureaucracy. In relation to the theories 
that I have discussed in earlier chapters this control is necessary 
for a number of reasons: 
1. Capitalism is moving to a bureaucratic society of a 
particularly stifling kind. What I call a bureaucratic society is a 
variation on the prediction of Schumpeter*: the end of 
entrepreneurship and the take-over by bureaucratic managers 
both at the government and at the corporate level. The 
difference between the private and the public sphere tends to 
disappear and democratic institutions are rendered powerless 
because of bureaucratic technicalities.87 
2. This movement towards a totally bureaucratic society with 
its patterns of rationalistic legitimation by means of science and 
There are in Schumpeter's view economic reasons which may, although not merely 
by themselves, bring about the end of capitalism. These reasons are technological 
development in combination with an increasing concentration of capital, the emergence of 
the giant company. This results in the disappearance of the entrepreneur, who created these 
companies in the first place. This is not very different from the point of view of Marx who 
maintained that socialism is only possible when the forces of production are sufficiently 
developed, and that the actual change to socialism, when the time is ripe, is a political 
and not an economic process. 
Within the political system there exists the possibility of changing the (socio-)economic 
system because the voter may implicitly vote for options which he cannot assess properly 
and which may be not in his direct interest. (For Schumpeter, workers and capitalist share 
interests in the capitalist system, in spite of their apparent differences.) This is so because 
he may be persuaded by the politicians he is voting for and because the results of his 
choices are not immediately felt. The psychology of the bourgeoisie, according to 
Schumpeter, is not fit to function as the leaders of men as the feudal lord could or his 
counterpart the politician can. The bourgeoisie is basically rationalistic and unheroic. 
Schumpeter predicts the emergence of socialism. A socialism that is not necessary 
egalitarian, but centers around a central authority, the 'ministry of industry'. See 
Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy London, 1943, p. 134-6. 
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technology induces feelings of alienation and powerlessness in the 
citizens. Although bureaucratic activity can be enhanced and 
made quicker through modern technology, it may not make 
society easier to understand let alone easier to direct in an 
democratic way. A meritocratic elite may (silently) come about, 
which gains a level of control that is unsurpassed because of the 
aid of modern information technology. 
3. The absolute control by such an elite may inhibit free 
development of not only political, social and cultural ideas but 
also of scientific and technological ideas that are not in the line 
of its direct interests. 
In order to keep such developments at bay the problem of 
expertise has to be discussed. If we believe that, in principle, the 
people are the ones who should rule, we have to solve the 
problem of how they can rule in a world where they are 
confronted with problems which require a high level of 
specialised expertise. The problem of controlling technology is 
also a problem of expertise. 
There is no doubt that when even an institution of 
representatives of the people, like a parliament, has great 
difficulty assessing the depth of certain key problems, as 
discussions about for instance nuclear energy, disarmament, and 
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other key issues demonstrate. The people who bring out their 
vote for them or in any other way are asked to decide over 
policy matters find that they have great difficulty to do so. 
4.4. Technical expertise, moral competence and virtue. 
In discussing the necessity of control of nuclear weapons, Robert 
Dahl touches upon difficulties of democratic rule. He points out 
that some issues which are of ultimate importance, like decisions 
about the use of nuclear weapons, are so complex that it seems 
to be impossible to deal with them in a democratic way. 
[T]he democratic process has clearly failed to function in 
controlling what may well be the most important decisions that 
will ever be made on this earth. Because of the boundless 
complexity of the issues involved in these decisions, perhaps the 
democratic process is inherently incapable of controlling them, 
and others of similar complexity.88 
It may be necessary, therefore, to leave control of these matters 
to those who are competent. In other words to allow for a 
'hybrid political system' where democratic rule and rule which is 
not democratically controlled together. Dahl observes that this is 
already a de facto situation. Democracy and meritocracy go 
together in modern democracies, and this is not only the case 
where nuclear weapons are an issue. Specialists often exercise 
more power than non specialists, such as the voters. The 
argument of guardianship as opposed to democracy is that often 
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wise and virtuous decisions cannot be taken in a democratic way, 
that it is better to have wise and undemocratic decisions than 
democratic but unwise decisions. 
In a state governed by guardians, much in the style of Plato's 
Republic, expertise in certain complex issues could be combined 
with wisdom, i.e. moral competence and virtue. Only those who 
are 'qualified' should rule. Being politically competent means that 
three qualities should be present: 
1. moral understanding, i.e. knowledge of the proper goals that 
a government, presenting the interests of its subjects, should seek. 
This should be combined with the desire or disposition to act 
upon these goals, i.e. virtue. This results then in, 
2. moral competence. These two are not enough. They should be 
supplemented with practical knowledge of how to reach these 
proper ends. This leads to, 
3. Technical or instrumental knowledge." 
If we accept that not everyone has the possibility of moral 
competence, than we should be strongly inclined to do away with 
democratic rule. 
ibid., p. 25. Dahl observes that these criteria were initially proposed by J.S Mill, 
in his book Considerations on Representative Government. 
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But the view that there is no fundamental equality among human 
beings in this respect is unacceptable. This is so not only on 
moral grounds, but also that we may expect that only the private 
individual, when in his full mental capacities, can define and 
properly defend his own interests. Therefore, giving the defence 
of interests of citizens in the hands of an uncontrollable 
government is an abomination. 
Meritocrats or technocrats suffer from a number of limitations. 
They have, like every other human being, the possibility of moral 
understanding even moral competence. But their technical (or 
technological) knowledge has the tendency to limit their views. 
There is no science or philosophy that enables one to rule justly. 
Plato's ideal of the unification of moral and instrumental 
understanding does not exist, and any claim in that direction is 
wrong. 
But the weakness of such claims could easily be shown to the 
satisfaction of most of us by a simple test: let them explain what 
their policies would be in a dozen different areas of policy, let 
them oe subjected to examination by experts in each area, and 
let us be the judges of their performance.89 
The probable outcome would be widely differing proposals among 
the claimants, which in their turn also differ with the experts 
ideas about the issues. 
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A third limitation is that instrumental knowledge rests upon 
certain world-views, which in themselves are not necessarily 
scientific. Views which may be not at all compatible with the 
problems at hand and the decision which should be taken.90 
Anothef, but similar, consideration is proposed by Shils in his 
book The Torment of Secrecy, he proposes a certain amount of 
educated 'amateurism' in the government, on high and lower 
levels, in a plural society. Not only is specialization in a certain 
field too narrow to be able to rule wisely, specialization of task 
and training is often characterized by an absence of concern for 
the fields outside the area of expertness.91 
The amateurs attitude is a necessity for freedom. It is obviously 
not the sole precondition. The amateur attitude is compatible 
with the utmost contempt for the mass of the population and 
the denial of their claims to dignity and justice. Amateurism is 
compatible with frivolousness, irresponsibility and incompetence 
to a degree great enough to destroy the social order, and it 
often threatens to turn into dilettantism. It is compatible with 
cruelty. It should not, therefore, be interpreted as an inevitable 
determinant of a regime of liberty. It is the underlying attitude 
of amateurism rather than functional amateurism that is so 
important to liberal society. It is the disposition and sense of 
affinity with a variety of fields of action which is perfectly 
compatible with specialization but which appreciates the dignity 
of spheres other than that in which the individual is specialized. 
The amateur attitude towards other fields is perfectly compatible 
with specialization but which appreciates the dignity of spheres 
other than that in which the individual is specialized. The 
amateur attitude towards other fields is perfectly compatible 
with reasonable specialization in one field, and without that 
combination modern liberal society would have a very hard time. 
The combination protects the relative autonomy of the spheres, 
acknowledging the value of the activities which make them up, 
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providing the motives for the concern for one's own and respect 
for others.92 
These considerations should be enough not to trust in any expert 
rule, however indispensable expertise may be. There is also the 
problem of virtue. According to Dahl it is the willingness to act 
selflessly in favour of the interests of others. There are many 
examples that this is a not uncommon phenomenon among 
people, but to trust in it is contrary to experience with rulers, 
since power tend to corrupt and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely, according to Acton. 
Dahl proposes a body which has to accomplish a number of 
objectives helped by technology adapted to a democratic goal. 
This technology clearly is an information technology which 
connects all interested citizens to this body, so that they may be 
able to influence decision-making. 
The objectives are: 
1. To ensure that information about the political agenda, 
appropriate in level and form, and accurately reflecting the best 
knowledge available, is easily and universally accessible to all 
citizens; 
2. To create easily available and universally accessible 
opportunities to all citizens to influence the informational 
agenda, and to participate in a relevant way in political 
discussions. 
3. To provide a highly informed body of public opinion that 
(except for being highly informed) is representative of the entire 
citizen body.93 
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The centre where this information may be received and relayed 
back to the public could be an Information Institution which is 
concerned with electronic data-gathering and dissemination.'94 
This proposal is not without problems. Geraint Parry remarks: 
The hopes of the most fervent direct democrats are likely to 
prove unrealistic. Developments in communications technology 
so far suggest that politics is as liable to be treated as an 
entertainment which competes with other entertainments. A 
modern Plato would probably perceive the 'fickle' public as 
'zapping' from one channel to another to avoid public affairs 
(witn the concomitant fear that it would use its voting button in 
the same way).95 
These technological possibilities would probably not serve their 
purpose to the full for the voting public as a whole, unless they 
can be forced to watch the channel where public affairs are dealt 
with. This is an unlikely possibility. It would still be an extra 
opportunity to give information to those who want it. 
Dahl furthermore proposes a highly informed body, of 'amateurs' 
in Shils' sense, which is representative of the entire citizen body. 
They would be chosen by a random process, in such a way that 
they according to statistical standards would mirror the whole 
As I will discuss later at greater length the function of such an institution is that 
all essential information would be essentially controlled by that institution (through its own 
activity and the data surveillance it would perform at both public and private 
organizations). 
For outside organizations it would be very difficult to tamper with the information 
available (although not impossible). Aside from guaranteeing protection of personal data, 
it could display requested information in levels of difficulty. In this way citizens with very 
different intellectual backgrounds would be able to receive relevant information on their 
own level. 
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population. This minipopulus might decide on an agenda of issues 
according to the information that is gathered among the citizens. 
According to Dahl a minipopulus could exist at any level of 
government.96 
The random process of selecting people for official duties is 
certainly not new. Rousseau and de Montesqieu already proposed 
such methods and claimed that they were democratic. 
'Election by lot,' says Montesquieu,'is democratic in nature.' I 
agree that it is so ... Election by lot would have few 
disadvantages in a real democracy, in which, as equality would 
everywhere exist in morals and talents as well in principles and 
fortunes, it would become almost a matter of indifference who 
is chosen. But I have already said that a real democracy is only 
an ideal. 
When choice and lot are combined, positions that require 
special talents, such as military posts, should be filled by the 
former; the latter does for cases, such as judicial offices, in 
which good sense, justice, and integrity are enough, because in 
a State that is well constituted, these qualities are common to 
all the citizens.97 
When the complexity of issues increases the ease with which 
democratic decision can be made decreases. Already the simple 
fact of the size of population and of the geographical area, that 
even the somewhat smaller democratic nation-states cover, asks 
for a democracy of delegates, or in modern terms a parliamentary 
oriented democracy rather than a system of direct consultation of 
the citizens. According to thinkers like Madison, this is an 
advantage. 
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...[A] pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of 
a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the 
government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs 
of faction....Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater 
variety of parties and interests, you make it less probable that 
a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade 
the rights of other citizens; or if such common motive exists, it 
will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own 
strength, and to act in unison with each other.98 
This argument is still valid to an extent. The only advantage to 
size is that variety is more likely to occur, and consequently 
tyrannic rule becomes more difficult. But this advantage of size 
is not anymore a fail-safe protection against totalitarian or 
tyrannic rule, as Nazi-Germany, grown out of the democratic 
Weimar Republic, has proved. 
Size and parliamentary democracy almost necessarily cause a 
certain degree of alienation because the citizen is not directly in 
touch with political life. This is complicated with the already 
mentioned complexity of issues, so that also in parliaments we 
have delegates who are more or less specialized in the various 
areas where issues arise. The result is that the ordinary citizen 
has at least difficulty in understanding the issues and their 
possible (or proposed) solutions. A further delegation of authority 
to experts, a situation that seems to be in process today, leads to 
increasing alienation of the citizen from government. Then a 
meritocracy may come about, in the guise of democracy. A kind 
of guardianship, as Dahl calls it, might arise that is for all 
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practical purposes indistinguishable from authoritarian rule. Some 
forms of 'quasi-guardianship' already exist in modern 
democracies. It is clear that without these committees society 
cannot function. They are committees like the Supreme Court in 
the United States." 
In the judicial system the reason for this is clear. Judges, 
especially when they are the last instance of judicial decision-
making should be shielded of from the turbulence of democratic 
politics and party politics. Their independence from interest 
groups should be ensured. In itself this is no guarantee that the 
judicial system will really work in an unbiased way but it is a 
necessary condition. 
On the whole the working of the judicial system is subject to 
indirect control, via the legislative and because the proceedings 
are normally public. This means that the people, and when they 
are not technically competent aided by experts in the form of 
journalists or publications by legal experts, can exert indirect 
pressure on the judicial system, be it in very general terms. The 
people working in the judicial system are usually bound by a 
strong moral code enforced by peer councils, which are difficult 
to avoid. 
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So the guardianship of the judicial system or in a strict sense a 
supreme court is really very limited, and is not designed to 
initiate action. This system is seen as indispensable for the 
functioning of a democratic political system, because it is possible 
to sue the state itself, which has to subject itself to the verdicts 
of a court. 
The system of the separation of powers, to which this discussion 
refers, seems to work well in respect to the functioning of the 
judicial system. It maintains the existence of limited guardianship 
balancing the executive and legislative by holding them to the 
laws they have made and execute, and by testing lower laws 
against higher ones, in the case of judicial review.* 
In most modern democratic states the abuse of the judicial 
system by government agencies is by and large impossible. This 
is one of the arguments in favour of a separation of powers. 
The notion of democracy that is implied by Dahl's proposal 
shows, as I have said above, the possibilities of control over 
technological applications and may be seen as in between a direct 
Also in countries where judicial review is not established as an institution it is in 
reality practised, only not in the form it takes in the United States. In the Netherlands, 
for instance, this task is performed by the 'Council of State' (Raad van State) in a mode 
that is quite different from that in the U.S., together (depending on the case) with the 
'High Council' (Hoge Raad) which is the highest court. 
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and representative democracy. I think that aside from political or 
representative democracy and democratic institutions like workers 
self-determination citizens' committees could be involved in 
democratic decision-making. This can, according to Dahl, happen 
on all levels of government, and in all sectors of society, as we 
shall see below. The stress would be laid on political democracy, 
since it is on that level that most general decisions are taken. Still 
citizens' committees can also be consulted on other levels than 
the political. 
One objection to the use of citizen committees is that they 
themselves have to be controlled, somehow, and that this would 
along traditional lines involve a system of voting with possibilities 
of impeachment or something like it. 
Technological decisions and control over highly complex (and 
technological) bureaucratic structures is something that goes 
beyond the abilities and concern of the average citizens. Often 
the decline of citizen-participation is seen as one of the failures 
of modern democracies. 
As in a system with jury-duty, citizens may be required to spend 
time to learn the basics of the area of expertise about which 
decisions have to be taken and over which control has to be 
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exercised. They would have to take part in a council that checks 
the workings of the institution(s) to be controlled and proposes 
ways to improve its functioning. Participation then gets a more 
precise meaning, namely the continuous advice and taking part 
of decision-making required of the polity as a whole in an 
institutionalised form. This does not mean that the 'normal' 
process of representative democracy, with a parliament and an 
executive which interact with interest groups, has to be abolished. 
On the contrary, institutionalized citizen participation combined 
with normal representative democracy, may enhance decision-
making because an element of general interest is (re)introduced 
in society. 
There, however, are some elements in a complex democratic 
society like ours that have to be taken into account, when we 
consider citizen participation in the form of committees. 
4.5. Controlling technology. 
When we talk about the problems of 'industrial society' we 
implicitly talk about technology. Typical elements of industrial 
society are the change in personal relations and the position of 
the individual in respect to previous societies. The individual 
person has become autonomous and isolated. 
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These phenomena can be seen as a result of industrial society 
with its ever increasing division of labour. This has caused the 
breakdown of the earlier methods of production found in the 
guild system and agricultural production in a feudal setting and 
ultimately the destruction of the extended family. 
The notions of individuality, as they were proposed by many 
thinkers in the renaissance and in the enlightenment period, and 
putting into practice in modern capitalism summoned a large 
number of problems. Alienation belongs to the more serious of 
them. Very often the individual is perceived as standing on the 
losing side of the struggle for control over his environment with 
impersonal institutions and powers. 
There have been situations where, because of alienation and the 
rational pursuit of private or institutional interests, the most basic 
interests of the human being have been greatly damaged. 
Western democratic political thought has always been directed 
towards the avoidance of tyranny. Tyranny is usually defined in 
such a way as to say that individual interests are damaged by the 
dictatorial powers of a government. 
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But we can go much further than that. It would not be a strange 
thing to say that the interests of large corporations have the 
ability of damaging individual interests both of their workers as 
of the general public. The incident with poisonous industrial 
exhaust in Bhopal in India is one of the more extreme examples 
where corporate interest (private according to the law) were such 
that no extra protection of the population and workers was seen 
as desirable. 
The arbitrary influence of corporate action on the life and 
interests of individuals can be seen as a form of tyranny. It can 
be seen as a form of tyranny because no specific justification of 
its actions is necessary. Still the demand for justification of its 
actions would seem stronger "the more a decision departs from 
legitimate expectations. The demand is also stronger the more a 
decision harms individuals. ...Decisions that most dramatically 
depart from legitimate expectations and that produce extensive 
harm to individuals require the strongest justification."'100 
Soltan (1987) proposes a supply and demand model in regard to justification and 
tyranny. The source of the demand for justification is the potential or actual violation of 
the rights of the individual. There is a balance between this demand and the supply of 
justification:"A decision is not tyrannous even if it is harmful and departs from legitimate 
expectations as long as it is justified with sufficient persuasive force." (Soltan, 1978, p.3.) 
It would not be difficult to find examples of situations where authoritarian governments 
(or guardians in Dahl's terms) would be so aware of the collective and private interests of 
a population that they would take farseeing and enlightened measures against such 
arbitrariness on the part of large and perhaps even small privately owned corporations. 
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In the light of this we can repeat the obvious remark that it can 
be maintained that no other person can claim to have better 
knowledge of another person's interest than that other person 
himself (children and mentally retarded people are of course a 
different class in this sense). Democracy is supported by this 
claim combined with the principle of political equality.101 
A solution to the above mentioned problems can be found in the 
democratic organization of society, which has to go a great deal 
further than merely political democracy as we know it now. There 
are strong arguments against a democratic, decentralized system 
which would come about when more sectors of society become 
democratized. Soltan formulates this in the following way: 
A decentralized, piecemeal decision-making system tends, first 
of all, to suffer from the problems of...the logic of collective 
action. Even as each special interest gains advantages from the 
state in its area of interest the effect of the granting of 
advantages to a broad ranee of groups is to make them all 
worse off then they would otherwise be. Furthermore, a 
decentralized pluralist system of this kind favors decisions whose 
benefits are concentrated and costs dispersed, even if the total 
costs outweigh the benefits. It also blocks decisions whose costs 
are concentrated and benefits dispersed even if the benefits 
outweigh the costs. The only solution seems to be to centralize 
decision-making and to increase the power of central authorities 
relative to the various specialized groups. This is the main 
argument in favor of various forms of authoritarianism in 
countries in which democracy is not fully institutionalized 
(especially the developing world). In more stable democracies it 
has been used as an argument for strengthening the executive 
(the Presidency in the U.S.), strengthening and centralizing 
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political parties and develop neo-corporatist tendencies in the 
process of interest articulation.102 
If this is true than the use of democratic institutions of lower 
levels of government and administration as well as on the highest 
level may be a necessary counterweight against the centralization 
of power in the hands of only a few. 
The existence of citizens committees on key places within an 
administrative structure is not incompatible with a certain element 
of centralisation. And with the application of modern information 
technology, it does not even have to slow down procedures. The 
technology that can bring about a strictly controlled society may 
also give the power of control in the hands of the citizens 
without impairing the ability to react quickly and adequately to 
changing circumstances. 
The guarantee of private life in the face of the ever increasing 
power of a government and other interested more private 
organizations to interfere with a person's freedom and private 
life, through information technology, seems to me an interesting 
case for a study in the possibilities of citizens-committees. 
Therefore, in the next chapters, I will deal with the debate about 
data-protection and discuss several legislations of a number of 
countries that try to cope with this phenomenon. 
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5. Data protection. 
Since the end of the 1960s the issue of data protection has been 
quite important. This issue resulted in a number of publications 
and subsequently in legislation in a number of Western countries. 
The problem of data protection* came about when the powers of 
surveillance of the state, but also of private organizations and 
companies were greatly enhanced by the large scale appearance 
of the computer. The problem if data protection is in the first 
place a problem of information technology. 
The problem can be stated as follows: 
1. There is an increased surveillance of the individual, 
2. Information is held about the individual which may be used or 
abused to force him to do or to comply to things which he would 
in other circumstances not do or comply to. 
When we talk about data protection we always mean by that term the protection 
of the individual from the use or abuse of data about his or her person or private life 
stored in databases. The term 'data protection' is than wrong. We mean the protection of 
individual privacy as far as the collection and dissemination of data is concerned. In French 
literature it is called 'La protection du secret de la vie prive'e'.(Kayser, La Protection de la 
Vie Privie, Paris/Aix-en-Provence, 1984, pp. 12-15). It seems to me that this terminology, 
although it is somewhat unwieldy is more correct, although it points only at one aspect of 
privacy or private life. However, for the purposes of this study I will continue to use the 
term 'data protection' because of its wide use in the above mentioned sense. 
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3. Information is held by public or private organizations which is 
not necessary for reaching the goals of these organization. This 
information increases their power over the individual. 
4. People do not want information about them tobe held outside 
their power to decide whether it can be disclosed or not. 
5. Information may be held on people which they would never 
want to disclose. This information may be quite irrelevant and 
simple, but disclosure may cause embarrassment. 
The monitoring of personal data is a form of surveillance that is 
exercised over the individual. The purpose of surveillance is social 
control. The problem is stated in a negative way. It is as though 
the gathering and storing of personal information is in itself a 
bad thing. But this is not necessarily so. Surveillance and social 
control are not always connected with manipulation or repression. 
However, most forms of social control, connected with the 
problem of data protection "have to do with the enforcement of 
norms. That is, surveillance sustems ... mainly work to monitor 
compliance with the standards of bahavior, and to enable 
organizations to promote what they deem desirable social 
conditions or practices."103 
An obvious example (out of many) are the British police forces. 
They have established a computer system which holds private 
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information about a large number of people. The Police National 
Computer Unit holds besides criminal information, information on 
citizens who have never committed any crime. To every record 
additional information may be added as to which political 
associations the person belongs to, etc. In short anyone who is in 
the opinion of the police on local or national level worthwhile to 
keep an eye on is in the PNCU.104 
When the creation of PNCU was announced 'Police Review' 
remarked that it: 'is to be far more comprehensive than any 
other computerised intelligence service in the world' (5.5.72), 
and went on to describe this general development in policing: 
'Police intelligence is now forward-looking, anticipating who is 
going to commit what, when and where, and because it is so 
purposeful it is also frequently libellous... Much of the 
information is personal details of a suspect, his family associates, 
way of life and although it may seem to trespass on the 
freedom of the individuafit is the bread and butter of successful 
policemanship.'105 
In principle, police organizations are ultimately controlled by a 
legislative body. Abuse of information could, again in principle, 
be brought to the attention of a parliament which can ask for 
explanation from the responsible members of the executive. 
Security agencies are not controlled. They have similar tasks as 
the police but their internal urge for surveillance and control 
runs unchecked. They keep records on people which fall, 
according to Bunyan, into three categories: 
i) those suspected of being foreign espionage agents in the direct 
or indirect (but conscious) employment of a foreign power; 
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ii) those employed by the state or in key industries who work on 
'sensitive' areas; and leading business people, MPs, and the 
media; 
iii) those considered to be 'subversives' by the agencies.106 
The second category is therefore important and has considerable 
effects on the private life of a person. It is the task of 'vetting' 
persons who are going to be employed in the bureaucracy and in 
key (for national security) industries. By giving negative 
information the whole career of someone may be ruined. 
An even greater problem occurs with the third category. It is not 
very clear what subversion really is. Definitions range from 'the 
contemplation of the overthrow of government by unlawful 
means', which remains within the limits of legal definitions of 
unlawful means, to the current definition of subversion: 
'Those activities which threaten the safety or wellbeing of the 
State, and are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent meansV07 
Bunyan remarks that the second definition is no longer restricted 
to unlawful means, and can therefore mean all activity which is 
only slightly critical of government. It means an extension of the 
area of possible surveillance and control of such organizations to 
perfectly legal activities of citizens, such as trade union and 
political activities. 
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The police and security organization are obvious examples with 
which the problem of data protection can be demonstrated. But 
one could think also of the databases of large organizations used 
for advertising campaigns, hospitals or medical organizations 
which want to keep track of certain diseases and how they 
develop in the population, tax offices, social security, etc. 
The question remains why such levels of surveillance came about. 
The mere appearance of the computer cannot be the only 
explanation. There must be a felt need for surveillance. 
5.1. The origins of surveillance. 
The origins of surveillance can be described in two ways. One is 
an explanation which shows historical elements that gave rise to 
the emergence of surveillance. The other is an approach which 
concentrates on changes of the environment in which 
organizations work and the relation of the individual with such 
organizations. The two approaches are complementary, and to an 
extent overlap. 
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Historically, the problem of surveillance arises, although not 
always experienced as such at the time, with the beginning of 
state intervention in social and economic affairs. 
If we look at some developments we can distinguish a 
development from 'non-intervention' to 'the welfare-state' as the 
growth of state-intervention in private life. In the nineteenth 
century 'the state' in various western countries gradually loses its 
neutral position and after the great depression of 1873 the liberal 
era of free trade comes to an end. A certain increase of 
protectionism and the process of securing the flow of raw 
materials for domestic industries by occupying or dominating 
large territories in Africa and Asia were the ways in which states 
intervene in what was in liberalism seen as private economic 
areas.108 
It does not stop with these developments. From the economic 
sphere state intervention extends itself to the social sphere. The 
upshot of Keynesian economic policy is the securing of consumer 
markets. Through state payments in the form of large, projects 
which both provide many previously unemployed with an income 
and improve the infrastructure of a country and a system of 
social security the state preserves a 'bottom' of consumption 
which is beneficial for the domestic economy. 
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Such organization of state intervention requires a large 
bureaucracy which administrates and records large amounts of 
data necessary for the execution of the state's tasks. The 
individual finds himself in a society which is like a large spider-
web of organizations and structures which do not only give him 
opportunities to develop himself but also turn him into an object 
of state concern rather than a subject.109 
The individual has lost the connection with the intimate small 
community of pre-industrial society. Urbanization and the 
separation of work and residence has eliminated the social 
control of the small community. In the place of the small 
community, structures have come about which can give the 
individual both large opportunities of development and freedom 
but at the same time can impose a form of control which goes 
beyond that of the small community. Examples are the 
standardization of education, social security, the protection of 
what is seen as vital economic and military interests. These 
examples have the effect of liberalization and at the same time 
the tendency to categorize and therefore judging individual 
aspects as intelligence, diligence, standardized knowledge, 
incentive, etc. In order to measure such aspects of an individual 
a whole range of social and psychological testing methods have 
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been developed, from the most crude to the most refined.* Even 
without being overtly authoritarian or even totalitarian modern 
western states want to know things about citizens, and sometimes 
not only their own citizens.110 
Saying this is not in itself a value judgement. It seems to me that 
the state in modern society has to administrate at least a 
minimum of personal data in order to perform its functions. The 
old liberal ideology of individual liberty however, is no longer, as 
has been noted before, valid for the workings of the state in a 
capitalist society. 
The other approach can be divided in two parts. First there are 
some writers who concentrate on the balance of social relations. 
Westin, in his book Privacy and Freedom, adopts a model of 
balanced social relationships which are disturbed through the 
advance of technology. This disturbance creates problems for 
privacy not anticipated in the privacy protecting conventions of 
earlier periods. Westin argues that the desire to restrict access to 
personal information had a great influence in the framing of the 
American Constitution.111 But he does not think, however, that 
there is anything inherently dangerous in the growth of use of 
personal data. The wrongs which are connected with surveillance 
" See Chapter 3. 
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systems are for Westin, merely the improper handling of 
particular individual cases.112 The only thing that has to be done 
is 'restoring the balance'. 
Similar ideas are proposed by Arthur Miller in his book Assault 
on Privacy. The balance of social relations is disturbed. Not 
merely because technological developments have led to the 
increased flow of information. But also because information is 
handled in a way which is incorrect. 'Sometimes he seems 
concerned that personal-data systems collect more data than is 
really necessary.113 Elsewhere, however, he seems most concerned 
about personal data filed without extenuating or explanatory 
information114 - in other words, about the dangers of not keeping 
enough data.'115 
The concept of the balance of social relations seems to be too 
simple for a real explanation. It does not take into account the 
'shift in prerogatives and power involved in the development of 
surveillance systems. ...Implying that the "wrongs" associated with 
these systems are simply matters of improper handling of 
particular individual cases, [] fails to address the larger social 
effects of these systems. 
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For another explanation of the reasons for the emergence of 
surveillance systems we have to go back to the technology 
discussion of the first chapter. There I proposed the idea that 
technology is not so much the development of devices and their 
systematic interaction and use, but that technology is a broader 
system of organization directed towards control over nature. This 
includes that part of nature which is human, the individual and 
society. The underlying motive is the 'quest for certainty', dealing 
with a contingent world by purposive-rational means. 
Rule follows this line of thought by remarking that formal 
organizations are trying to cope with uncertainty in their 
environments. They do this by trying to keep track of the 
uncertain aspects in their environment in order to be able to 
improve "planning, adjustments, and arrangements and the like so 
as to achieve their desired result."116 
...[] Only formal organizations in the modern sense devote 
themselves so systematically and self-consciously to searching for 
unpredictable or disruptive elements in the environment, and 
attempting to master them so as to achieve desired results.117 
The environment for most if not all organizations is for the 
largest part made up of people. The uncertainties to be mastered 
is to what people "deserve" as an organizational response to their 
actions. 
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Rule draws attention to the fact that not all organizations have 
a need for surveillance, even when they deal with a large number 
of people. For instance, a sports stadium selling tickets for a 
cricket match has no need for a surveillance system monitoring 
personal data on its citizens.* Rule gives a number of conditions 
under which surveillance systems seem to develop: 
1. When an agency must regularly deal with a clientele too large 
and anonymous to be kept track of on a basis of face-to-face 
acquaintance; 
2. When these dealings entail the enforcement of rules 
advantageous to the agency and politically burdensome to the 
clientele; 
3. When these enforcement activities involve decision-making 
about how to act towards the clientele... 
4. When the decisions must be made discriminatingly, according 
to precise details of each person's past history or present 
situation; 
5. When the agency must associate every client with what it 
considers the full details of his past history, especially so as to 
forestall people's evading the consequences of past behavior.118 
The first reason is by far the most important. In a small scale 
social environmant the other reasons would be easier to 
overcome without resorting to modern surveillance systems. 
Therfore for Rule in Private Lives and Public Surveillance the 
change of social scale is the underlying explanation for the rise 
of surveillance as an aid to social control.119 
I deliberately took cricket as an example, because its viewers appear to be quite 
peaceful in their behaviour. Football is, nowadays unfortunately, a sport that somehow 
summons violent behaviour in many of its supporters. There screening and surveillance may 
be felt necessary by the stadions, selling tickets, but certainly by the police. 
181 
The connection between the growth of social scale and 
surveillance is according to Rule most clearly found in the 
centralization of surveillance activities. 
Here most clearly one notes the constraints exerted on mass 
surveillance by the growth of scale, constraints pressing directly 
towards increased capacity. These constraints derive from the 
fact that it fails to hold its clients as fully as possible responsible 
for their actions, because of this, every surveillance system must 
aim to accomplish two things. First, it must strive to collect the 
most 'complete' information as possible on its clients. And, 
second, it must make sure that clients cannot easily escape 
measures of control based on such information.120 
Surveillance, which is the monitoring of personal data, is directed 
towards social control. Rule warns that surveillance and social 
control does not necessarily mean 'manipulation' or 'repression'. 
But 'the forms of social control discussed ..., however, often have 
to do with the enforcement of norms. That is, surveillance 
systems ... work mainly to monitor compliance with standards of 
behavior, and to enable organizations to promote what they deem 
desirable social conditions or practices'.121 
According to Rule there are three methods of enforcement which 
need surveillance: 
1. excluding troublesome people from participation. 
2. adjustment of privileges accorded to individuals to the risks 
which they pose for the controllers (an example Rule uses is the 
extension of credit for credit card owners). 
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3. actively reach out to curtail behaviour considered 
undesirable.122 
The problems lie, obviously, in the gathering and using of private 
information in order to be able to discriminate between people 
in the environment of an organization. Exclusion of troublesome 
people, the adjustment of privileges and curtailing undesirable 
behaviour is dependent on up to date personal information. 
Surveillance can result in limiting freedom, intruding in what 
people experience as their private lives. Privacy and freedom 
seem to be essential notions in this discussion. 
5.2. Privacy, freedom and the individual. 
Often privacy is only seen in relation to liberty. As such it is also 
defined in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man from 
the United Nations (December 10, 1948). Privacy is seen in 
relation to the protection of private life, or family life. And it 
ought to have legal protection against investigations and 
subsequent disclosure. Therefore it is sometimes referred to as 
the 'secret of the private life'. The protection of this secret lies 
also in the protection against investigations concerning religion 
and political beliefs and affiliations.123 
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Privacy, however, besides political elements, is rooted in the 
cultural, social and psychological aspects of our society. Privacy 
was certainly not considered a value of great importance in every 
historical period and every culture." Western society expressed a 
gradual concern for privacy, especially in the nineteenth 
century.124 
The relation with liberty is very strong. Liberty, as John Stuart 
Mill puts it, is the protection which is offered against tyranny. 
Tyranny does not simply take the form of a dictatorship, where 
all power is in the hands of one person or a small elite. Tyranny 
can have a popular form, as Mill with great insight remarks: 
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, 
and still is vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through 
the acts of public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived 
that when society is itself the tyrant - society collectively over 
the separate individuals who compose it - its means of tyranny 
are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hand of its 
political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own 
mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or 
any mandates at all in thing with which it ought not to meddle, 
it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds 
of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such 
extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating 
much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul 
itself.125 
The maxim proposed is the society can only interfere with an 
individual when self-protection of itself or other citizens is at 
stake.126 Hence every individual is free to do whatever he/she 
For a more general anthropological discussion of privacy Barringtom Moore Jr.'s 
book Privacy, Studies in Social and Cultural History, Newbury Park, Ca., 1987. 
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wants as long as it does not inteferes with the freedom of other 
citizens. 
The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must 
not make "himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains 
from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts 
according to his own inclination and judgement in things which 
concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion 
should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without 
molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost. 
That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most 
part, are only half truths; that the unity of opinion, unless 
resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite 
opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, 
until mankind are much more capable than at present of 
recognising all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to 
men% modes of action, not less than to their opinions.127 
The second part of the citation is interesting because it shows 
another reason why liberty, not only physical privacy but also of 
action and thought, are necessary. It is the element of truth. The 
suppression of idea's is wrong because they may be true. Only 
open discussion can bring out their truth. On the other hand true 
idea's cannot be maintained as such without open and free 
discussion, otherwise they become dead dogma.128 
The two notions which are central are the freedon of thought, 
action and speech which are only limited where anothers freedom 
to do so is endangered, or when it forms an intrusion into 
someone's private life. Both freedom, in the form of acting 
publicly as privacy are important attributes of the individual. 
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Rule makes a distinction between aesthetic privacy and strategic 
privacy. Strategic privacy is the information about a person or 
held by a person which serve as a means to an end or may have 
future consequences. Rule uses the example of a person who 
conceals plans for future employment from the present employer 
or the witholding of ambiguous medical information from 
someone until certainty is obtained.129 Strategic privacy can clearly 
be extended to having political and religious beliefs. Disclosing 
such information may in some cases lead to difficulties with an 
employer or restrictions of normal liberties by the state. This is 
perhaps less privacy in the normal sense. It includes the 
possibility to withold information about possible future public 
actions. It is only partly private. It is private where it concerns 
what one considers ones own intimate sphere, but it is related to 
freedom of thought, expression and action where it concerns ones 
position in work, political action, etc. 
The opposite of strategic privacy points at the psychological and 
more intimate elements of privacy. Rule calls this "aesthetic 
privacy". It is the desire to conceal personal information as an 
end in itself. Disclosure brings embarrassment or distress rather 
than having other effects. Examples are quite obvious, they 
concern the act of excretion, sexuality and profound emotions.130 
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The impression may exist that surveillance is only a matter of 
'strategic privacy' and individual freedom. However, it is not at 
all farfetched that certain authoritarian regimes use the disclosure 
of aesthetic private information about their perceived political 
enemies to harass them, or to put them in a bad public position. 
This all depends on the official morals of a nation. But examples 
are easily found in the German and Soviet history and more 
recently in the United States, which does not even have an 
authoritarian form of government.* 
The right of protection against investigation about beliefs, 
political, social, religious or otherwise, and the guarantee of 
personal freedom, brings us at a very important point. A 
democratic political system, this means also the real existing 
democracies, cannot work if its citizens are not free to express 
their political views. The expression of views is in itself not 
necessarily a private thing, in the strict sense of the word. 
Neither are political beliefs, especially when these expressions are 
voiced in relation to groups or parties - hence political affiliation. 
But they belong to individual freedom. If citizens are to arrive at 
'enlightened understanding' of the issues at hand and as a result 
The revelations about the private life of Senator Hart during the presidential pre-
elections in 1987, were clearly used by his political enemies. It may not be all that unlikely 
that they were even instrumental to disclose this information, which did not enter all 
details in sofar as aestethic privacy is concerned, but clearly hinted at them. 
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of this understanding vote or in any other way try to influence 
political decision-making then they should have the liberty and 
the privacy to inform themselves and consider lines of action 
when needed, individually or as a group or party. Self-
determination along these lines is seen as essential to democracy. 
Privacy is often seen, as Shils puts it, as an "unpenetrated 
sphere".131 This definition causes problems in the eyes of some 
writers, like Bryant and Dahrendorf. They maintain that 
democracy and a liberal and plural society are maintained against 
the beckgound, according to Bryant, of "public values which 
indicate the relation of its constituent parts to one another and 
to the society and polity as a whole. Moreover these values 
recquire continuous public support even at the cost of some 
reduction in privacy...".132 
Bryant then mentions Dahrendorf who, in his book Society and 
Democracy in Germany, analyses the aspects of German society 
which oppose or stimulate democracy. In the views of 
Dahrendorf, one of the reasons for an authoritarian disposition 
of German society is exactly privacy. He arives at this conclusion 
by defining privacy in contrast to publicity (Offentlicbkeit). 
Publicity is the realm of social values, which describe general 
relations between people. Private virtues are not in the same way 
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general. Private are those separated parts of society, which have 
an immanent resistance against publicity. Privacy is its own 
measure.133 
For Dahrendorf and consequently Bryant, the relation of privacy 
and publicity is negative, given the resistance of privacy against 
publicity. Therefore it is possible for Dahrendorf to say that the 
reason for National Socialism to emerge is the fact that the 
avarage German withdraws himself within the four walls of his 
privacy which is a-political, and does not stimulate him to 
participate in public life and face its often difficult choices. He 
goes even a step further and defines privacy as the result of 
authoritarian rule of earlier periods. The ruler in a pre-capitalist 
society could rule because he was able to push his subjects out 
of the political, 'public' sphere into their own privacy. "Divide 
and rule" considerations certainly played a role. The 'public' 
became in this way totally dominated by the lord, who himself 
had of course no real regard for private virtues.134 
I think that this definition of privacy is somewhat too restrictive. 
It separates too strictly between privacy in the sense of 
psychological privacy, in the sense of Rule (aesthetic privacy) and 
the realm of freedom to develop thought, opinions, and beliefs 
and expressing them. Moreover, privacy in the sense as 
189 
Dahrendorf describes it is an anachronism when applied to the 
pre-capitalist era. We may safely assume that private life, as we 
see it, did not exist earlier than about 200 years ago. 
To withdraw too much inside a a-political privacy might well be 
detrimental to democracy. It is in fact the oposite of what would 
be expected for democracy. Privacy is the basis of individual 
freedom, a freedom which extends itself into the public sphere. 
The withdrawal in the sense of Dahrendorf is a withdrawal from 
the public sphere, instead of combining it with private life so 
that mutual reinforcement can exist. Therefore it is possible to 
maintain that authoritarian regimes are not in themselves enemies 
of privacy, so long as this privacy does not expresses itself in 
voicing opinions against the regime, i.e. forms the basis of public 
action. Latin American dictatorships, probably are not much 
interested in the privacy of their citizens in that sense. 
Given this interaction with privacy, individual freedom in the 
sense of Mill, is indeed essential, to democracy. It is the 
requirement for a democratic, liberal society. Authoritarian or 
dictatorial systems do not have such requirements. The opinion 
of citizens is at best not important to the rulers but mostly it is 
a potential danger. Unfortunately also in democratic political 
systems there are parts of the executive which do not favour 
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political beliefs in certain directions. For instance, in search of 
terrorists many governments have probably transgressed widely 
the privacy rights of many individuals trying to look for would be 
IRA or Rote Armee Fraction members.* 
The link with democratic decision-making is not always obvious. 
It can be maintained that certain political beliefs are directed 
against democracy and that some of these beliefs are not 
explicitly against transgressing the law in order to attain a 
political goal. Therefore people with such beliefs are a potential 
danger to the democratic system and the liberties (also privacy) 
which it guarantees. Hence such people cannot be employed in 
the government bureaucracy. So a certain monitoring of an 
individual's belief seems to be necessary. 
These considerations are used as a legitimation of certain 
government policies which involve gathering and storing 
information about the political beliefs of individual citizens. Still 
the opportunities to enlarge the scope of such investigation and 
acting upon it are very large. All kinds and forms of intimidation 
are possible and the spectre of 'Big Brother' is easily invoked. 
• 
It is now a discussion in Germany whether persons who express understanding for 
terrorist organizations and their actions ought to be persecuted or not. Paragraph 129a of 
the criminal code (Strafgesetzbuch), also called the "terrorism-paragraph'' (Terrorismus-
Paragraph) can be and is interpreted that way by the German courts. See, Die Zeit, 
Hamburg, Nr.6 Febr. 3d, 1989, p.50. 
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Such practice does not enhance the citizens' possibilities to 
engage in political activities which are seen as essential for a 
democratic system to exist. 
One may doubt that (i) privacy and individual freedom are 
prerequisites for democracy and (ii) that democracy is a 
prerequisite for privacy and individual freedom. As far as the 
second point is concerned one could say that also authoritarian 
or dictatorial political systems could, in theory, maintain privacy 
rights of citizens. There is some evidence that 'authoritarian 
systems with universal moral claims on the population are capable 
of developing some institutions that protect ordinary subjects 
from some abuses of power' (underlining by me, Ph.).135 Today 
such universal moral claims cannot be made in reality by 
authoritarian systems. In his book Privacy Barrington Moore uses 
as an example for such a system ancient imperial China, where 
it seems that such claims could be made. 
In all modern authoritarian and dictatorial systems rights of 
personal freedom connected with privacy are either severely 
limited or altogether absent and for good reasons for the rulers. 
It is unlikely that an authoritarian or dictatorial ruler (or rulers) 
would grant rights against their power to rule or, more properly 
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stated, their misuse of authority. 'Such rights are both a limitation 
on, and a threat to, a ruler's dominance.'136 
Now the objections against doubting that privacy and personal 
freedom are prerequisites for democracy are clear. A democracy 
cannot exist without the possibility for its citizens to generate 
countervailing powers against 'the state' or better their self-
appointed rulers. Privacy is not merely 'being on your own at 
home with your family', it is the possibility to determine one's 
own affairs and above all defining one's own interests without 
intervening with another person's possibility to do the same." This 
is the typical liberal notion of privacy. 
That is why I think that democracy, privacy and personal freedom 
are notions which reinforce one another.137 It is for these reasons 
that I believe that the guarantee of privacy and personal freedom 
is not only an essential human right but also a condition for 
democracy, whatever form it may take. The liberal notion of 
The notion of 'privacy' is also often used in connection with economic activity, 
notably with the private ownership of means of production. As such privacy is seen as the 
basis of the capitalist system. 
I do not want to make explicit use of this interpretation of the notion 'privacy", although 
it can possibly be argued that it cannot be excluded from it. I believe that personal 
integrity, beliefs, family life and other social and personal relations can be seen as private 
while economic ownership is excluded from that, since it affects society in such a way as 
to lead to an unequal distribution of wealth. Here, I do not want to discuss whether this 
is just and desirable or not. 
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privacy is, so to say, basic. If it is abandoned, also other basic 
notions like human rights lose their importance, because the 
individual human being is in danger of no longer being respected. 
5.3. The dangers of Surveillance. 
The problem of modern information technology is that 
investigation upon individuals and almost unnoticed intrusions on 
what we call private are very well possible. 
The arrangements which are necessary to protect citizens from 
the influences of electronic data gathering and processing 
concerning private date is the example I want to use in order to 
survey the possibilities of democratic control of technology and 
more important widespread technological applications. 
The problems concerning privacy and personal freedom lie, 
obviously, in the gathering and using of personal information in 
order to be able to discriminate between people in the 
environment of an organization. Exclusion of troublesome people, 
the adjustment of privileges and curtailing undesirable behaviour 
is dependent on up to date personal information. 
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In order to achieve a high level of control, as has been said 
above, data has to be as complete as it can possibly be. One of 
the risks is then that also data which is not immediately necessary 
for the purposes of an organization is being gathered. In the view 
of Rule, there is always too much data gathered on individuals. 
Too much data, together with an enlargement of scale, not only 
poses great risks for someone's privacy and one's grip on one's 
own life. If the data is not correct or the systems which handles 
the data does so in a wrong way, the results may be even more 
dangerous. According to Barron: 
The most insidious dangers are those that arise out of the scale 
of the operation, both in respect of the amount of data that can 
be stored and the speed with which it can be processed. If the 
system is faulty, and/or not well designed, the effects of error 
can be catastrophic. Computers rarely make errors themselves, 
but they magnify to an alarming degree the mistakes of their 
users: it has been truly said that 'to err is human; to make a 
thorough mess of things you need a computer'. In a properly 
designed computer-based databank it is technically possible to 
copy information almost instantaneously, without removing or 
disturbing the original, and the speed with which the data is 
processed makes it feasible to 'browse' through a large file in a 
manner that would nor be possible in a Tiling cabinet and 
paper' system. The rapid processing speed also makes it possible 
to carry out searches that would be impossibly laborious by 
hand. For example, given the London telephone directory it is 
very difficult by manual search to answer the question 'who has 
telephone number 01-387-7030?'. In a computer-based system it 
is easy. The ability to perform long and tedious searches means 
that it is possible to establish indirect correlations that are 
present in the data but not obvious to a visual search also 
establish serendipitous correlations between apparently unrelated 
items. Of course this is not necessarily a bad thing - detection 
of crime depends largely on establishing such relationships - but 
it poses a potential threat to privacy. 
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Barron takes the position that all threats posed by mechanical 
data systems is not the system itself but the people who run it. 
This notion is somewhat simple, but it does not contradict the 
views I have proposed earlier. Surely the danger cannot come 
from computers or database systems as such but they rise from 
an organizational system as a whole, consisting and directed by 
people no doubt, trying to deal with an uncertain environment in 
relation to its supposed goals. Such organizations do not merely 
maintain their own databases but would be tempted to be able 
to link their data to data present in other systems. It should not 
be ruled out that sometimes, under what they perceive as great 
need or pressure, they may also resort to illegal means to do so. 
Barron describes the nature of the threat as follows: 
(i) Illicit access to information with malicious intent by 
persons not entitled to such access, 
(ii) Unexpected consequences of making information freely 
available to authorized persons by mechanical means, 
(iii) The use of information for purposes other than that for 
which it was collected in the first place. 
These are direct threats to privacy. Closely related, though 
not strictly matters of privacy, are further threats: 
(iv) the danger of basing action on inaccurate or outdated 
information, 
(v) the danger that the individual will be at a disadvantage in 
his confrontations with large organizations (public or 
private) because they have ready access to large amounts 
of information, 
(vi) the danger that information, possibly collected just for the 
sake of it, may receive a hallowed sanctity just because it 
is stored in a computer. ('It must be right, the computer 
says so'.)139 
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Especially the last point is interesting. It is the result of the 
ideological impact that science and technology, notably 
information technology have made. It is connected with the belief 
that computers can think, have reasons for their own, and possess 
a superior insight compared with the average human being, as I 
have tried to make clear in the chapter on 'Good' and 'Bad' 
technology. 
5.4. Remedies. 
The solutions or remedies that are offered by most of the writers 
about privacy and data protection, are at best proposals for 
legislation. Rule, disappointingly merely hopes that organizations 
can be brought to a less high level of discrimination so that they 
do not need so much detailed data about individuals. He hopes 
that 'a looser, more private world' will come about. 
If organizations were not expected to make such highly refined 
distinctions between people, the need for rigorous data 
collection would be greatly eased. The alternative to endless 
erosion of personal privacy through increased surveillance is for 
organizations to relax the discrimination which they seek to make 
in their treatment of people.™ 
This is the expression of a hope. There are no concrete 
proposals, for at least legislation, no view of arriving at this 
situation. An Rule himself remarks that procedural safeguards 
endure just as long as the social and political circumstances from 
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which they arose.141 But whatever the difficulties, bureaucratic 
surveillance should be limited beyond a certain limit.142 
Unfortunately Rule does not tell us what the limit is, and where 
it can be found. 
Westin, Baker and Miller in their respective books give more 
concrete proposals. Unlike Rule they do not seem to be 
disturbed by the dynamic nature of bureaucratic environments 
and their needs nor by the dynamic nature of information 
technology itself. Perhaps this is due to the fact that they 
published their works in a time where developments of 
information technology did not appear to have such direct 
impacts on the way organizations worked." 
Westin and Baker state in Databanks in a Free Society, that they 
see no significant change of the data collected from before the 
use of computers as in the present day. They fail to see that 
there is an enormous change in the quality of the data collected. 
At that time the interactive work with computer programs was just beginning in 
companies, and mostly only in the United States/The traditional use of a computer was just 
to replace certain parts of the work, on a 'stand-alone' basis. So certain programs for 
calculations, stock administration, bookkeeping, etc., were given to the computer together 
with the data they had to process. This was called "batch-processing'. It had the effect that 
the computer stood more or less outside of the companies organization. It was an auxiliary 
'department*. 
Nowadays we have seen the development of interactive computing, with direct interogation 
of databases, etc. This direct communication with programs still changes the whole 
organization of administrative, and other, work. The use of information technology is more 
immediate and faster. The term 'paperless office' illustrates this development nicely. 
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Perhaps the data itself did not change much, but its inherent 
cohesion is greatly improved because of the possibilities to link 
seemingly unrelated pieces of data about individuals and groups 
(see also Appendix l).143 
Westin stresses the necessity of analysis and painstaking planning, 
when information systems are set up. Such rational analysis and 
planning should include 'provisions for confidentiality of 
information, restrictions on improper circulation, and sanctions 
against unauthorized use should be written into the basic 
legislation and administrative rules...'.144 The question is who 
should do that planning, and what kind of controls are built in 
such planning process? 
Miller in The Assault on Privacy like Westin agrees that 
procedural reform is the only and sufficient answer. Moreover he 
seems to believe that it is possible to built in technological 
solutions (like password systems, encryption, managing managers, 
etc.) in order to safeguard confidentiality, improper circulation 
and abuse of data.145 
Nowadays we are more than seventeen years further in 
technological development, and even the most technologically 
secure computer systems are under attack from what is often 
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called 'hackers', owners of small computer systems which consider 
the breaking of all kinds of sophisticated security system a nice 
sport. The problem with this people is that they are often 
successful, and can steal important information from all kinds of 
large computer centres. Even the computers at the Pentagon 
were not safe from them. 
That such measures are not sufficient, does not mean that they 
ought not to be taken. They make unauthorized access to data, 
although not impossible, difficult. It must however be realised 
that they from only a very small part of eventual solutions. The 
problems with technological solutions are two-fold: 
1. It must be decided what the relation is of cost .and benefit. It 
may be that certain technological solutions are so cumbersome 
that they render the information system useless. 
2. It is difficult to decide in all but the clearest cases what level 
of security should be applied. Certainly a more dynamic decision 
making body instead of mere procedural arrangements is 
necessary. 
The best protection against abuse of data is not gathering and 
storing it. I will deal with the question of 'what data is really 
necessary?', in subsequent chapters.146 
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Miller thought also of more dynamic safeguards such as a privacy 
ombudsman, the limitation of data to necessity and a code of 
ethics for computer people.147 An ombudsman would be able to 
solve problems of control, without having necessarily to resort to 
a court of justice. Moreover he would be able to provide 
government with advice on matters of privacy and data 
protection. 
The remedies which I have mentioned above have been of great 
value for the construction of data protection legislation in many 
countries. Most reports and studies done in the various countries 
do not differ in their conclusions much from Westin, Baker and 
Miller, in their assessment of the problem and the offered 
solutions (see chapter six and Appendix 2.). 
One could have the impression that governments implement data 
protection legislation not because they find that there are strong 
reasons, outside of public opinion, to do so. Mostly there are 
attempts to play down the importance of such legislation. 
The reasons for this are not so far fetched. Any body of laws 
concerning the handling of personal information and the 
employment of database systems and computer centres in doing 
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this, is an extra restraint on the government bureaucracy. The 
constraints are felt in four ways: 
1. The measures that legally have to be taken to check on 
government, and often also private, databases, involves extra 
work and time of often already constraint departments; 
2. The formation of a new 'data protection' bureau or 
department adds to the already unwieldy state bureaucracy; 
3. The execution of data protection legislation, like any other 
legislation, will put constraints on the government budget; 
4. There are branches of the executive, security and intelligence 
services, which at least superficially are going to be influenced by 
such legislation. As we will see in the next chapter, such services 
are invariably left outside the reach of the legislation. The 
influence is one of public discussion, and possibly of malcontent. 
At best it can be expected from governments, that they are 
inclined to propose legislation in order to get the issue of data 
protection of the political agenda and return to the order of the 
day in the cheapest way possible. This does not necessarily mean 
that the results are invariably poor. But creative moves are not 
to be expected. 
There has been no western government and no, to my 
knowledge, western political party that has officially stated that 
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the issue of data protection was unimportant. It seems that all 
through the political spectrum in western countries, it is 
considered bad taste to deny the need for it. This has usually the 
effect that most parties in power have made it one of the special 
issues mostly expressed as the view of the government and 
connected to its basic social and political ideology (and if possible 
excluding other political views from having the right to claim that 
data protection belonged to their ideology). 
The solutions found are almost all concentrated on the 
procedural level. I believe that this at best a good beginning. 
There can be no solution to the problem of data protection and 
privacy when the necessary legal measures are not taken, and no 
legislation is proposed. The great disadvantage or lack of such 
measures is that reaction to new developments is always limited. 
At best, a data protection agency can advice a government to 
take further measure, and propose additional legislation when 
new technologies, and/or new practices concerning the obtaining 
and handling of personal information develop. 
A mere prohibiting legislation can severely hinder all kinds of 
quite necessary bureaucratic procedures which may involve a 
certain amount of personal data. On the other hand leaving large 
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room for all kinds of bureaucratic initiative in this field will 
create the problems the legislation is supposed to solve, and 
nothing or very little is achieved. 
Therefore a more dynamic approach of data protection and 
control should be taken. It is necessary that the utmost care is 
taken that personal information, when needed, is handled with 
great confidentiality and no abused. This task cannot be left to 
the various bureaus themselves. That is why the institution of an 
ombudsman or controlling institution is proposed. But such 
institutions lack three things: 
1. They tend to become specialized in the sense of a limited 
professionalism. Informed amateurism in the sense of Shils and 
Dahl would give such an institution a greater edge. 
2. Such an ombudsman or data protection institution is not 
designed to actively investigate possible abuse of personal data. 
Mostly it is expected that citizens or organizations inquire about 
possible infringements of their rights, and demand investigation. 
Usually the information concerned must be supplied by 
themselves. 
3. Within a framework legislation, such a controlling and advising 
institution cannot react actively to new developments, and must 
await further legislation. 
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In the next chapter a number of legislations in western countries 
will be compared. In order to deal with the criticisms I have 
made above I will propose in chapter seven a solution, which is 
in my view both democratic and more effective than the current 
proposals. There I will propose a solution in the form of a fourth 
power which can deal with privacy and data protection in a way 
which does not merely constrains the use of data but which also 
will be able to define what data is necessary in a given period 
and how it should be handled. 
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6. Control of Data Bases. 
6.1. Introduction. 
In the last chapter some general and mostly theoretical 
considerations were discussed, some of which have been 
influential for the construction of legislation. 
In this chapter I shall discuss some examples of legislation 
concerning the control of information technology in the field of 
data protection. 
Aside from extreme possibilities of abuse of private data, much 
enhanced by modern information technology, there is a tendency 
of a large accumulation of personal data in government and 
private databases. This is necessary in order to be able to 
distribute in an efficient and responsible way facilities to where 
they are needed. On the other hand this handling of information 
outside the influence of the individual himself also very much 
limits his power of decision over his own life.148 This power of 
self-determination is the other aspect of privacy. 
The concept of data protection is directed towards the 
safeguarding of privacy, personal freedom, hence the right of a 
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person to self-determination.149 In some respects we can see in 
this concept the return of classical liberal ideology. In the light 
of this right of self-determination and the necessity of weighing 
the interests of the 'social-whole' against those of the individual 
a number of direct methods for data protection, in a procedural 
sense, are imaginable: 
1. limiting of prohibiting the collection of personal data in certain 
cases; 
2. prohibiting the collection of certain types of data (for example 
religion, political affiliation, race); 
3. prohibiting certain uses of personal data.150 
In order for data protection to be minimally effective, the person 
registered should be able to have some insight in what is 
registered about him and where, what the purpose is of such 
registration and what the consequences are for him of this 
registration. 
From the discussion in the last chapter, we may conclude that 
the solutions offered in the divers legislations are not 
revolutionary. They limit themselves to procedural and legal 
remedies for a problem that goes beyond them. Nevertheless we 
have to find a measure by which we can compare the various 
countries. 
207 
With the proposals of Westin c.s. and Miller we can say that the 
procedural considerations centre around three main notions. The 
first is the rights of the individual. What kind of possibilities does 
the individual have to know what data is stored about him/her, 
where and how. Moreover is there any active reporting and 
checking done by the government, or by a data-control institution 
(ombudsman)? Second, what kind of techniques are included in 
the legislation? It may be that connections, networks, with foreign 
data banks are not controlled (data transfer to foreign countries), 
or that manual files are kept outside the scope of the law. 
Thirdly, there are the rights and duties of the data banks and 
their owners. Are only government data banks included or are 
also private data banks included in the law? Is there a 
registration duty. 
Also in order to limit a description of legislation in various 
countries I want to look then at a number of categories or 
questions concerning data protection which can be drawn from 
the three notions above: 
1. Does the law include private as well as public databases? 
2. Can individuals demand information about data which is stored 
in databases? 
3. Is there 'illegal data'? 
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4. Does the law prosecute those databases which store 'illegal' 
information about people? 
5. Is there an institute which inspects data (data inspector)? 
6. Does the prosecuting duty lie with the person involved or with 
the law (data inspection institution)? 
7. Does the law regard also data-transfer to other countries? 
8. Does the law include personal data in manually processed data 
files (paper files)?. 
9. Is there registration duty for data-gathering and processing 
when personal data is involved?* 
Compare with the US Federal Commission of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare Records, computers and the rights of citizens, Report of the 
Secretary's advisory committee on automated personal data systems, Washington 1973: 
"There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret 
(HEW report, p.41). The commission elaborates this principle in a 'public notice 
requirement' (pp.57 v.v): 
'Any organization maintaining an administrative automated personal data system shall give 
public notice of the existence and character of its system once each year. Any 
organization maintaining more than one system shall publish such annual notices for all 
its systems simultaneously. Any organization proposing to establish a new advance of the 
initiation or enlargement of the system to assure individuals who may be affected by its 
operation a reasonable opportunity to comment. The public notice shall specify: 
1. The name of the system; 
2. The nature and the purpose(s) of the system; 
3. The categories and number of persons on whom data are (to be) maintained; 
4. The categories of data (to be) maintained, indicating which categories are (to be) stored 
in computer-accessible files; 
5. The organization's policies and practices regarding data storage, duration of retention 
of data, and disposal thereof; 
6. The categories of data sources; 
7. A description of all types of use (to be) made of data, indicating those involving 
computer-accessible files, and including all classes of users and the organizational 
relationships among them; 
8. The procedures whereby an individual can (i) be informed if he is the subject of data 
in the system; (ii) gain access to such data; and (iii) contest their accuracy, completeness, 
pertinence, and the necessity for retaining them; 
9. The title, name, and address of the person immediately responsible for the system.' 
Quoted in De Graaf, 1977, p.205-7. 
209 
The following description of data protection legislation of 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, the USA, and the United Kingdom, cannot be complete 
within the scope of this work.* The information about the 
different legislation is mostly taken from secondary sources, since 
primary information is sometimes not readily available, but is also 
written in the original languages which I do not always know 
sufficiently to be able to read legal texts. I have searched for 
sources as up to date as possible, nevertheless in the mentioned 
countries things may have changed, so this data has to be looked 
at with the thought in mind that they serve merely as realistic 
examples of possibilities of data protection. 
6.2. General description of the diverse legislations. 
It is perhaps useful to have an overview of the general 
characteristics of the data protection laws adopted in the various 
countries. For a more complete overview per country see 
Appendix 2. 
I do not claim any specialised legal expertise in the discussion of these examples 
of legislation. I am fully aware that there may be more far reaching consequences of these 
legal provisions, about which I do not have the competence to judge. 
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6.2.1. Canada 
On March 1, 1978 the Human Rights Act became effective. This 
act concerns itself with the protection of 'personal information 
and embodies the principle that the privacy of individuals should 
be protected to the greatest extent consistent with the public 
interest'.151 There is a certain limitation on civil liberties built in. 
Moreover the law is only valid for persons with the Canadian 
nationality and persons who are resident in Canada.152 Citizens 
have a right to demand information about personal data held 
about them in the government's automatic databases. No 
reference is made to manual files. These databases contain data 
which is to be used for administrative purposes. The law requires 
the annual publication of an index of those governmental 
(federal) databases which lists the contents of the files and its 
proposed use. The Canadian government issued guidelines for the 
implementation of the data protection law. These guidelines 
include rules about the accuracy of data and the methods of 
access open to citizens and social science research.153 "The 
regulation of federal information banks and their description in 
the information bank index only applies to records used for 
administrative purposes. Similarly, the provision for individual 
access to personal records in government hands only applies to 
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records used for a decision-making process that relates directly 
to an individual versus other research and statistical purposes."154 
The Canadian government, under pressure of the social science 
community in Canada, reserved large privileges for social science 
research. 
6.2.2. The Federal Republic of Germany. 
At January 27,1977 the German federal data protection law, 'das 
Bundes Datenschutz Gesetz (BDSG)', was enacted.* The 
intention of the act is not merely to protect against the misuse 
of personal data in data processing but to 'guarantee the integrity 
of the individual when information about his person is handled 
in an organized way.' The interesting thing about the law is that 
the content of the information is considered to be not important. 
Only the fact that identifiable persons are involved is sufficient 
to be covered by the law. The law also includes manually handled 
files when they refer to identifiable persons. The same is valid 
for data stored by the press of media archives.155 This is not so 
The German 'Land' of Hessen was the first state in the world which formulated 
legislation concerning the use of personal data. See Ulrich Damman and Ralph Brennecke, 
Country Report Federal Republic of Germany, in Mochmann and Muller, "Data Protection 
and Social Science Research", ibid., p. 129. 
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strange given the level on which gossip-newspapers operate in 
Germany. 
The individual 'Lander' may have their own data protection laws 
but have to abide by the general principles of the BDSG. These 
principles are: 
a. The processing (storage, transfer, modification, erasure) of 
personal data is admissible only if permitted so by legal 
provision (including those of the BDSG) or if the person 
concerned has given his consent. The most important 
admissibility criteria of the BDSG are: 
in the public sector: the necessity for the legitimate 
accomplishment of the tasks of the public bodies involved; 
in the private sector: the purpose of a contractual or 
quasicontractual relationship with the person concerned or 
a careful consideration and balance of legitimate interests 
("berechtigte Interessen") of the person/institution who has 
the data or gains access to them on the one hand and 
the threatened interests of the person concerned 
warranting protection ("schutzwurdige Belange") on the 
other. 
b. Data have to be blocked (subject to no further use except 
under certain conditions) and to be erased on application of the 
person concerned if there is no further need of these data for 
accomplishment of the original task or purpose. 
c. The person concerned has the right to know what data are 
stored. Exceptions are enumerated. In general, the person 
enquiring has to pay for the information. The law provides for 
the information on where data are or could be stored - in the 
public sector by means of official publications and public 
registers (about the structure and purpose of data registers), in 
the private sector by individual information about the storage of 
information about him, if he does not know already. 
d. The individual concerned can ask for the correction of 
incorrect data, and for the erasure of data stored without justification. If the correctness of data is contested, they have to 
be blocked. 
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e. A federal data protection commissioner (Bundesbeauftragter 
fur den Datenschutz) is appointed by the President on the 
proposal of the federal government as an independent agency 
of control over the federal administration. He reports directly 
to the parliament and to the government. The states have 
created similar control institutions. Private data processing 
activities are under the (limited) control of state agencies. 
Anybody concerned may appeal to one of these control 
institutions, if he feels his rights to be violated by the processing 
of his personal data. Physical persons and private bodies beyond 
a certain volume of data processing have to appoint an internal 
data protection commissioner who is responsible for the 
enforcement of data protection. 
f. Unauthorized transfer and modification of data are criminal 
offenses. The penalty is up to two years imprisonment.156 
6.2.3. The Netherlands. 
On December 1, 1981 the Dutch parliament agreed about a law 
concerning data protection.157 The law follows the principles 
established in the advice of a commission (Commissie Koopmans) 
set up as early as 1972 (after the census agitation of 1971) and 
which delivered its final report in 1976. 
The data protection law does not restrict itself to automated 
databases. This is contrary to what the Commission proposed. A 
restriction should be made, according to the Commission 
Koopmans, on practical grounds. It is very difficult to try and 
control already existing and well-established institutions with a 
large volume of data on persons in paper files.158 The 
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consequence is, of course, that name and address information can 
be stored in a manual administration and all other sensitive data 
in an automatic one, which provides the interested persons with 
a number which corresponds to name and address information. 
Therefore the law does includes manual files. 
The law has two ways of control: 
1. It established a body which registers 'sensitive' databases and 
grants permits, the registration office (Registratie Kamer). 
2. It granted rights to the individual who is registered and which 
are supposed to protect the individual.159 
The law defines 'personal data' as all data which can be traced 
back to an individual (identifiable data) however difficult this may 
be. This involves the possibility of decrypting encrypted data, 
linking remote databases to one another, burglary (electronic or 
otherwise). 
6.2.4. Sweden. 
Sweden was the first sovereign state to enact a data protection 
law. The law came into force in July 1, 1973.' Sweden has been 
The German State of Hessen, as noted above, enacted the first data protection law 
in the world, but Hessen is not a sovereign state. 
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the first in many related things. Since 1947 every Swedish citizen 
has a Personal Identification Number (PIN). This code contains 
information about date of birth and sex.160 The existence of this 
code together with the increasing importance of electronic data 
processing was the reason for discussions about privacy during 
the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies.161 
Another interesting feature of Swedish society is that there is 
great openness of governmental information to all citizens. This 
is so because of the constitutional principle of freedom of 
information and publicity. This principle originated in the 
eighteenth century and is only limited by the secrecy law. 
The secrecy law, amended in may 28, 1937, establishes "restraints 
on the Right of the General Public to have access to Official 
Documents." It also guarantees the secrecy of identifiable 
information on a person for a period of twenty years.162 
6.2.5. The United States of America. 
In the United States the protection of data is regulated in two 
laws, the Privacy Act of 1974, and The Freedom of Information 
Act of 1966 (amended in 1974 and 1976). Both laws are 
specifically directed to federal bureaus and databases.163 However, 
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most if not all states have implemented similar legislation as the 
federal government. 
The Privacy Act is concerned with the protection of the citizens' 
right to privacy. In doing so it regulates the "collection, 
management, and disclosure of personal information maintained 
by governmental agencies."164 The collection of data by private 
organizations is not limited. 
The Privacy Act gives citizens the right to inquire whether 
information about them is stored in federal databases and 
demand access to these records, in so far as they do not have 
access under the Freedom of Information Act which tries to 
improve the openness of government and public access to data. 
In contrast to European systems, the US system of data gathering 
about citizens and nationals is much less thorough. It seems that 
the various US governmental agencies, be it on federal or state 
level, do not want to record if anything at all about their citizens. 
The only thorough data gathering and processing is the census 
which is held every ten years, and updated with mini-censuses. It 
is therefore that a large part of the concern of the Privacy Act 
was with the Bureau of the Census, followed by the Social 
Security Administration and the Department of Health, 
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Education and Welfare. Where they could exchange data under 
the Federal Reports Act, in order to improve efficiency and 
decrease redundancy of data, they are now restricted in the kinds 
of information they can exchange. When this information includes 
personal data about identifiable individuals the exchange may be 
prohibited. However, a limited flow of identifiable data among 
federal agencies is permissible, according to the privacy 
Protection Study Commission in their final report of 1977. The 
condition is that there has to be a commensurate increase in 
protection of confidentiality. The Commission in its report 
concerns itself also with social scientific research.165 
There is no definition of explicitly illegal data but the Privacy Act 
stipulates that agencies shall maintain "only such information 
about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a 
purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or 
executive order of the President." Each Federal Agency, however, 
is responsible for interpreting the Act. There is no Data 
Inspection Commission or any comparable institution, which 
reviews the data concerned. Within the various federal agencies 
there are officers who concern themselves, among other tasks, 
with the implementation of the Privacy Act, although the Act 




On November 11, 1987 the Data Protection Act came into force 
in Britain. As such it is the latest data protection legislation that 
came into power in a western country. The purpose of this act 
is to protect citizens against abuse of data that was held on them. 
Moreover the Act gives them the right to know what is held on 
them. 
The Data Protection Act received Royal Assent in July 1984, and 
is itself the result of a long process of discussion in Britain. The 
ultimate cause for the act to come about was the European 
Convention on Human Rights which came into force in 1953.167 
In the twenty years between the European Convention and the 
adoption of the Data Protection Act things have changed but not 
so much that principles like privacy and the limitations on the 
right of interference of a government with private life and 
correspondence have disappeared. 
The Act maintains six data protection principles. "Organizations 
using computers are required to ensure all information is: 
- collected and processed fairly and lawfully 
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- held only for lawful purposes described in the register entry 
made by the organization 
- used only for the purposes and only disclosed to the people 
described in the register entry 
- adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes 
for which they are being held 
- accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date 
- protected by proper security. 
The Act provides the citizens with five rights: 
- to check if any organization keeps information about [him/her] 
on computer [underlining by me] 
- to see a copy of this information subject to certain exceptions 
- to complain to the Data Registrar or the courts if [he/she] does 
not like the way organizations are collecting or using the personal 
information on their computer 
- to have inaccurate computer records corrected or deleted 
- to seek compensation for damage by the misuse of computer 
records.168 
6.3. The questions. 
In this section I will discuss the way in which the questions I 
have asked at the beginning of this chapter are answered in the 
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various legislations. In this way an overview of the effectiveness 
of data protection in the selected countries will become clear. 
6.3.1. Does the law include also private databases? 
In most countries the data protection legislation includes also 
private databases. In Britain the data protection Act demands 
organizations and persons processing data on computers to 
register with the Data Registrar. It is a criminal offence not to 
register. The act does not specify how big or how small these 
organizations should be in order to register or whether private 
persons (with an address list in which data about friends and 
relatives is collected) should register or not. 
Article 4 of the act merely demands that registration takes place: 
4. Registration of data users and computer bureaux 
(1) The Registrar shall maintain a register of data users who 
hold, and of persons carrying on computer bureaux who provide 
services in respect of, personal data and shall make an entry in 
the register in pursuance of each application for registration 
accepted by him under this part of this Act.169 
The data protection law in Sweden does not make any distinction 
between public or private databases. 'The Data Act defines 
'personal information' as 'information concerning an individual'. 
A 'personal register' is 'any register or any other notes made by 
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automatic data processing and containing personal information 
that can be assigned to the individual concerned.' 
The Data Act stipulates that a personal register must not be 
started or kept without permission by the Data Inspection Board 
(DIB), unless the register has been ordered by the Government 
or the Parliament. The DIB shall give permission to create and 
run a personal register, if there is no reason to assume that the 
register will lead to undue encroachment on the personal 
integrity of registered persons and the register is kept according 
to the rules set up by the board."170 
The Dutch data protection law demands also that all databases 
which contain personalised data are registered at the 'Registratie 
Kamer'(see above). Also in the Netherlands the law makes no 
distinction between private and public databases. 
The same holds for Germany. The BDSG (Bundes Daten Schutz 
Gesetz) is concerned with public as well as private databases. 
The first principle of the German data protection clearly and 
explicitly includes private databases (see above). 
What is probably not known by the general public in Germany 
is that census data (note that census data is data about 
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identifiable persons) can be copied to various public institutions, 
notably townships (Gemeinden) in order to update their 
population registers which are generally thought to overstate the 
size of the population. This is a simple and routine action, which 
involves the connection of the census computers at the Federal 
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) and the computers of 
the other public institution. The data are, of course, transferred 
in a compatible form, so that they can be used by different 
computer systems and programs.171 Below I will concern myself 
with the possible consequences of such transfers. 
The two countries that are exceptions are Canada and the 
United States. In both countries the respective data protection 
legislations concentrate on databases maintained by public (mostly 
federal) institutions. 
In the United States the Privacy Act is concerned with the 
protection of the citizens' right to privacy. In doing so it regulates 
the "collection, management, and disclosure of personal 
information maintained by governmental agencies."172 The 
collection of data by private organizations is not limited. The 
dissemination of data by these organizations is only limited by the 
relevant articles in the constitution and other laws about libel and 
slander. 
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An interesting example of this freedom is mentioned by Flaherty 
when he discusses the public discussion about privacy measures, 
or the lack of them, in the Bureau of the Census: 
Moreover, critics of the Bureau of the Census seem unaware of 
the amazing variety of personal information on individual 
American adults annually published in city directories by 
R.L.Polk and Company of Detroit. Its 1400 community 
directories list the name and address, marital status, occupation, 
place of employment, telephone number, residence, and 
information about rental or home ownership for individuals in 
the locality. In response to specific requests from its clients, 
Polk can produce geographical selections of information by 
areas as small as postal zones, census tracts, or neighborhoods. 
Yet the company states the "we don't have anything in our files 
that is not available under the law."173 
It seems to me that when the protection of privacy is concerned 
also the development of databases like Polk's should be 
controlled in some respect. 
6.3.2. Can citizens ask which data is held about them? 
In Britain, like in most other countries, after the data-users (the 
persons or organizations who own the databases concerned) have 
registered they can do almost anything they want with it. The 
only case that a violation can be detected is when a data subject 
finds out about it, usually by chance. There is no way that a 
data-subject can, in practice, ensure that data about him/her is 
correct. He or she cannot ask the Data Protection Registrar (the 
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institution at which the owners of databases containing personal 
data have to register) to find out who has information about 
him/her. Data-subjects have to find that out for themselves, and 
only then they can ask the data-user to inform them about it. 
The data-user can require a fee from the data-subject for 
searching and/or correcting data held on the subject.174 
In Canada citizens have a right to demand information about 
personal data held about them in the government's automatic 
databases. These databases contain data which is to be used for 
administrative purposes. The law requires the annual publication 
of an index of those governmental (federal) databases which lists 
the contents of the files and its proposed use.175 'The regulation 
of federal information banks and their description in the 
information bank index only applies to records used for 
administrative purposes. Similarly, the provision for individual 
access to personal records in government hands only applies to 
records used for a decision-making process that relates directly 
to an individual versus other research and statistical purposes."176 
In Germany the second and the third principle of the data 
protection law regulate the rights of citizens to demand 
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information on data held about them and possible correction of 
these data if they prove to be incorrect.* 
In the Netherlands the individual has also the right to inspect 
data about himself and demand correction in the case of 
incorrect data. Any database with 'sensitive' data in it has to 
keep a log of any third-party-access to the database. The owner 
of a database which registers individual data, has to send to 
every individual a notice on the moment of registration that data 
about this person is entered in the database. This has to happen 
only when this is not made clear in another way. 
There is an exception for police and medical databases and, 
social scientific or statistical databases. In the case of social 
scientific databases the right to inspect data may be suspended 
since the organisation of these databases is not directed towards 
The rights of citizens are specified in the principles of the Federal Data 
Protecgtion Law: 
c. The person concerned has the right to know what data are stored. Exceptions 
are enumerated. In general, the person enquiring has to pay for the information. 
The law provides for the information on where data are or could be stored - in 
the public sector by means of official publications and public registers (about the 
structure and purpose of data registers), in the private sector by individual 
information about the storage of information about him, if he does not know 
already. 
d. The individual concerned can ask for the correction of incorrect data, and for 
the erasure of data stored without justification. If the correctness of data is 
contested, they have to be blocked. (See above and also Appendix 2). 
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particular individuals but towards certain personal characteristics 
of an individual.177 
The active control and prosecution of those who abuse data lies 
obviously with the individual, and not with the registration office, 
whose task it is to merely grant permits (with or without 
conditions). As with all other legislations security and police 
databases are exempted from any registration duties and are not 
subject to the control of either the individual concerned nor of 
any other public or private entity. 
The Swedish Data Inspection Bureau publishes a list of databases 
and research projects which contain or are concerned with 
personal data. The citizens have a right to request what kind of 
information is stored about them, although not more than once 
a year per database. There appears to be no fees for this service. 
The Privacy Act in the United States gives citizens the explicit 
right to inquire whether information about them is stored in 
federal databases and demand access to these records, in so far 
as they do not have access under the Freedom of Information 
Act which tries to improve the openness of government and 
public access to data. 
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There is among the six countries which are described here no 
exception as far as the right of citizens to inquire about 
information held on them. The differences are more a matter of 
degree in which this is possible. In no country the citizens are 
automatically informed about data held about them. This results 
in relatively few inquiries by citizens and even less demands for 
correction of incorrect data. The reason clearly is that the 
individual citizens do not know if and where data about them is 
stored. 
6.3.3. Is there a definition of illegal data? 
There are only two countries where certain types of data are 
defined as illegal. One is Britain and the other is the United 
States. 
In section 2(3) of the British data protection act there is a 
provision about which data may be restricted: 
The secretary of state is empowered to modify or supplement 
by order the data protection principles in matters of a 
potentially sensitive nature, and any such orders once passed 
into law will be included in references to the act and the data 
protection principles. 
This provision derives from Article 6 of the Council of Europe 
Convention which requires that personal data in respect of -
(a) racial origin 
(b) political opinions or religious beliefs 
(c) physical or mental health or sexual life 
(d) criminal convictions 
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may not be passed automatically unless domestic law provides 
adequate safeguards. 
There is no doubt that massive amounts of personal data as 
described above are processed automatically and much of it will 
be exempted from the operation of the act altogether for 
reasons of national security and from the subject access 
provisions for reasons to do with the prevention of crime and 
the collection of taxes.178 
In Sweden there is also a restriction on what kind of data may 
be stored and what kind of data may not be stored without 
specific permission of the DIB, although somewhat different from 
Britain. There must be specific reasons and needs accompanied 
with a number of safeguards for the storage of data like: 
information about criminal convictions, whether a person "has 
been treated as a Child Welfare Committee case", information 
about drug addiction, information about dependence on welfare, 
information about religion and political affiliation, and presumably 
racial origin. One exception is that religious and political 
organisation may keep a computerized list of their members.179 
None of the other countries have any limitation on what kind of 
data may be registered on people. The only requirement is that 
there have to be guarantees and safeguards concerning a person's 
privacy. In Canada there is no indication that the data recorded 
on individuals is in any way limited, only that the data should not 
be 'vague'.180 
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6.3.4. Does the law prosecute databases with illegal data? 
From the paragraph above it follows that only Britain and 
Sweden have provisions concerning the prosecution of database 
owners who store illegal data. The other countries, since they do 
not define illegal data have no provisions for prosecuting storage 
of illegal data. 
6.3.5. Is there a controlling institution (data inspection)? 
In five of the six countries discussed here there are controlling 
institutions or data inspectors. In Britain there is a Data 
Registrar who maintains a list of databases where personal data 
is stored.181 He sees to it that the six principles of the Data 
Protection Act are maintained.182 He also sees to it that 
complaints of citizens about particular databases are investigated. 
He also makes recommendations about data protection to the 
government. 
In Canada a Privacy Commissioner has been designated by the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission. The Commissioner can 
investigate violations of privacy in government databases. The 
commissioner can only report his findings to the government 
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Minister involved and to the person who complained about abuse 
of data held on him/her. Neither the concerned Minister nor 
Parliament have to comply with the Commissioners 
recommendations.183 
Also in Germany the establishment of a controlling institution is 
established. "He reports directly to the parliament and to the 
government. The states have created similar control institutions. 
Private data processing activities are under the (limited) control 
of state agencies. Physical persons and private bodies beyond a 
certain volume of data processing have to appoint an internal 
data protection commissioner who is responsible for the 
enforcement of data protection."184 
In Holland a registration office was established which registers 
databases with personal data and sees to it that they comply with 
the provisions of the law.185 
In Sweden there is the above mentioned Data Inspection Board 
which does not only register databases with private data but also 
sees to it that they contain only legal data and that they do not 
exchange data with, for such transfers unauthorized databases.186 
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In the United States there is no controlling agency. Each Federal 
Agency, however, is responsible for interpreting the Act. There 
is no Data Inspection Commission or any comparable institution, 
which reviews the data concerned. Within the various federal 
agencies there are officers who concern themselves, among other 
tasks, with the implementation of the Privacy Act, although the 
Act itself does not require this. Nothing is known about their 
performance.187 
6.3.6. Does the prosecuting duty lie with the law? 
In only two countries the data protection institution has the right 
and duty to prosecute databases and their owners who violate the 
data protection law. These countries are Germany and Sweden. 
In Germany unauthorized transfer and modification of data are 
criminal offenses. The penalty is up to two years imprisonment.188 
Therefore it is likely that under the BDSG the data commissioner 
can take the initiative of the prosecution violators of the law, in 
public as well as in private databases, however the individual(s) 
concerned have their own rights of prosecution. 
In Sweden the DIB prosecutes actively all those who violate the 
Data Act. Private citizens have of course the right to prosecute 
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those who disseminate their private information without their 
consent or who store either illegal or incorrect data.189 
In the other countries, Britain, Canada, The Netherlands and the 
United States, citizens themselves have to find out about possible 
abuse or incorrectness of data held about them and about where 
such data is held. Then they can prosecute the concerned 
database owner under the provisions of the respective 
legislations.190 In the United States this is not necessarily a great 
problem, especially because the databases which are covered by 
data protection legislation are Federal and State databases. In 
such cases citizens can simply ask particular if there is anything 
registered about them under the freedom of information act.191 In 
the other countries finding out about where and what 
information is stored on a person may be more difficult. 
6.3.7. Does the law regard data-transfers abroad? 
In all countries except the United States such transfers are 
regulated by the respective data protection laws. Usually the 
requirements to send personal data abroad is that the receiving 
country must have similar data protection legislation as the 
sending country. In canada transfers of data are also regulated 
for private databases.192 
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In Britain transfer to other countries is limited in general to 
those countries who are bound by the European Convention to 
other countries a request has to be filed with the Registrar.193 
In Germany the transfer of personal data from public authorities 
to other (public or private) organizations in other countries is 
admitted under certain conditions. Such transfers can take place 
if the receiver can make clear that he needs the data and has a 
formally justified interest in these data. Or that the sender has 
an interest in transferring the data to a certain receiver. Transfer 
can only take place when there is a justified and credible interest 
in transferring them or when personal data about persons 
involved which are worth protecting are not violated. Transfers 
take place in the sphere of justice, public administration, tax (to 
avoid double taxation), crime and drugs. 
Persons whose personal data are transferred or processed are 
protected within the BDSG: 
1. The rights of the person involved may not be worse than 
under the BDSG, when they are transferred to another country. 
This can only be the case when 
2. the receiving country has data protection legislation which is 
in its essentials comparable to the BDSG, or 
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3. when the receiving country has a special treaty with the 
Federal republic which takes care of the rights of the persons 
whose data is transferred.194 
A special part of the Dutch data protection law concerns itself 
with the international situation. The three paragraphs under this 
chapter establish the reach of the law in order to prevent the 
evasion of the law through data transfers and processing in other 
countries. The databases concerned with personal data 
established in a foreign country by a Dutch or Dutch based 
organizations have to obey to the same rules as databases 
established in the Netherlands. Transfers of Dutch 'sensitive' data 
and foreign databases accessed or owned by Dutch organizations 
need a permit from the registration office. 
This is the same for data security of foreign databases which can 
be accessed from the Netherlands. When the database is 
established in a foreign country under the supervision of a 
foreign owner or another foreign organisation, no registration is 
necessary under Dutch law, also when private data about Dutch 
nationals is stored. The registration office can give dispensation 
to particular databases in case of conflict with foreign data 
protection laws.195 
235 
The transfer of computerized personal data from Sweden to 
other countries needs a license of the DIB. The Data Act also 
includes manual files, and is in this way more strict than when 
internal Swedish transfers are concerned. When a license for 
export is applied for the Data Inspection tries to determine if the 
data protection laws of the importing country are comparable to 
the Swedish laws. If that is not the case the license is refused. 
The import of information is not included in the law. 
6.3.8. Does the law also concern itself with manual files? 
In three countries, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
States, the data protection laws concern itself also with manual 
files. In Germany the law explicitly includes manually handled 
files when they refer to identifiable persons. The same is valid for 
data stored by the press of media archives.196 This is not so 
strange given the level on which gossip-newspapers operate in 
Germany. 
The Dutch data protection law does not restrict itself to 
automated databases. A restriction should be made, according to 
the Commission, on practical grounds. It is very difficult to try 
and control already existing and well-established institutions with 
a large volume of data on persons in paper files.197 The 
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consequence is, of course, that name and address information can 
be stored in a manual administration and all other sensitive data 
in an automatic one, which provides the interested persons with 
a number which corresponds to name and address information. 
Therefore the law does includes manual files.198 
In the United States the Freedom of Information Act and the 
Privacy Act do not particularly distinguish between automated 
and manual files.199 Therefore it seems that manual files are also 
included. The United States Supreme Court in the case Whalen 
v. Roe in 1977 which "presented the question whether a state 
could record, in a centralized computer file, the names and 
addresses of all persons who had obtained, pursuant to a doctor's 
prescription, certain drugs for which there was both a lawful and 
an unlawful market". The Supreme Court decided that such a 
centralised file was not allowed and, in its opinion explicitly 
included non-computerized data banks: 
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the 
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in 
computerized data banks or other massive government files. 
(Italics by me, Ph.)200 
Therefore there is reason to assume that manual files are meant 
to be included in U.S. data protection legislation. 
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Notably in Sweden the Data Act does not concern itself with 
manual files, including when they can be mechanically (punch 
card sorting, etc.) be sorted or selected. Neither does the act 
protect the privacy of 'non-living' persons.201 Given the discussions 
in Sweden about privacy in the ninteen sixties and seventies this 
is a strange fact, for which I have no explanation. It is possible 
that the Data Act does not regard these files because the manual 
files are considered so much outdated and cumbersome that they 
do not pose any real threat to privacy. 
In Britain the Data Protection Act does not cover manual 
records. Campbell and Connor in their book On the Record 
observe that the exclusion of manual files allows information 
users to protect their most damaging data by retaining them or 
transferring them to paper. Information once held on a computer 
database need not be disclosed to the data subject if it is later 
processed only on paper.202 However, in the definition section of 
the act, minimal data (like name and address) held on a 
computer with references to a manual record are included in the 
act. The combination of computer and manual files is seen in the 
same way as combined computer-files.203 Even if data users do 
not transfer their sensitive data to paper, they can evade the Act 
by processing it in a fashion contrived to avoid referring to 
individuals in their main records.204 
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In Canada simply no mention of manual files is made in the 
Human Rights Act .205 
6.3.9. Does the law demand registration of databases? 
This question can be answered with 'yes' for all countries 
mentioned here. It seems to be a general opinion that data 
protection legislation cannot function properly without such a 
registration. 
6.4. Evaluation. 
In order to be able to compare better the different countries it 
is perhaps useful to make a table in which the most important 
properties of the various data protection legislations are pictured. 
In such a way we can develop an idea about which law gives the 
most protection and which the least. 
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The nine questions: 
1. Does the law include 
also private databases? 
2. Can citizens demand 
information about data 
that is held about them? 
3. Is there a definition 
of illegal data? 
4. Does the law prosecute 
databases with illegal 
data? 
5. Is there a controlling 
institution (data-
inspection)? 
6. Does the prosecuting 
duty lie with the law? 
7. Does the law regard 
data transfers abroad? 
8. Does the law also 
concern itself with manual 
files? 
9. Does the law demand 





























































A rather striking difference is the difference between the US and 
Canadian legislation on the one side and the European legislation 
on the other. All European legislations include private databases 
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which hold personal information, while the north American 
legislations do no such thing. 
This is probably related to a difference in opinion about what a 
government can do and what a government cannot or is not 
allowed to do. Moreover the discussion in the US and Canada 
about privacy and computers focuses on the workings of the 
government of the state. In general the public fear about abuse 
of private information took form in the notions of personal 
freedom versus the possibility of the government becoming 'Big 
Brother'.206 
The disregard for private databases is in European eyes a bit 
strange. Not only commercial organizations like Polk can gather 
and use private information about people, probably for no other 
purpose than providing a service, but also other organizations 
with other more politically and socially oriented goals. Among a 
host of probably harmless organizations, we find at least in the 
United States, but now also in Britain and in other forms 
elsewhere, organizations like the Klu Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi 
Organizations and others which have a special interest in knowing 
to what race and/or religion people belong, if they have 
communist sympathies or not. 
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It is this sort of thing that is dangerous. The availability of 
information about a particular citizen is not important but the 
potential possibility of categorizing citizens in economically, 
politically or socially valuable, dangerous, undesirable, safe etc. is 
the danger that is behind too much private information about 
citizens. Therefore it seems to me important that also private 
organizations are confronted with restrictions about what they 
can register and what not about people. 
It would, of course, be naive to think that for example the Klu 
Klux klan would willingly let a governmental inspection institution 
look in databases where it holds information about its 'enemies'. 
But they would have to be more careful with such practices 
because it would be easier for a government and a public 
prosecutor to find evidence of illegal conduct. 
The danger lies of course also with organizations of the state 
intelligence and security organizations which advice governments 
about citizens in applications for civil service jobs, benefits, etc. 
Even when we do not have a straightforward authoritarian or 
totalitarian regime, but simply a strong state, like in Britain and 
the Netherlands, these things can be dangerous. 
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All countries dealt with share with Britain the exclusion of police 
and security records, with the results described above. There is 
nowhere any control about the accuracy of the information and 
the relation the information has towards the execution of the 
tasks of the police and security organizations. Nor is there any 
time limit for which this information can be kept. This seems to 
me a grave shortcoming. 
The need for a police force and to some extent security 
organizations is defendable, but that does not mean that they 
have to operate entirely out of control of parliaments and 
governments. The discussion about the workings of the security 
services in Britain, the US, Israel and other countries shows that 
this problem is real. 
The country where this problem is taken most seriously is 
probably Sweden. There the privacy discussion was taken to the 
extreme, certainly in Swedish circumstances, of a 'coup d'etat'. 
Although certain politicians in Sweden found such considerations 
offensive207, it helps to construct measures which certainly in less 
extreme circumstances provide a maximal protection for the 
individual citizen. 
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On the whole Sweden has the most complete data protection 
legislation compared with the other countries. The only question 
which had to be answered with 'no' was whether the Data 
Protection Law concerned itself with manual files. Only in the 
US, The Netherlands and Germany data protection laws concern 
themselves also with manual files. This is an important point 
because information dangerous for a persons privacy may be 
stored on paper. It is true that mass processing of such files goes 
much slower than computerized files. Still such files may serves 
as identification files while the computerized files are totally 
depersonalised so that they comply with existing data protection 
legislation. It is exactly because of this the data protection laws 
in Germany include such files. 
In all countries citizens have the right to demand information 
about what is stored about them in at least public databases but 
in all European countries also in private databases. Sometimes 
they have to pay a fee for such services in one case (Sweden) 
they are allowed to do this only once per year per database. 
Nowhere, except in Germany, is this information provided 
automatically when a person's data are entered in a database. 
This lack makes it difficult for private persons to find out where 
and if there is information stored about them, except in the most 
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obvious cases. Hence the possibilities of control, correction and 
possible prosecution in the case of abuse are seriously curtailed. 
In the case of abuse, it may come to ones attention long after 
the harm is done, and even then it may be difficult to trace the 
source of the abused information.' The reason that Germany has 
included this rule about the automatic provision of information 
(given when the entering of personal information in a database 
was not obvious at the moment of gathering) is perhaps the very 
bad experiences during the Nazi-period with personal information. 
Only two countries Britain and again Sweden have explicitly 
defined what kind of information is illegal to gather, except in 
cases where there is a statutory and explicit need for it. To leave 
such rules out of a data protection law is severely limiting the 
working of the law. One of the best ways of protecting a person 
against abuse of personal information is not gathering it. I will 
talk later about what information is really indispensable for public 
and private purposes, but it is essentially not very much. 
Consequently only in Sweden and Britain prosecution on this 
basis is possible. 
Suppose the (not so) hypothetical case that someone is harassed by complete 
strangers because of race, religion or political beliefs. It is not at all clear where these 
strangers got the information concerned. It is not impossible that they obtained it from 
government sources (most European administrations register the religion of a person, if 
any), but this may not at all be the case. And where does one look among a myriad of 
private- (like Polk) or semi-private databases. 
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The only country which has no Data Inspection Institution in one 
form or another is the United States. There it is assumed that 
the government agencies concerned exercise their own 
responsibility according to their own interpretation of the Privacy 
Act and Freedom of Information Act. This interpretation can, of 
course, always be challenged before a federal court. All other 
countries do not trust their own government agencies with this 
task and have at least a data inspection institution (itself mostly 
operating uncontrolled) which checks the way of information 
gathering and storage in relation to an agency's needs or in the 
European case a private organization's needs, in order to be able 
to decide whether a permit should be issued or not. 
More control and more action of the data inspection institution 
is seen in Germany and Sweden where it can check the proper 
use of a database for which a permit was issued. In case the 
owner of the database fails to correct its use according to the 
data inspection's recommendations, the data inspection can and 
will prosecute that database owner. In all other countries at most 
a recommendation to the parliament or minister concerned is 
made. The individuals whose personal information is used in an 
illegal way have to prosecute the database owner(s) when they 
fail to correct their behaviour. 
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The only country which does not regard data transfers abroad is 
the United States. The reason for this probably is, that the US 
is a data-importing country and not an exporting one.208 
Commercial computer centres in the US offer their services to 
organizations all over the world to process any data they may 
want to be processed. Therefore it may be that the US legislator 
is not very much concerned about limiting data transfers to 
foreign countries. 
In all countries the law demands registration of databases with 
personal information. In the US and Canada, this holds only for 
governmental databases. 
The problem with most of these data protection laws is threefold: 
1. There is a systematic disregard for the data gathering and 
processing in police and security organizations. It certainly must 
have been one of the hot issues in the late sixties and early 
seventies when the privacy and data-protection discussions were 
going on. 
2. The individual citizen has the right to demand inspection of 
the data stored in him/her, but has almost no way (except in a 
way in Germany) to find out where data is stored about him/her, 
aside from the most obvious places. 
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3. Data protection laws have no provisions for the study of 
technological possibilities, now and for the foreseeable future. 
One can say that there is a systematic underestimation of what 
information technology can do. It is striking to see that even 
people like Flaherty, who studied the subject thoroughly 
(although only from a legal and social scientific point of view) 
speak about "morbid fear of computers" and "overestimation of 
possibilities".209 Flaherty mentions in this respect the comment of 
a social scientist about the release of a depersonalized sample 
tape by Statistics Canada for scientific purposes: 
The most challenging and misleading comment on the subject of 
confidentiality came from a prominent Canadian social scientist 
who questioned the possibility of preparing a public use sample 
that would make further identification of individuals impossible. 
Even the sample did not contain the name and address of an 
individual, in his opinion it would be relatively easy to identify 
a certain number of persons by using only four or five 
characteristics. For example, in certain cases, the age, sex, 
occupation, ethnic origin, and the province of residence would 
be sufficient to identify and individual. He argued that Statistics 
Canada could not run the risk; the only possible solution was to 
rely on custom analyses.210 
The mentioned social scientist probably understood the 
possibilities of information technology a little better than 
Flaherty. With address lists like the ones produced by Polk (and 
there is no reason that Polk is the only one and the US the only 
country doing this) it is possible to try to match characteristics. 
It is especially possible when aside from name, address, sex and 
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age information there is information about profession, and 
information about ownership of houses and cars. A community 
or neighbourhood has than certain characteristics which with a 
high probability can be matched against the depersonalised data 
of a statistics bureau. The characteristics of neighborhoods and 
other communities are unique. When certain depersonalised data 
is from a certain area is issued than it is possible to try to match 
these data with what is already known about certain communities 
or neighborhoods (i.e. their unique characteristics). This can be 
done, of course, with the aid of computer programs which try to 
match these data. A higher certainty can be rather easily 
obtained by random checking. This would involve actual research 
within the targeted areas, so that what is known about it can be 
extended.' 
• 
In an article, Are statistical data bases secure?, presented at the National Computer 
Conference in 1978 Dorothy Denning discsses several methods of making data bases secure. 
She concludes that merely stripping name and address data are insufficient, moreover that 
methods that take place within the query possibilities of the DBMS (Data Base 
Management System) can be easily circumvented (pp.526-8) Complete security can be 
expected when users (and other interested parties) have no or very little supplementary 
knowledge, a circumstance very seldomly met (p.528). The schemes that make databases 
fully secure have the danger of making the data base useless for its intended purposes, or 
are too cumbersome in practice (p.529). 
One method overlooked is the active programming by the mala fide users which can access 
the data base flies without the use of the DBMS. This possibility is generally overlooked, 
although a very present danger. The activities of amateur hackers (people who break in to 
a large computer system) and their successes demonstrates this danger. Professional hackers 
with far more resources may be more successful and lesser discoverable. 
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The problem with such procedures was, in the seventies, the 
technological and financial limits that it would impose upon those 
who would want to do such a thing. It requires the power, 
memory storage and speed of a large mainframe. Nowadays this 
is less a problem. Not only have computer services become 
cheaper, but also the speed, power and storage capacity of small 
computers approaches those of earlier mainframes. With powerful 
database management systems, working with additional artificial 
intelligence (AI) programs, can actually do this work of 
comparing and selection. They are designed to perform such 
tasks. That is not to say that the computer industry is trying 
determinately to violate people's privacy, but these programs are 
designed and produced because there are so many tasks similar 
to the one mentioned.' 
Many kinds of safeguards were talked about in the seventies. 
Two of them were explicitly mentioned by the Canadian 
Committee of Statistics when they dealt with the probability of 
undesired disclosure of private information through a sample 
from the census results for social scientific research: 
The brief by the Committee on Statistics directly addressed the 
risk of the identification of individuals in public use samples and 
described two strategies to eliminate any risks of disclosure. The 
first suggestion was the application of small random disturbances 
to the individual data. Assuming seventy variables per record 
See for a simple explanation of the principles of database management 
Appendix 1. 
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and no more than five variables being manipulated at one time, 
most analyses would be likely to contain "errors" in only a 
relatively few cases. These random disturbances would probably 
be fewer that the natural disturbances introduced during the 
taking of the census. The second strategy could substantially 
reduce the benefits to users and society, because it involved 
the collapsing of categories in those cases where the details of 
the more crucial variables might create a probability of 
disclosure. The Committee thus favored the introduction of 
random disturbances.211 
This does not answer the points of the prominent social scientist 
with his misleading remarks. Random disturbances cannot take 
place in every record, the error-chance would become to large, 
moreover one can eliminate such disturbances or neglect them 
when they only partly 'disturb' essential data like sex, age, 
address, profession, etc. Moreover, very often more than five 
variables are handled at one analysis run. Again, a method of 
reconstructing data from a sample file would be 'through the 
back door' by taking public lists like telephone directories, yellow-
pages, and if available, legally or illegally, city administration files, 
or client files from large mail-shopping centres or financial 
institutions. When a pattern is established on the basis of these 
files a further reconstruction of personal data should not be too 
difficult. 
There is also the possibility of encrypting the data files or parts 
of records containing personal information. In order to 
demonstrate its diminishing use I would like to show as an 
example a short article from the personal computer magazine 
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'BYTE' which reports on commercially available software 
designed to eliminate, for completely legal reasons, encryption of 
files produced by a particular administrative and word-processing 
program. 
Regain Password-Protected Files from SMART. 
Smack is a proprietary program designed to help users of 
Innovative Software's SMART software package to regain 
password-protected files where the password has been lost, 
forgotten of added. 
The program is written in Turbo BASIC and is stand-alone, so 
you aon t need the SMART software to run it. SMACK can see 
the spreadsheet and data-manager screen passwords and 
resurrect the file-encrypted word processor documents. SMACK 
does not find the old password, but adds a choice of two new 
passwords. File colors, tab settings, and other formatting 
structures may be lost, and possibly one or two characters at the 
head of the document can become corrupted, but the file 
contents remain complete. [Underlinings by me, Ph.] 
SMACK runs under MS-DOS or PC-DOS 2.0 or higher on 
computers that can run the SMART software package version 
2.0 or higher with graphics card. 
Price: $70 U.S. 
Contact: Dandy Computer Services, 36 Avalon Rd. Bridgwater, 
Somerset TA6 4JE, U.K., (44) 278-424029.212 
There is no doubt that what can be done with one software 
package's encryption option, can also be done with another. The 
fact that decrypting software becomes commercially available, 
makes all kinds of encrypting schemes' of, at most, limited value 
" Most encryption schemes are derived from the DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD 
form the Federal information Processing Standards Publication 46, of January 15,1977, and 
the additional 'Specifications for the Data Encryption Standard'. The publication is 
extremely confident that decryption without knowing the key is impossible: 
As there are over 70,000,000,000,000,000 (seventy quadrillion) possible keys of 56 bits, 
the feasibility of deriving a particular key in this way [random trial of keys] is extremely 
unlikely in typical threat environments. Moreover if the key is changed frequently, the 
risk of this event is greatly diminished. 
This implies that it is not thought that the encrypted data can be decrypted without key. It 
is not certain that the mentioned decryption software decryptes a scheme that is 
(continued...) 
252 
(like the famous copy protection of PC-software which does not 
allow the making of duplicates of the same software for other 
users than those who have legally obtained it, which has become 
useless in the face of special copy programs).213 
These examples serve merely to demonstrate that we cannot rely 
on technological solutions as far as security of personal data (or 
any data) is concerned. What is necessary is a flexible control of 
databanks which potentially contain information which may pose 
a threat to personal privacy, without sacrificing the benefits that 
such systems may provide for crime investigation and social 
scientific research. This is the main question of the next chapter. 
After looking at these examples of legislation two additional 
questions come to mind: 
1. How much and what kind of information should be allowed to 
be held on a person (on computer or hand maintained files)? 
2. What kind of institutional arrangement would be a good 
safeguard against abuse of personal information? In the next 
chapter I will try to answer these questions. 
(...continued) 
programmed according to the DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD. But what it shows is 
that to great a confidence in encryption schemes is not always justified. One can almost 
always expect that at some moment a decryption method is invented which makes the most 
sophisticated encryption scheme worthless. The history of the German ENIGMA is one 
example. Given enough resources and talent every encryption method will be broken. 
253 
7. The Fourth Power. 
7.1. Introduction. 
Following the discussion about democracy, the problem of data 
protection and existing legislation about the protection of privacy 
and personal freedom, I want to propose a different approach to 
the problem of government and private databases containing 
personal information. Such a discussion will bring out the aspects 
and difficulties of citizen control over technological developments. 
As we have seen, files containing personal information represent 
one of the important issues in our societies. There have been 
numerous instances of official abuse of this information in many 
Western Countries. Information technology may bring, in this 
respect, a real totalitarian society closer. 
In our days governments, good or evil, can rely on the use of 
computers. What would have happened when the Nazis had 
computers at their disposal? They were clearly on the way of 
making them, like the allies. Nothing was more indispensable for 
the Gestapo than their files, with the addition of the files of local 
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police in the occupied territories.* Modern database technology 
makes the compilation and retrieval of records in large files 
instantly possible, where before the computer it cost a long time 
and much work. 
A government interested in the same objects as the Nazis would 
today be infinitely more effective than the already very effective 
Nazis were. Not only would they be able to work more quickly, 
more efficiently and with fewer people, the amount of 
information that they could generate and act upon would be 
more reliable and eliminate deceptive information. 
The last, deceptive information, can be illustrated with an 
example; for instance, someone from Jewish ancestry but whose 
parents have become Catholics. This situation confused Gestapo 
searches for Jews, because the people who, earlier, compiled this 
information thought of Judaism as a religion and not something 
specific for a race. That means that the entry 'religion: Jewish' 
was changed into 'religion: Catholic'. With the aid of modern 
The Dutch resistance saw the dangers of the use of the flies gathered by the Dutch 
government before the war. The brunt of Dutch resistance was laid in the destruction of 
Dutch Government files so that the Gestapo could not use them. These actions have 
probably saved the lives of a large number of people. Largely, because of the lack of files 
the Gestapo had to resort to 'wild' arrest actions in the street, in order to find those 
whom it wanted to find. A for the Nazis desirable side-effect of these wild actions was, the 
terror that these actions spread among the population. See also Frits W Hondius, Emerging 
Data Protection in Europe, New York, 1975, p. 187. 
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data-base query techniques it would have been very easy to find 
the 'right' background or uncover who belongs to what race, if 
there is only information about religion. The 'right' background 
can be found through a intensive search among someone's 
ancestors. 
7.2. What is necessary information? 
Even if we can determine what kind of information should be 
present in databases containing personal information, we have to 
find out the means of controlling that the database is limited to 
this information. One has to keep in mind that any proposal 
carries elements of opinion. There is no way for scientifically 
determining what information should be held or not. Aside from 
bare basics the subject is one which is very much influenced by 
moral standards, and a social views. Nevertheless, it would be 
unwise to avoid the problem. 
The kind of information present should be limited to that 
information that is absolutely indispensable to society (this is of 
course a dubious point, as I have said, but the maxim is: as little 
personal information as possible). 
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So only information concerning Name, address, city, date and 
place of birth and financial data for tax purposes (this includes 
possessions and income). I would like to make a strong point 
against the registration of sex. Like information about race, 
religion and political affiliation this is absolutely unnecessary 
information to hold about a person. The reasons for this are the 
following: 
1. Having no information about the sex of a person would largely 
eliminate public discrimination of a certain sex (the discrimination 
of women is still an issue in most societies, including western 
industrialized societies). 
2. The association of two or more people would become a 
private affair not sanctioned by public morality or the state. This 
would ensure the freedom of people to live together for whatever 
reason they want. This is especially an issue in some western 
European countries where the state does not want to grant them 
the economic advantage of living together, which in the case of 
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living together is expressed in extra taxation or decreased social 
security payments.* 
3. It follows from the last point that also sexual relations are in 
principle not the business of the state. This means that 
heterosexual or homosexual relations and everything that may be 
in between should be outside of state control. 
The whole discussion revolves around discrimination social and 
economic. If for instance for good democratic or economic 
reasons a government wants to know how many men there are 
in a population and how they are divided over various age 
categories, it can resort to quite a diverse number of sampling 
techniques which are usually accurate enough to base policies on. 
Exact figures are not necessary and also never used. This is of 
course also true for data like race, political affiliation, religion, 
etc. 
It is unlikely that the economic advantage is on the whole so large that it would 
lead to cramming people in a small house just because of that. Only people in the very 
lowest income strata would experience this as a true advantage, and I think they are 
entitled to that. Furthermore it cannot be denied that it is everyone's right to live with 
whomever they want. The state has no right to interfere with human relations in this 
respect. An obvious exception is when one of the parties involved is forced to be with the 
other(s) entirely against its will. But I assume here agreement between the parties for 
whatever reason it may exist. 
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Information stored in computers of medical centres and hospitals 
could be turned over to the patient after treatment is completed. 
Given the private character of such data only the patient himself 
should be responsible for it. If this information is destroyed or 
lost while in possession of the person concerned it is his own 
responsibility. This sounds harsh, especially when such 
information is lost because of an accident outside of the control 
of the owner. It is, of course, a point of democratic decision if 
this should be so. Nevertheless I believe that the principle is 
right. 
The computers storing patient information could be checked, so 
that no files remain containing information which can be traced 
back to persons. Only statistical information, for scientific and 
general health care purposes can remain. 
Then there are the files held by police and security organizations. 
It can be argued that for purposes of police search and national 
security reasons this information should not be controlled by 
other public institutions, but only by those institutions which have 
a direct responsability. 
This is only partly true. When criminal investigation is on its way 
information about the persons suspected of crime or any 
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involvement of crime should remain secret. The disclosure of 
information held on persons in respect to the current investigation 
would greatly hamper such investigation, and is therefore not to 
be advised. But when this investigation is stopped or abandoned 
the persons involved should be (actively) informed about the 
existence of information about them in respect to criminal 
investigation. 
This sort of private information is clearly of importance to the 
police, but after a period of 'good behaviour' should perhaps be 
deleted (depending on the kind of crime), as is done to some 
extent in Sweden. It is evident that in order to give a former 
convict a chance to 'better his life' public information, readily 
available , would greatly impair the possibilities of finding 
appropriate work or a place to live, since future landlords or 
employers could easily check on the person's past. 
Here I have only discussed proper police organizations, but I 
have also mentioned security organizations in general. It can be 
argued that for purely defensive reasons there may be a need for 
security and counter espionage organizations. It would be better, 
however, they are organized like the police forces and subject to 
the same kinds of control then maintain them in their present 
largely undercover existence. This subject is in need of a larger 
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discussion then the present, and therefore a discussion about the 
shape of these organizations is beyond the scope of the 
discussion here. 
A computer system which registers databases which hold personal 
information can also, interactively or otherwise, disclose to the 
person involved where information is actually held on him or her. 
It is not so difficult to envisage a database system under control 
of a data registrar, or similar institution, which provide this 
service. Terminals open to the public, in public buildings could 
enable citizens to receive this service, among other things, by 
accessing a menu which provides it as an option and giving a 
personal code (tax-number, social security number, etc.). Or the 
system could be accessed via the telephone, with a personal 
computer. 
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An information screen showing what is held on a person could 
look like this: 
Citizen record. 
Last name: Doe 
First name(s): John, William 
Born: April 1, 1947 
Place of birth: Everytown, Country 
Address: 7 Some St. City: Everytown Postal code: 01 
INFORMATION ABOUT YOU IS HELD IN THE 
FOLLOWING DATABASES: 
1. Occupier Inc. 4 
2. Mail Order Comp. 5 
3 6 
For Tax information press the RED key. 
J 
In order to get the information from the databases from Occupier 
Inc. and Mail Order Comp. the citizen could get on-line information 
or would ask either through the public database he is looking at or 
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privately ask for the information held. If a company does not want 
everyone to see who his customers are, then no information should 
be stored on them, and the company has to design its dealings with 
these customers accordingly. 
7.3. A proposal. 
Following the discussion on necessary data and the information service 
which is possible for a data registrar a further proposal is possible. 
Files containing information and also personal information in the 
broadest sense of the word, are central for the functioning of any 
state, including a democratic state. It is impossible for a state 
apparatus to function properly when it has no information at all about 
its citizens. Perhaps in feudal society this was possible, but not in a 
modern industrialized society. 
Only when we deny the necessity of levying taxes, making social 
services, organizing national defence, etc., can we maintain that this 
kind of information is not necessary. But in doing so we would deny 
many functions that are dependent, albeit indirectly on organizing 
these activities. The state would be deprived of the means of 
influencing economic life, organizing traffic, and many other things. 
Even an anarchist society, if it wanted to maintain modern industries, 
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could not escape from the necessity of gathering personal information, 
however limited this might be. 
Given this central necessity, but combined with the necessity of 
protecting the citizen against abuse of information stored about him, 
I propose the following: 
1. All information stored about any individual should be, in principle, 
absolutely public. There is no need for secrecy, when the most 
elementary information is concerned, which includes financial 
information. This means that any citizen has the possibility to check 
on what kind of information is collected.* As far as economic and 
financial information is concerned, it can be argued that when this 
information is public it could become a weapon for an adversary in 
negotiations between companies. The Swedish example shows us that 
there is no need for fear in this matter. In Sweden almost all 
information about persons and companies is public, and the thriving 
Swedish economy gives shows that this is no disadvantage. 
In Sweden there exists already a fully public governmental database system. It is 
prohibited, some very special cases excluded, for the government to maintain secret files. 
This law is extended to the databanks of the government and to the databanks of private 
organizations. There is a Data-inspection which checks the data on private and public 
databases. Not only personal information like name and address are public but also 
financial and income data. That is why, for instance, the car factory VOLVO has based its 
database activities in Hamburg, Germany, because at the time in the Federal Republic of 
Germany there is no public control of data worth mentioning. 
See: Hoffman, Gerd E. Computer Macht und MenschenwUrde, Miknchen 1976, p. 157-8, and 
see also Chapter 8. 
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A 'good' public information system would inform the citizens about 
what is stored about them and where. Moreover, I believe that such 
information should be public, so that the population as a whole can 
see what is held about everyone. The thought that for instance 
income should be secret is already today quite old-fashioned, while in 
most cases pay-scales are available to the public. It is no great deal 
to find out what someone earns, for those who are really interested. 
Knowing someone's main occupation is usually enough. 
Secrecy may be the enemy of safety in this sense. As long as 
information is secret it may be anything since checking it is difficult. 
Moreover when the collected information is public then the incentive 
is present to collect only the information which can publicly be proved 
to be indispensible. 
I can only think of the two earlier mentioned cases as exceptions to 
this. One is medical information, which I believe should be in the 
hands of the person concerned (or his/her parents or guardians in 
case of inability to act in his/her own interest). The second is 
information on previous criminal behaviour. 
These two exceptions should still be subjected to control by an 
institution which protects the citizens against abuse of this 
information. In the case of medical information the hospital computers 
should be checked on the fact that from the case information name, 
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address and identification number are removed after the patient is no 
longer under treatment. In the case of police intelligence files it 
should check that the information is deleted on the appropriate 
moment, and kept within the realm of its obvious use, i.e. the 
prevention of crime and the finding and arresting of those who 
committed crimes. 
2. The creation of a fourth power, i.e. the institution that maintains and 
controls the information which is collected about individuals. Such a 
thing would seem the opposite of what one should do in these cases. 
Decentralization looks like a more obvious solution. One objection is 
the one from Karol Soltan, mentioned above, which argues against 
decentralization, because decentralization poses problems for quick 
and adequate decision making. Another is that such a solution does 
not take into account the possibilities of modern information 
technology. I have already indicated above that it does not matter in 
principle where the information is physically stored, or even under 
what kind of department or institution, because the combination and 
retrieval of files is a fast and relatively simple thing.' 
From a theoretical point of view a fourth power in our proposal is 
not a power proper in the sense of a theory of separation of powers. 
It is a derived power, derived from the power of the executive power. 
See Appendix 1. 
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In itself it has no strict political function, like the other powers in the 
classical sense have. 
I believe, however, that the gathering, maintaining and reporting 
personal information can be seen as a new function. This function is 
not new in a strict sense, because, as I have already indicated, the 
'normal' bureaucracy already performes it. But so it has been with the 
classical functions within the state. 
In a feudal society it is possible to distinguish a legislative, executive 
and judicial function. The separation of powers has been proposed by 
De Montesquieu and later Madison, in order to enhance a system of 
'checks and balances' where no single body could control all functions 
at the same time. So it is with our function of information gathering 
and maintenance. To define this function legally and contribute it to 
a separate power is to safeguard against the holding of too many 
'powers' or 'functions' in one body. The executive has, by its nature, 
enhanced the importance of the information function to such an 
extent that it may become dangerous to leave it with the executive 
power. 
The advantages of a further separation of powers are: (i) A relatively 
autonomous institution, like the judicial system, does not have to react 
to the ever changing wishes of an executive. It merely has to observe 
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the law. It can really act without scorn or bias, in regard to the other 
powers, (ii) Those who deal with personal information and protect it 
from abuse could be put under the control of an occupational ethic 
maintained by a council of peers, (iii) The institution could check the 
use of its databanks by other agencies. It could trace the sorts of 
combinations made and take care that these agencies get only the 
information they really need (give out authorizations to use certain 
data and not other data) Beside it would have the means and 
expertise to check the use of data. 
The fourth power could mitigate the information disadvantage that 
parliaments have vis-a-vis the government214. The executive power, 
nowadays has an almost monopoly of information that is submitted to 
parliaments and departments. A computer system network organized 
by the institution will put equal computing power in the hands of 
parliamentary institutions on all levels as in the hands of executive 
branches of all levels. 
Still one can imagine that certain personal data, gathered through a 
census for instance, has to be available for social scietific research. In 
chapter 7 this problem is discused at some length. In the present 
setup of the countries discussed in chapter 7, no satisfactory solution 
was found for the problem of privacy, microdata, and social scientific 
research. The fourth power institution can be dealing with this on a 
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more flexible basis. Microdata can become available in some cases to 
some researchers, depending on the decision of the citizen committee 
(see below) who controls the fourth power. This means that a less 
rigid policy can be followed, because the fourth power has always the 
right to control the use of data and withdraw the licens for its use if 
need be. 
Another function that could be performed is the control of 
commercial databases controlling personal data. It could require the 
screening of a database, and report back to the individuals concerned 
that information about them is stored in a particular database, and 
that they have the right to require that this information is deleted. 
In certain cases this cannot happen. For example, when one is the 
debtor of a company or organization one cannot require deletion of 
the necessary information held by the organizations database about 
him. But databases for purposes of commercial or other propaganda 
should respect these wishes. A central authority should require third 
organizations to inform the public about who is registered in their 
computers and who is not, as I have indicated above/ 
It also would greatly relieve those who do not want to receive the avalanche of 
commercial printings every day. 
7.4. Citizens' control. 
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All this is, of course, no guarantee that this system will not be abused. 
It all depends on what a certain government finds to be important, 
and it could try to change the law accordingly. 
It also would not prevent anyone inside the institute taking illegal 
action and selling information to the highest bidder. A fourth power 
would suffer from the same ailments as the third power, the judicial 
system, does. But where the control of the judicial system functions 
via public channels, and citizen participation is limited (where no jury 
system is present), it would not have to be the case for a fourth 
power. 
As in a system with jury-duty, citizens may be required to spend time 
to learn the basics of information technology and take part in a 
council that checks the workings of the institution and proposes ways 
to improve its functioning. There are some elements in a complex 
democratic society like ours that have to be taken into account, when 
we construct a fourth power even when it is controlled by a citizen 
body. 
In the chapter where democracy is discussed we have seen that Dahl 
makes a distinction between technical expertise and moral 
competence. The distinction which Dahl makes between moral 
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competence and technical expertise runs curiously parallel with 
Habermas's distinction between practical and technological discourse. 
The difference is that Dahl tries to put these notions into practical 
proposals, while Habermas uses his notions as tools for critique of 
modern industrial society. 
Dahl proposes a body which has to accomplish a number of objectives 
helped by technology adapted to a democratic goal. This technology 
clearly is an information technology which connects all interested 
citizens to this body, so that they may be able to influence decision-
making. 
The objectives are: 
1. To ensure that information about the political agenda, appropriate 
in level and form, and accurately reflecting the best knowledge 
available, is easily and universally accessible to all citizens; 
2. To create easily available and universally accessible opportunities 
to all citizens to influence the informational agenda, and to 
participate in a relevant way in political discussions. 
x To provide a highly informed oody of public opinion that (except 
for being highly informed) is representative of the entire citizen 
body.215 
The centre where this information may be received and relayed back 
to the public would exactly be the Information Institution that I have 
proposed as a fourth power. All essential information would be 
essentially controlled by that institution (through its own activity and 
the data surveillance it would perform at both public and private 
organizations). 
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For outside organizations it would be very difficult to tamper with the 
information available (although not impossible). Aside from 
guaranteeing protection of personal data, it could display requested 
information in levels of difficulty. In this way citizens with very 
different intellectual backgrounds would be able to receive relevant 
information on their own level.216 
The proposal of Dahl of a highly informed body which is 
representative of the entire citizen body, would be very useful as a 
controlling body for the fourth power.217 
7.5. A minipopulus controlling the fourth power. 
Since our fourth power is not like the judiciary, a power that in itself, 
in order to arrive at 'just' verdicts' has to be screened off from the 
democratic process, a minipopulus actually could control the workings 
of this power. 
The people selected by a random process to serve in this minipopulus 
could be educated in the most important aspects of data storage and 
retrieval, together with possible dangers that may exist when too much 
information about a citizen is stored or when, for personal freedom, 
undesirable combinations of certain files are made. 
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They should control that: 
1. Only within the institution of the fourth power the connection of 
several files (like tax and police files, via ID-numbers) with Name and 
address information is made. 
2. That all citizens are informed that information about them is stored 
in various (also private) databases and which these databases are. 
3. That there is an easy way to amend or correct the information 
stored about a citizen. The citizen has to provide evidence that these 
amendments or corrections are necessary. 
4. That organizations which need statistical information rather than 
individual pieces of information have no access to other information 
than aggregates. Or when they have to check methods and 
proceedings of aggregation have no access to name and address 
information or any other information beyond their need. 
5. That other information available to citizens, and given by citizens, 
in order to contribute to the political decision-making process (as 
mentioned above) is correct. 
6. That large and/or important private databases are scrutinized on 
what information they contain and for what use it is kept. 
7. That essential information about the working of the fourth power 
and the general condition of information gathering by private 
organizations is reported to the public. 
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A certain amount of technical knowledge is necessary in order to be 
able to do this. Therefore the minipopulus should be aided by experts 
who are not connected with the data-institution, and who can inform 
them about possibilities of control and about the risks, uncertainties 
and trade offs of information policies. 
7.6. How is this control exercised? 
The minipopulus in Dahl's view is only a body that provides 'normal' 
parliamentary institutions with issues which are considered to be 
important.218 It is in itself not a decision making body. The issues that 
the minipopulus proposes may be rejected by the institutions that do 
the actual decision-making. The problem for the decision-making 
institutions is that they would have to reckon with critique and 
resistance from the public. The minipopulus will probably take care 
that its proposals are duly advertised in the media, and so 
communicated to the public. If its proposals meet public agreement 
a parliament will be hard put to reject the proposed issues. 
The concept of citizens' committees or minipopuli is not reserved for 
application at the highest levels of government decision-making. To 
my mind then the concept could be applied at lower levels of 
government or at 'key institutions'. This application of the principal 
concept of citizens' committees at other levels than the highest will 
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have consequences for the tasks of these committees. As I have tried 
to make clear above, the citizens' committee in the case of controlling 
the Fourth Power has not merely an advisory function. It has to check 
on a number of things. In order to be able to effectively do this such 
a committee has to be endowed with real power. It should have the 
power to order correction when it finds that one of the essential tasks 
of the Fourth Power is badly executed. 
Therefore the committee and its members should have the possibility 
to investigate freely into the actual procedures and day to day 
activities of the Fourth Power. But not only of the Fourth Power. 
Also databases of private companies should not only be subjected to 
the routine controls of the civil servants of the Fourth Power, but also 
to inquiries by the members of the citizens committee when they see 
a reason to do so. 
Furthermore the citizens' committee should have an essential role in 
policy-making concerning issues of information technology and 
gathering and registration of personal data. Political, economic and 
social circumstances may change so that other requirements for the 
gathering and registration of personal data may be necessary. 
Another very important function that this committee would have is 
the active assessment of technological developments in its own sphere 
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of information technology (technology assessment will be discussed in 
the next chapter). This would not only enhance its ability of policy 
making but also its expertise and power to advise and inform other 
government bodies and the public. 
The technical aspects of information technology and the problems of 
personal data imply an active control of a citizens' committee. Normal 
parliamentary institutions can only have a temporary interest in the 
functioning of various parts of the bureaucracy. This is so because; (1) 
a parliament is not meant to directly control the bureaucracy: this 
control is a function of the executive. (2) Parliament usually takes up 
discussions about the functioning of the bureaucracy in situations of 
necessity. In this sense a parliament usually reacts to situations rather 
than initiating discussions and proposals. 
With 'specialized' citizens committees this may be different. Through 
its specialized knowledge about information technology and its 
understanding of what is thought and felt by a large number of the 
population the citizens' committee can actively control the Fourth 
Power. It does not have to wait until a situation of need for legislative 
proposals or policy making presents itself. Within its own realm it can 
actively undertake investigation, formulate policies and enforce them. 
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The fourth power itself, and this should be clear, is not an entirely 
independent body. It has to obey the law. Maintaining the law is why 
it is there. Thus the fourth power is like the executive restricted by 
the legislative power, also democratic be it in a different way. The 
only difference with other 'bureaus' is that it does not fall under the 
direct control of the executive and that it has the possibility to 
propose its own elimination, when its citizen committee perceives that 
the control of information technology with respect to the privacy of 
citizens is no longer necessary. 
7.7. Technology assessment as a tool for control. 
In order to be able to be able to control the use of certain aspects 
of information technology, the citizens committee concerned with the 
Fourth Power has to merely be informed about the curent state of 
affairs but must be able to foresee, as far as that is possible, future 
developments of technology. Therefore, one of its tasks is to assess 
and extrapolate developments of information technology. I want, with 
this task in mind, look at a method of research which has become 
important in respect to the forecasting of technological developments. 
At the beginning of the nineteen seventies a method of research was 
proposed in relation to technology and its effects to society and 
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nature. This was called 'technology assessment'*. It was very broadly 
defined as a kind of future research, in which the possible effects of 
a new technology is assessed. 
Technology assessment comprises studies that systematically examine 
the effects on society that may occur when a technology is 
introduced, extended, or modified, with special emphasis on those 
consequences that are unintended, indirect, or delayed.219 
Some writers distinguish two ways of approach: (1) the problem 
oriented approach and (2) the technology oriented approach. The 
problem oriented approach directs itself to the more or less direct 
effects of a technology (risk assessment may come in this category) 
and the technology oriented approach is directed towards the long 
term consequences of a technology.220 In the following I will discuss 
these two approaches together, because I believe that they cannot be 
separated as two totally different ways of looking at technology. 
Technology assessment would include the following notions or 
considerations: 
a. Appraisal of technological "progress"."In an early study about 
* 
Technology assessment was later followed by 'risk assessment' as the basis of 
technology studies (as some saw it). This approach is, as the name implies, negatively 
oriented namely on the possibilities of encountering disaster and how to avoid or minimize 
it. See Conrad, J. (ed) Society, Technology and Risk Assessment, London 1980, esp. pp. xix-
xvii. 
The constituting items mentioned in the text are Hetman's: 
a. Appraisal of technological "progress". 
b. Systematic analysis of socio-technical systems. 
c. Social impact analysis. 
d. Evaluation of alternative technologies. 
e. Study of technological futures. 
f. Control and management of technology. 
(continued...) 
278 
technology assessment of the OECD, Francois Hetman asks: "Of what 
should the control and management of technology consist?" 
For Hetman technology assessment, "though essentially forward 
looking it is not just technological forecasting as such but an analysis 
of the societal consequences of technological 
change." Technology assessment has to be done before a new 
technology is going to be applied. 
Note that it is never the intention to inhibit the research and 
development process. In the Schumpeterian sense the relatively 
independent 'entrepreneur', who may be very well a scientist or 
engineer in a R & D centre, must be free to develop whatever he 
thinks is beneficial, profitable or just nice. If this kind of freedom did 
not exist, technology assessment would only have the limited function 
of merely being a decision tool about what to develop, the social 
impact element would be very much diminished. Because then large 
organizations and the state would be able to wield complete control 
over technological and scientific developments. 
Aside from this ideal situation technology assessment should also be 
carried out when the application of a certain technology is on the way 
** 
(...continued) 
They are mentioned in: Francois Hetman, Society and the Assessment of Technology, 
pp.53-65. 
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so that new insights and experiences can be used as starting points for 
a new round of analysis. 
b. Systematic analysis of socio-technical systems. 
Technology assessment is considered by Hetman as an extension of 
systems engineering. More disciplines are to be involved. Moreover 
the notion that technology cannot be left alone and that governments 
should be held responsible for its correct development, is extremely 
important in this. Both good and bad side effects need be investigated 
as well as missed opportunities. The study of side effects should not 
be limited to the short term but should also include also a 'higher-
order' level, in the sense of affecting larger structures of society, and 
longer term consequences should be compared with benefits on the 
short and long term. 
The objection could be made that the belief in the possibility of 
predicting long-term benefits or dis-benefits is unrealistic. It is true 
that long term planning and prediction in general is very difficult in 
our society. Nevertheless this consideration does not absolve us from 
the duty to try and develop methods which would make such long 
term views more possible. 
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c. Social impact analysis. 
Hetman signals the need for an independent institution in order to 
exercise this analysis. This fits in very well with the proposal of 
citizens' committees. 
Such an institute can stimulate the use of new knowledge and develop 
new tools which can be used in technology assessment, or possibly 
replace it. "In a world of accelerating change, that is to say to 
undertake pre-crisis as well as post crisis study, to generate new 
knowledge and to plan ahead." 
d. Evaluation of alternative technologies. 
"Considered as a step towards a humanization of science and 
technology, technology assessment essentially comes out to the 
evaluation and selection of alternative technologies with regard to a 
clear defined set of objectives and potential applications... It is 
designed to take into account [also]... technological applications 
inclusive of its physical, economic and political side-effects which are 
very often connected only indirectly with the actual use of 
technology." 
e. Study of technological futures. 
In such a study the following items should be included: 
1. Technological projection. 
2. Technological assessment (technological options). 
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3. Technological planning. 
4. Technological parameters of social and economic 
planning. 
It is clear that much of this still needs to be developed. It may be 
asked if useful projection and planning is possible at all. Nevertheless, 
such questions will never be answered when no serious attempt is 
made to design methods for projection and planning. Through giving 
direction to research and development projects certainly a part of this 
problem can be solved. 
The difficulty is that such processes cannot be nationally controlled 
but need a much larger body of control like a world government. 
Such options are still very far away from reality. 
f. Control and management of technology. 
Hetman defines the control and management of technology as "a 
process of analysis, forecasting and assessment of technological futures 
leading to decision-making": 
1. Monitoring side-effects and development of socially acceptable 
alternatives. 
2. Screening and selecting of new technologies resulting from already 
known or attainable scientific results. 
3. Need for original R&D in the development of new 
and desirable technologies in relation to changing 
282 
social goals and future priorities. 
Technology assessment has according to Joseph F. Coates221 six 
aspects that have to be kept in mind: 
1. Technology assessment is a policy tool. 
2. Technology assessment is likely to be iterative and part of an 
interlocking set of studies. 
3. New technological knowledge creates new ignorance. 
4. A major policy need is the organization of certainty and uncertainty 
to define effective strategies and tactics for managing any particular 
technology. 
5. More information and analysis, rather than less, promotes better 
decisions. 
6. In the long range, indirect and unanticipated effects of a technology 
are often more significant than the immediate or planned 
consequences. 
The actual process of technology assessment consists of several steps 
that have to be taken." The purpose of the whole exercise is to trace 
These steps are according to MITRE Corporation in A Technology Assessment 
Methodology, Washington, D.C. 1971: 
1. Define the assessment task; 
2. describe the relevant technologies; 
3. develop state-of-society assumptions; 
4. identify impact areas; 
5. make a preliminary impact analysis; 
6. identify possible action options; 
7. complete impact analysis. 
(continued...) 
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the unintended (and perhaps intended but for the outside world 
unknown) consequence of the application of a new technology on the 
short as well as on the long run. This research has to be effected in 
an institution that is independent from those who have developed 
the technologies which are under scrutiny and also from those who 
have a direct interest in its application. 
There are various points of criticism against the proposals of 
technology assessment. When we look at these points of critique it 
can be shown that the citizens' committees are in a good position to 
define social and technological objectives: 
1. "[Difficulties related to the choice of social objectives." 
It would probably be better possible for the citizens' committees to 
define social and technological objectives. They will be less biased by, 
in a social sense, abstract expertise, because they are a sample of the 
population selected not because of their expertise but of the ability 
to reflect on a certain issue popular opinions and thought. Of course 
they would and have to gain a certain expertise in the area that they 
are covering, because without that their ability to make wise decisions 
would be greatly impaired. The difference from a real expert is that 
* 
(...continued) 
A full discussion would take the space of a whole book especially because there have been 
developments in this area. Nevertheless this list of steps serves as to give an impression of 
what technology assessment is about. 
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expertise for them would not have an overruling importance for their 
deliberations. 
There is of course the problem of aggregating the preferences of the 
members of the committees (Arrow's theorem).222 The citizens' 
committees may well become victim of cyclical preferences. This is 
seen by some writers (Kenneth Arrow and Charles R. Plott, among 
others) as an undermining phenomenon of liberal, democratic 
institutions and majority systems. They claim, based on very technical 
considerations on voting, that 'there is no formula for aggregating 
consistent (transitive) individual preferences into a consistent 
(transitive) ranking that will satisfy certain apparently very weak and 
reasonable conditions.'223 Thus the definition of social and 
technological objectives by citizens committees is in danger. 
Although this problem has caused heated discussion among experts I 
think it is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the problem fully. 
Barry and Hardin remark about Arrow's theorem: 
Arrow demands that we as individuals be able to rank all feasible 
state of affairs for the whole society. I have no idea how to set 
about such a task nor presumably does Arrow. What is often easy 
to do, however, is to rank all available candidates or issue-positions 
in a formal election. It happens that Arrow's peculiar results follow 
even for the latter kind of choice problem - although their 
significance for that realm must be severely qualified, as a brief 
consideration of the actual practice of majority rule suggests.224 
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In reality the picture is more complex. Although any combination of 
votes is a mutually exclusive alternative, the situation may arise that 
no particular outcome can be generated. Just a number of possible 
alternatives. This is in our case not really aproblem. What the citizens 
committee does than is limit the nu,mber of choices and in such a 
way provide a higher committee like a parliament with an advice 
which contains of a number of possibilities. Moreover the various 
choices may interact and are not to be seen as independent from each 
other. In choosing or determining objectives there has to be extensive 
discussion which may result in solutions which are less ruled by 
interest than by necessity. With this I mean that some solutions may 
be simply technically impossible or difficult. This complicates the 
picture of cyclical preferences. I do not think that the problem of 
cyclical preferences will hamper the work of the citizens' committees 
very much. Cyclical preferebces only arise when people disagree also 
about the issues. In the process of giving advice or recommendations 
the discussion about the issues is exactly what the citizens' committees 
should do. They are the only ones in a position where technical 
expertise and 'good sense' are combined. That means that the 
discussion about the issues concering their 'area of competence' is 
probably more meaningful within their area of competence than 
outside it. 
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2."[D]ecision on over what time-scale a proposal's effects should be 
examined." 
This point will give great difficulty also to deliberations in a citizens 
committee. There is no standard which can reasonably be applied 
other than experience with earlier technology assessment research 
combined with the ultimate outcomes. Here, clearly, citizens' 
committees cannot give superior information. 
3. "Objectives involve values and these, with the timing of policy and 
action, are major political questions on which the parties and interests 
involved will probably hold quite diverse views." 
The citizens' committees could probably for the reasons stated above 
decide between the values connected with the technological objectives 
involved. The values they would hold would come close to the range 
of values held by the whole population. The problem with popular 
vote is that in political campaigns all kinds of values are shrewdly 
connected to sometime quite adverse political goals, a process usually 
referred to as propaganda. The voters, without any insight in how 
these things work, have difficulty in seeing through these 
propagandistic manipulations. 
The citizen committees combine a certain level of expertise with a 
representation of 'public values', and would therefore be better 
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equipped to mediate between the values and interests involved with 
technological objectives as the outcome of various technology studies. 
4. "When comparing schemes we need to estimate the extent of each 
retreat or advance, preferably on a scale that allows concurrent 
changes to be aggregated; but many human and social benefits and 
dis-benefits cannot be quantified in any realistic way, and some 
attempts to calculate 'social costs' have a very contrived air, and 
convinced few but their authors."225 
The citizen committees would, of course, have great trouble to 
quantify benefits and dis-benefits, but that would not keep them from 
defining a range of possibilities which would give the possibility of 
showing preferences that live in the population and the willingness to 
pay certain costs connected with them. For experts working in 
specialized government or corporate bureaus, this is an extremely 
difficult problem to solve. But for a citizens committee these 
difficulties, although not absent, would be less, since they would have 
less need for quantification in respect to weighing social costs against 
social benefits. 
A construction where citizens' committees or a mini-populus decides 
on what are to be considered important issues226 will at least help to 
solve some of these problems. 
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The outcome of technology assessment studies would have to be 
presented in such a way that informed citizens, possibly with the aid 
of independent experts which may be added to the supporting staff 
of the citizens committee, can understand them. As we all know 
research outcomes are liable to manipulation, especially for 
propaganda purposes (for instance in elections). Therefore it should 
be stressed that wherever possible unambiguous and understandable 
language is used for reporting the outcome of technology assessment 
studies, as for every study that is done for public purposes. 
7.8. Conclusion. 
The discussion about a fourth power is not entirely new. In a book 
called De Vierde Macht (The Fourth Power)227 a Dutch professor in 
public administration observes the de facto existence of a fourth 
power, i.e. the government bureaucracy. 
The bureaucracy has generated so much power in modern societies 
that he thinks it is appropriate to speak about a fourth power. It has 
gained this power largely through its monopoly of information. 
Through the de jure creation of a fourth power a new system of 
checks and balances could emerge. 
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Modern information technology could take care that this does not 
result in the slowing down of the necessary information exchange 
between the different public organizations, and between these 
organizations and the public. Moreover the existence of a controlling 
citizen body which has the duty to report to the public about current 
situations of data-gathering and usage, would be a safeguard against 
abuse of this information. 
The participation of citizens in the way Dahl proposes it and the 
presence of a citizen body controlling certain applications of 
information technology could contribute in the lessening of the 
alienation of the public from technological and political matters. 
8. Conclusion. 
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In chapter 1 I have asked some questions about the possibility 
and necessity of controlling technology. In order to answer these 
questions I have looked, not at theories and approaches which 
describe technology and the society which produces technology 
in a favourable way, but at theories and viewpoints which take a 
critical point of view. 
The theories of Marx and Engels teach us that technological and 
also scientific developments, as far as they are tools for 
production, are intrinsic in a particular type of society called 
capitalism. Its development is not only dependent on the creative 
genius of scientists and engineers, but on the needs of a certain 
type of production, competition and the market. 
The critical outlook of Marx and Engels inspired the Frankfurt 
School to look at the ideological and cultural aspects of 
technology and science. They did not merely look at the way 
technological and scientific thought became a part of our culture 
but they also looked at the effects that this thought and its 
applications have for the human being. They argued that instead 
of liberating (in the last instance for Marx and Engels) 
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technology and science also have an alienating and reducing 
effect on human consciousness. 
The problem of control of technological and scientific 
developments is grounded in the problem of general liberation of 
man. Habermas develops this thought in his concept of 
domination-free communication, because communication is one 
of the most essential aspects of humanity. Technology, at least in 
its applications, ought to be controlled. This control, however can 
only take place in the larger framework of human liberation. 
In the light of this discussion one can say that democratic 
decision-making is certainly a step on the way of human 
liberation. The thinkers of the Frankfurt School and before them 
Marx and Engels, although less outspoken, did not believe that 
'bourgeois' democracy offers us a way out. Democratic theory 
does not claim to be able to attain the absolute human liberation, 
but it provides a means to improve the human condition. 
Therefore democratic means of control of technology are to be 
preferred above static and authoritarian devices. 
As an example information technology and more precisely data 
base technology and the problem of privacy and personal 
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freedom are used. The quest for control motivates public and 
private organizations to attempt to gain control over their 
environment through increased surveillance of the individual. This 
is seen by many as a threat to individual freedom and privacy. 
Moreover it is a threat to democracy and liberty. 
The diverse kinds of existing legislation, in six countries (Britain, 
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United States) about electronic information 
handling are not sufficient, although they certainly cover a part 
of the problem. The individual considerations and solutions 
offered by these pieces of legislation are often valuable but tend 
to overlook severe problems (like the possible abuse that of data 
by police and security organizations) and are in general too static. 
It is clear that if any public control must take place, the stress 
will be laid on application rather than on development. That is 
not to say that there can be no interference in R&D but that 
companies and research institutions need a certain amount of 
freedom in order to develop new technologies. 
At most certain types of research can become prohibited. But 
that can only happen in very rare cases. Subsidies can be granted 
to certain research projects and certain projects can be initiated 
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by public institutions. But overall control of R&D is impossible 
and undesirable. 
It is in the field of application that public control effectively can 
take place. For instance certain applications can be slowed down 
or speeded up according to need. A government may decide not 
to apply for instance nuclear energy, because of the risks involved 
given the state of the art of nuclear devices. 
The overwhelming problem with democratic governments and its 
subsequent methods of decision making is the element of 
expertise combined with moral capacity. Mere technological 
expertise is not enough to be able to make valuable decisions 
about anything. The classical notion of 'virtue' is indispensable. 
But while the people and their representatives may have virtue 
they often lack expertise. Even a parliamentary representative 
who is more or less specialized in a certain field, is often not 
specialized enough to make a good judgement of a case, or to 
decide between several conflicting pieces of advice. 
Moreover there are the problems of alienation and ideology 
which go hand in hand with technological developments, 
especially with developments of information technology as I have 
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tried to indicate in this chapter. These ideological elements often 
disguise possible roads to follow and it is not easy to look 
through them. 
My proposal of a fourth power controlled by a citizens committee 
can only deal with a part of the problem of information 
technology control, let alone with the control of technology as a 
whole. Such an institutional arrangement can be of only limited 
value as far as ideological effects of technology and the 
development of consciousness are concerned. Still, I believe that 
it shows a way in which certain application and certain effects of 
technology can be controlled in a democratic way. This answers 
the questions asked in chapter one: Is democratic control of 
technology possible? If this is so, how can it be done? 
Democratic control of the actual research and development 
seems a difficult thing, although a democratic government or 
other organisation can ask for the research in the direction of 
the solution of certain problems, for which technological solutions 
may exist. In the case of the fourth power, R&D in the direction 
of database technologies and public information dissemination 
technologies, may be stimulated. 
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The democratic control over applications is clearly possible. The 
fourth power proposal is clearly made in view of this possibility. 
Through legislation which is rather static, and through the 
ongoing discussion in citizens committees certain applications may 
be favoured above others, yet others may be excluded because 
they endanger the rights of those involved with them, etc. The 
level of protection that the fourth power proposal offers is 
limited, in the sense that it cannot withstand the attack of a 
totalitarian government. In Germany of the 1930s ultimately, 
democratic institutions, unions and other institutions which tried 
to protect liberty had to succumb to the power of the nazi 
government. The fourth power proposal can, however, stop 
certain tendencies towards absolute surveillance at the beginning. 
Total control over technological and scientific development seems 
unlikely, whether it is democratic or not. Science and technology 
are, so to say, projects of the whole human race and do not 
leave much possibility for overall control by just a part of that. 
Through the discussion of the critical theory, I have tried to show 
that technological development is immanent in social and 
economic structures which are not easily changed, although the 
possibility of giving a certain direction to them cannot be 
excluded. 
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The possibilities of giving direction to developments as technology 
lie in changes which are implemented on a partial and often 
piecemeal basis. Society can probably be consciously altered but 
it cannot be done as result of a radical intervention. I believe 
that the growing powers of the human race will force it to 
become more civilised. 
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APPENDIX 1.: Data base Organization. 
In this appendix I want to discuss some elementary aspects of 
data storage and retrieval. In (wo)man-powered administrations 
files are kept on paper, sometimes in ledgers and sometimes in 
card-systems. A record which is usually a number of data-items 
(like name, address, city, salary, etc) put together. In the old 
system the goal is to cram as much information as possible in one 
record. This is done because combinations of information from 
different files is difficult and time consuming. 
This can be called an advantage, because it is difficult to bring 
certain essential pieces of information together when these pieces 
actually exist in different files. So, for example, if we have two 
files, one with name and address information together with an 
ID-number and a file with name and ID-number and religious 
orientation, it is perfectly possible to single out those who are 
Jewish but it is a long and laborious process. 
Databases. 
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In computer-organized data-systems this is no longer the case. 
Especially in structured file systems like databases it is in 
principle possible to link every piece of information to every other 
piece. This is essential for databases. A database is: 
a collection of interrelated data stored together [in the same 
system, which can be spread out over physically different 
computers, which can also be placed in different locations] with 
controlled redundancy to serve one or more applications in an 
optimal fashion; the data are stored so that they are 
independent of programs which use the data; a common and 
controlled approach is used in adding new data and modifying 
and retrieving existing data within the database.228 
In databases there exist a number of files which contain only 
records with as few single data-items as possible, with an 
identification item. Often there is a 'master-file' which contain 
records essential to make sense of the information stored in the 
database. Today the database systems are relational databases, 
contrary to earlier systems called hierarchical database system. A 
relational database system consists of tables. Each table consists 
of directly related information, the logical combination of tables 
is often called a relationship. Suppose we have, for instance, a 
simplified situation where we have to register citizens, income, 
tax, occupation, and membership of a political organization. In a 
conventional system we would make the following record and 
write it on a system-card: 
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j Name|Address|City|Income|Tax|Occupation|Polit. affil. 
I I I I i i I I 
We have here in fact five elements of information: 
1. Citizen's name and address. 
2. His income (for tax purposes). 
3. Tax information (amount, and paid yes or no) 
4. His occupation. 
5. Membership of a political organization or mere political 
affiliation or beliefs. 
These notions we call entities. We have also determined what 
elements belong to entities. When we have done this we can 
speak of record-types. 
A record-type is an entity of which the belonging elements are 
known. An entity is a person, thing, notion or basic unit which 
is used in a certain environment. 
The diagram I have showed above is a record. When we leave 
out the address information, we can simply display the entity 
citizen without that part of the record which belong to that 
entity. We have, of course, already done the same with the entity 
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income, which may consist of more than a simple number or 
amount of money. 
So a logical record would be the following, without the intra-
record structure: 
1 1 1 1 — 1 
Citizen|Income|Tax|Occupation|Political affiliation| 
l I ' ' l l 
Through the ordering in the record the relation citizen, income 
tax, occupation and political affiliation is fixed. If we have more 
than one occupation per citizen or membership of more than one 
political organization we have to duplicate records and this is 
cumbersome and occupies more space than necessary. This slows 
down searching and combining. 
It is however the classical way of registration until databases 
came about. Different departments of governments or companies 
had to deal with information in this way. The exchange of 
information between departments inside organizations or between 
organizations is difficult when information is stored in this way. 
In the Second World War the Nazis had to work literally through 
whole file systems in order to get the information they wanted. 
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Electronic data processing makes a much simpler method 
possible. Consider the following design. 
Citizen file: 
i 1 1 
I Number I Name I Address 
l l 1 I 





i i i i 






i i i | Number| Political affiliation! 
I I I 
Suppose a citizen has three incomes from three income 




of income (social secu-
rity fees) 
To have these relations would be interesting for checking and 
statistical purposes combine this information with occupation. 
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A combination looks like this: 
occupation 1 
i1"" - ,sffi^;%^4M&&u&gm&i 5' 
The diagrams above are the occurrences of a certain structure of 
data. 
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If we display only the structure, we have the following diagram: 
1 
Occupat ion | 
l i 
•>• T a x -< 
This kind of diagram is called the Bachman diagram after the 
designer of relational database systems. It presents the logical 
structure of data. Between the record-types 'citizen', 'occupation', 
and 'tax' there are relations designated by arrows. Two entities 
together with the relation that connects the two is a 'set'. 
A set has an owner, the record-type from which an arrow 
departs, and a member, the record-type to which the arrow 
points. The files which contains owner records is what I earlier 
called a master file, because it is the file that gives a certain 
meaning to a relation, or sometimes to a whole database.' 
The rules that are given for the notion 'set' in the CODASYL DataBase Task 




Cit izen I 
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Someone who wants to interrogate the database does not have 
to be concerned with the organization of data. There is a 
DataBase Management System (DBMS) which takes care of how 
certain files are to be connected. This system also forms the link 
between database and user. 
In this system it also possible to authorize certain users to use 
certain information and access to other information can be 
denied. Those who have full authorization can control also what 
is stored and what is not. Such authorizations can be given to 
different government departments, who can define their parts of 
the database, or define their own databases (which can later be 
linked to an overall database). 
There has to be, of course, a more or less central control of how 
the database is structured (the database administrator) but this 
person or institution does not control the use of the database, 
* 
(...continued) 
a. one record-type forms the OWNER type, one or more different record types form the 
MEMBER types. 
b. One SET-OCCURRENCE is formed by one occurrence of the OWNER-record-type and 
0, 1 or more occurrences of the MEMBER-record-types. 
c. A record type cannot be OWNER and MEMBER in one and the same set. 
d. A record can be the OWNER of 0, 1 or more different sets and at the same time be 
the MEMBER of 0, 1 or more other sets. 
e. A record-occurrence of the OWNER-type implies a set-occurrence of the set of which 
it is OWNER. 
An appearance of a MEMBER-type can only exist in one occurrence of the same set-type 
at the same time. 
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but merely its technical condition. The user simply states which 
kinds of information he wants and the relevant records are 
presented to him in a more or less sophisticated way. The ease 
with which this can be done is increasing over the years. 
Database management systems become more and more 'user-
friendly' and faster, so that any combination of data can be 
quickly made. This is of course and advantage and a danger at 
the same time. 
If we have a government that wants to deal with those who have 
no occupation, or not anymore (unemployed), and belong to 
certain political organizations, the necessary records can be easily 
found in our simple example. 
>• C i t i z e n 






This way of dealing with information is most efficient, this 
efficiency is built in the database as a system.The main aspects 
of a database system are: 
1. The logical structure between pieces of data is fully expressed. 
2. Superfluous duplication of data is prevented. 
3. The database can accept and display data in a simple way. 
4. Simple access possibilities. 
5. Privacy. Not every user or program is allowed to access all 
data which are stored in the database. There is an interface 
(which belongs to the database management system) between 
program or user which takes care of this. 
6. Integrity. The data have to be accurate. 
7. A database can recover relatively quickly from malfunctions 
and mistakes. 
8. Creation, maintenance and reorganization can be done in a 
simple way. 
9. Testing of new programs and/or user interfaces do not hamper 
the reliability of the database. 
10. Changing the organization of the database has minimal 
consequences for the users. 
11. Modern databases can be interrogated interactively, through 
a query language. The user can in this way directly add and 
retrieve data in the database. 
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The logical construction of a database is described in a 
'SCHEDULE' with the aid of a Data Description Language 
(DDL). The description of the part of a database that is used for 
an application or is directly accessible to users is called a SUB-
SCHEDULE. Making these descriptions is very much the work 
of experts. 
A user or a programmer does not have to concern himself with 
the organization of data within a database (there is data 
independence). The only limitation is the authority to access 
certain pieces of data. Again defining access-rights is very much 
a technical business and the work of experts. 
I think that this example is sufficient to show from a somewhat 
more technical viewpoint how easy it is to retrieve the requested 
data. It should be noted that this data does not have to be 
present in the same computer. There may be networks of 
computers present in, for example in every city and in every tax-
office, which still support one database system. 
The database management system may simply support the 
uninterrupted use of one database spread out over more than 
one computer. This makes the whole system not very transparent 
for the citizen when government databases are concerned, even 
when a theoretical freedom of inquiry is guaranteed by the law. 
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The citizen needs to know how to access the database 
management system. And regardless of its user-friendliness this 
may be difficult. 
Several kinds of information on citizens stored in the database 
may be effectively hidden from any user. So, for instance, the 
information of membership of political organization can be stored 
in one part (i.e. one computer of the intelligence service) of the 
database which is inaccessible for non-authorized users. 
It would require much expertise and stamina to find out whether 
this kind of data exists of not. Only those who have full 
authorization to examine all parts of the database could find out. 
Therefore the danger that the undesirable combination of certain 
data can take place is real. The consequences may be that a 
quite slow and hardly noticeable process towards totalitarianism 
may take place. 
Combination of data by, for instance, a security agency, does not 
have to result on overt action. It can lead to, what has taken 
place under the Nixon administration, tax-harassment or other 
actions which are usually not linked to abuse of personal 
information. Secondly it may be used in times of crises, like the 
detention of Japanese Americans during the Second World War. 
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When a certain level of control over this information is reached 
by certain agencies, then it can be used in the selection of 
candidates for high positions in the bureaucracy or for political 
functions.' Thus creating a climate where this sort of practice 
might easier take place without too much public resistance. 
The revelations about the private life of Senator Hart in the Democratic pre-
elections for the presidency of the United States, point in that direction. Aside from the 
relation of trustworthiness and promiscuity, which may or may not exist, the fact is that 
clearly information on someone's private life was misused for political purposes. 
311 
APPENDIX 2.: Dataprotection legislations per country. 
Canada 
The Canadian government, under pressure of the social science 
community in Canada, reserved large privileges for social science 
research. 
On March 1, 1978 the Human Rights Act became effective. This 
act concerns itself with the protection of 'personal information 
and embodies the principle that the privacy of individuals should 
be protected to the greatest extent consistent with the public 
interest'.229 There is a certain limitation on civil liberties built in. 
Moreover the law is only valid for persons with the Canadian 
nationality and persons who are resident in Canada.230 Citizens 
have a right to demand information about personal data held 
about them in the government's automatic databases. No 
reference is made to manual files. These databases contain data 
which is to be used for administrative purposes. The law requires 
the annual publication of an index of those governmental 
(federal) databases which lists the contents of the files and its 
proposed use. The Canadian government issued guidelines for the 
implementation of the data protection law. These guidelines 
include rules about the accuracy of data and the methods of 
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access open to citizens and social science research.231 "The 
regulation of federal information banks and their description in 
the information bank index only applies to records used for 
administrative purposes. Similarly, the provision for individual 
access to personal records in government hands only applies to 
records used for a decision-making process that relates directly 
to an individual versus other research and statistical purposes."232 
It appears the other databases, including private databases, are 
outside the scope of the provision of the act. It seems that only 
data held by organizations of the government are concerned. 
However, the flow of data to other countries is restricted.233 
There is no indication that the data recorded on individuals is in 
any way limited, only the data should not be 'vague'.234 
A Privacy Commissioner has been designated by the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission. The Commissioner can investigate 
violations of privacy in government databases. The commissioner 
can only report his findings to the government Minister involved 
and to the person who complained about abuse of data held on 
him/her. Neither the concerned Minister nor Parliament have to 
comply with the Commissioners recommendations. 
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It seems that the person involved who suspects that data held 
about him has to develop the initiative of search and complaint. 
Again only government databases are involved, private databases 
seem to be out of the picture. 
The scientific community has urged the Canadian government to 
provide them with micro-data (i.e. data about single persons) for 
social-scientific research. For these purposes (statistical and social 
scientific research) the Canadian statistical agency, Statistics 
Canada, issues a sample tape, with de-personalized micro-data on 
a sample of the population. This tape is given only to bona-fide 
organizations, like universities and research institutions. This 
information contains data derived from census data. The release 
of this sample of de-personalised census data shows the concern 
for the possibilities of access and use of government data on the 
Canadian population by social scientists. There is no doubt about 
the usefulness of social scientific research, but for me the 
question remains whether a government really needs extensive 
data on every individual citizen and if so if it is necessary to 
disseminate such data in one form or another (de-personalized) 
to social scientists. I will return to this question at the end of this 
chapter. 
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The limits on civil liberty regarding the public interest are clear. 
Like in Britain and many other countries, police and national 
security organizations are exempted from limitations concerning 
personal data. They can collect and retain data on every aspect 
of one's private life without any hindrance from the side of the 
law, because they defend the public interest. 
Again a summary with the nine categories in mind: 
1. The Canadian data protection law concerns itself only with 
public (government owned) databases. 
2. The Canadian data protection law allows citizens to demand 
information about what is held about them in government data 
banks. It is not at all clear if they can do the same for private 
databases. 
3. It seems that there are no general regulations about what is 
'illegal' data or not. There is complete freedom to gather all data 
necessary for a specific government task. It is dissemination of 
such data which has become illegal under circumstances not in 
line with 'the public interest'. 
4. The law is only concerned with the abuse of data in 
government of public data banks. There the law prosecutes 
abuse. The ones prosecuted are invariably the 'abusing' civil 
servants or bureaus or third parties who have either illegally 
acquired access to government data banks or have used 
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government data which has given to them for specific tasks for 
different purposes. 
5. The institute which is concerned with the inspection of data 
and its use is the Privacy Commissioner, who, however, has no 
official powers beyond reporting data-abuse and giving 
recommendations to the Government and Parliament. 
6. The individual involved is the first one to prosecute eventual 
data-abuse about himself. Only when large scale abuse of 
government data is discovered, the minister or the parliament 
may take action on recommendation of the Privacy 
Commissioner. 
7. The law certainly regards data-transfers to other countries, and 
this also involves private data banks. 
8. The law is not concerned with manually processed data or 
paper-files. 
9. There is no registration duty for data banks other than 
government data banks which automatically appear in the index 
of government data banks together with their file-descriptions. 
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The Federal Republic of Germany. 
At January 27,1977 the German federal data protection law, 'das 
Bundes Datenschutz Gesetz (BDSG)', was enacted.* The 
intention of the act is not merely to protect against the misuse 
of personal data in data processing but to 'guarantee the integrity 
of the individual when information about his person is handled 
in an organized way.' The interesting thing about the law is that 
the content of the information is considered to be not important. 
Only the fact that identifiable persons are involved is sufficient 
to be covered by the law. The law also includes manually handled 
files when they refer to identifiable persons. The same is valid for 
data stored by the press of media archives.235 This is not so 
strange given the level on which gossip-newspapers operate in 
Germany. 
The BDSG is concerned with public as well as private databases. 
The individual 'Lander' may have their own data protection laws 
but have to abide by the general principles of the BDSG. These 
principles are: 
a. The processing (storage, transfer, modification, erasure) of 
personal data is admissible only if permitted so by legal 
provision (including those of the BDSG) or if the person 
The German 'Land' of Hessen was the first state in the world which formulated 
legislation concerning the use of personal data. See Ulrich Damman and Ralph Brennecke, 
Country Report Federal Republic of Germany, in Mochmann and Miiller, "Data Protection 
and Social Science Research", ibid., p. 129. 
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concerned has given his consent. The most important 
admissibility criteria of the BDSG are: 
in the public sector: the necessity for the legitimate 
accomplishment of the tasks of the public bodies involved; 
in the private sector: the purpose of a contractual or 
quasicontractual relationship with the person concerned or 
a careful consideration and balance of legitimate interests 
("berechtigte Interessen") of the person/institution who has 
the data or gains access to them on the one hand and 
the threatened interests of the person concerned 
warranting protection ("schutzwurdige Belange") on the 
other. 
b. Data have to be blocked (subject to no further use except 
under certain conditions) and to be erased on application of the 
person concerned if there is no further need or these data for 
accomplishment of the original task or purpose. 
c. The person concerned has the right to know what data are 
stored. Exceptions are enumerated. In general, the person 
enquiring has to pay for the information. The law provides for 
the information on where data are or could be stored - in the 
public sector by means of official publications and public 
registers (about the structure and purpose of data registers), in 
the private sector by individual information about the storage of 
information about him, if he does not know already. 
d. The individual concerned can ask for the correction of 
incorrect data, and for the erasure of data stored without justification. If the correctness of data is contested, they have to 
be blocked. 
e. A federal data protection commissioner (Bundesbeauf-tragter 
fur den Datenschutz) is appointed by the President on the 
proposal of the federal government as an independent agency 
of control over the federal administration. He reports directly 
to the parliament and to the government. The states have 
created similar control institutions. Private data processing 
activities are under the (limited) control of state agencies. 
Anybody concerned may appeal to one of these control 
institutions, if he feels his rights to be violated by the processing 
of his personal data. Physical persons and private bodies beyond 
a certain volume of data processing have to appoint an internal 
data protection commissioner who is responsible for the 
enforcement of data protection. 
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f. Unauthorized transfer and modification of data are criminal 
offenses. The penalty is up to two years imprisonment.236 
What is probably not known by the general public in Germany 
is that census data (note that census data is data about 
identifiable persons) can be copied to various public institutions, 
notably townships (Gemeinden) in order to update their 
population registers which are generally thought to overstate the 
size of the population. This is a simple and routine action, which 
involves the connection of the census computers at the Federal 
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) and the computers of 
the other public institution. The data are, of course, transferred 
in a compatible form.237 Below I will concern myself with the 
possible consequences of such transfers. 
The BDSG also defines principles about the collection of data. 
The collection of data about individuals is admissible: 
1. "if permitted by legal provisions or 
2. If the person concerned has consented (in writing, except when 
another form is appropriate)."238 
Data collection is admissible for: 
"... [PJublic bodies: as far as it is necessary to accomplish their 
tasks, - for private persons and institutions: within a contractual 
relationship or as far as it is necessary to safeguard their 
legitimate interests, and provided that no interests of the person 
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concerned warranting protection will be harmed; furthermore 
manual storing of information directly derived from generally 
accessible sources."239 
Transfer of personal data from public authorities to other 
(public or private) organizations in other countries is admitted 
under certain conditions. Such transfers can take place if the 
receiver can make clear that he needs the data and has a 
formally justified interest in these data. Or that the sender has 
an interest in transferring the data to a certain receiver. Transfer 
can only take place when there is a justified and credible interest 
in transferring them or when personal data about persons 
involved which are worth protecting are not violated. Transfers 
take place in the sphere of justice, public administration, tax (to 
avoid double taxation), crime and drugs. There is, however, the 
possibility of special laws which can annul the above. Certain 
processing of data can take place outside of the BDSG when 
another law states that it is legal. 
Persons whose personal data are transferred or processed are 
protected within the BDSG: 
1. The rights of the person involved may not be worse than 
under the BDSG, when they are transferred to another country. 
This can only be the case when. 
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2. the receiving country has data protection legislation which is 
in its essentials comparable to the BDSG, or 
3. when the receiving country has a special treaty with the 
Federal republic which takes care of the rights of the persons 
whose data is transferred. 
Summarizing we can say that: 
1. The BDSG concerns itself with public as well as private 
databases. 
2. Individuals can demand information about what is stored about 
them in a (public or private) database. For the answer a fee may 
be demanded. 
3. There seems to be no provisions about what kind of data is 
registered or not. There is no evidence that certain data is 
labelled illegal. 
4. The law has only provisions about 'incorrect' data and not 
about illegal data. The law demands that only data that is correct 
may be used for its legal purpose and otherwise should be 
blocked. Only the registration of incorrect data or personal data 
which can be traced back to an individual by non-authorized 
databases and the unauthorized transfer and modification of data 
are prosecuted. 
5. There is a data inspector who is concerned with the 
enforcement of data protection. 
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6. It seems that under the BDSG the data commissioner can take 
the initiative of the prosecution violators of the law, in public as 
well as in private databases, however the individual(s) concerned 
have their own rights of prosecution. 
7. The law regards data transfers to other countries. These 
transfers need a license from the Federal Government and are 
in general limited to countries which have comparable data 
protection laws to the BDSG, or when statutory obligations 
demand such transfers (mostly tax information). Incoming 
transfers are of no legal concern. 
8. The law does include manual as well as automated files. There 
seems as far as privacy is concerned to be no difference between 
them for the BDSG. 
9. There is a registration duty for data-gathering and processing 
when personal data is involved. When public institutions are 
concerned the law proscribes that a list is published with 
databases in it which store individual data. Private organizations 




On December 1, 1981 the dutch parliament agreed about a law 
concerning data protection.240 The law follows the principles 
established in the advice of a commission (Commissie Koopmans) 
set up as early as 1972 (after the census agitation of 1971) and 
who delivered its final report in 1976. 
The data protection law does not restrict itself to automated 
databases. This is contrary to what the Commission proposed. A 
restriction should be made, according to the Commission 
Koopmans, on practical grounds. It is very difficult to try and 
control already existing and well-established institutions with a 
large volume of data on persons in paper files.241 The 
consequence is, of course, that name and address information can 
be stored in a manual administration and all other sensitive data 
in an automatic one, which provides the interested persons with 
a number which corresponds to name and address information. 
Therefore the law does includes manual files. 
The law has two ways of control: 
1. It established a body which registers 'sensitive' databases and 
grants permits, the registration office (Registratie Kamer). 
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2. It granted rights to the individual who is registered and which 
are supposed to protect the individual.242 
The law defines 'personal data' as all data which can be traced 
back to an individual (identifiable data) however difficult this may 
be. This involves the possibility of decrypting encrypted data, 
linking remote databases to one another, burglary (electronic or 
otherwise). 
Public preventive control takes place through the following 
provisions: 
a. All (automated) data banks handling personal data must 
be registered. Extra obligations: 
b. Those data banks which do not fall in the category of 
rather simple administrative systems (lists of subscribers to 
a magazine, or members of associations) are obliged to 
draw up regulations describing the information handling 
procedures and privacy protection measures; these 
regulations must be agreed to by the Registration office. 
c. For the most dangerous data banks (carrying sensitive 
information like medical, criminal, psychological, etc. data) 
or which disseminate to third parties, a system of permits 
is proposed. The registration office can make conditions 
to enhance the protection of the privacy of the registered 
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individuals before granting the permit. 
The General Provision of the law: 
The most important rule is that no dissemination of the data to 
third parties other than those mentioned in regulations or permit 
agreed to by the Registration office may take place. 
Exceptions can be made: 
a. with consent of the registered individual; 
b. with special consent of the Registration office; 
c. for cases which can be seen as a part of the "normal 
functioning" of the registration system; 
d. when based on legal obligations; 
e. to investigating police-officers.243 
The law does not limit or prohibit in any way what kind of 
information can be gathered about individuals, it only limits the 
dissemination of this information. 
The individual has the right to inspect data about himself and 
demand correction in the case of incorrect data. Any database 
with 'sensitive' data in it has to keep a log of any third-party-
access to the database. The owner of a database which registers 
individual data, has to send to every individual a notice on the 
moment of registration that data about this person is entered in 
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the database. This has to happen only when this is not made 
clear in another way. 
There is an exception for police and medical databases and, 
social scientific or statistical databases. In the case of social 
scientific databases the right to inspect data may be suspended 
since the organisation of these databases is not directed towards 
particular individuals but towards certain personal characteristics 
of an individual.244 
The active control and prosecution of those who abuse data lies 
obviously with the individual, and not with the registration office, 
whose task it is to merely grant permits (with or without 
conditions). As with all other legislations security and police 
databases are exempted from any registration duties and are not 
subject to the control of either the individual concerned nor of 
any other public or private entity. 
A special part of the law concerns itself with the international 
situation. The three paragraphs under this chapter establish the 
reach of the law in order to prevent the evasion of the law 
through data transfers and processing in other countries. The 
databases concerned with personal data established in a foreign 
country by a Dutch or Dutch based organizations have to obey 
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to the same rules as databases established in the Netherlands. 
Transfers of Dutch 'sensitive' data and foreign databases accessed 
or owned by Dutch organizations need a permit from the 
registration office. 
This is the same for data security of foreign databases which can 
be accessed from the Netherlands. When the database is 
established in a foreign country under the supervision of a 
foreign owner or another foreign organisation, no registration is 
necessary under Dutch law, also when private data about Dutch 
nationals is stored. The registration office can give dispensation 
to particular databases in case of conflict with foreign 
dataprotection laws.245 
Summarizing we can say that: 
1. The Dutch data protection law includes public as well as 
private databases which hold 'sensitive' information. 
2. Individuals have the right to demand information about data 
stored on them in a database. 
3. There is no illegal data. The collection of data is free. 
4. There is consequently no prosecution of databases which 
collect illegal data, only correction of incorrect data can be 
demanded. 
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5. There is a registration office which grants permits to databases 
which have sensitive data. 
6. The prosecuting in the case of illegal dissemination or storage 
of incorrect data lies primarily with the individual(s) concerned. 
7. The law regard data transfers to foreign countries. Transfers 
of Dutch 'sensitive' data and foreign databases accessed or 
owned by Dutch organizations need a permit from the 
registration office. 
8. The law explicitly includes manually operated files. 
9. There is a registration duty for data gathering and processing 
for both public and private databases, when they contain personal 
data. 
Sweden. 
Sweden was the first sovereign state to enact a data protection 
law. The law came into force in July 1, 1973." Sweden has been 
the first in many related things. Since 1947 every Swedish citizen 
has a Personal Identification Number (PIN). This code contains 
information about date of birth and sex.246 The existence of this 
code together with the increasing importance of electronic data 
The German State of Hessen, as noted above, enacted the first data protection law 
in the world, but Hessen is not a sovereign state. 
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processing was the reason for discussions about privacy during 
the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies.247 
Another interesting feature of Swedish society is that there is 
great openness of governmental information to all citizens. This 
is so because of the constitutional principle of freedom of 
information and publicity. This principle originated in the 
eighteenth century and is only limited by the secrecy law. 
The secrecy law, amended in may 28, 1937, establishes "restraints 
on the Right of the General Public to have access to Official 
Documents." It also guarantees the secrecy of identifiable 
information on a person for a period of twenty years.248 
"The Data Act defines 'personal information' as 'information 
concerning an individual'. A 'personal register' is 'any register or 
any other notes made by automatic data processing and 
containing personal information that can be assigned to the 
individual concerned.' 
The Data Act stipulates that a personal register must not be 
started or kept without permission by the Data Inspection Board 
(DIB), unless the register has been ordered by the Government 
or the Parliament. The DIB shall give permission to create and 
run a personal register, if there is no reason to assume that the 
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register will lead to undue encroachment on the personal 
integrity of registered persons and the register is kept according 
to the rules set up by the board."249 The Data Act does not 
concern itself with manual files, including when they can be 
mechanically (punch card sorting, etc.) be sorted or selected. 
Neither does the act protect the privacy of 'non-living' persons.250 
There is a restriction on what kind of data may be stored and 
what kind of data may not be stored without specific permission 
of the DIB. There must be specific reasons and needs 
accompanied with a number of safeguards for the storage of data 
like: information about criminal convictions, whether a person 
"has been treated as a Child Welfare Committee case", 
information about drug addiction, information about dependence 
on welfare, information about religion and political affiliation, and 
presumably racial origin. One exception is that religious and 
political organisation may keep a computerized list of their 
members. 
It must be mentioned that the formulation of the Data Act is so 
general that, at least in theory, the most trivial files containing no 
more that names and addresses needed a permit. Especially 
today, with so many personal computers containing small 
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databases with names, addresses and telephone numbers of 
relatives, friends and business connections, the procedure of 
applying for and granting permissions for databases becomes 
impossible. In practice this is not done, and larger databases not 
important for the 'personal integrity' of the ones registered get 
permits on a routine basis. 
The DIB has had, because of these general terms, many conflicts 
with the Swedish National Central Bureau of Statistics (Statistika 
Centralbyran - SCB). Flaherty described the reasons for this 
conflict: 
Certain fundamental themes developed by the leadership of DIB 
have influenced their decisions on activities at SCB. DIB 
advocated policies which are both controversial and overly 
cautious by international standards. These views appear to be 
largely associated with the articulate Director General and 
former deputy-director of the DIB, Jan Freese, because he has 
been actively engaged as a publicist for data protection and has 
written and thought a great deal about the impact of computers 
on society. 
Freese doubted that a statistical bureau in the form of the SCB 
had any real use for society. Freese believes that most statistical 
data necessary for governmental and economic purposes can be 
assembled in other ways than through the aggregation of citizen 
records. SCB would at most have an advising task as a bureau of 
statistical experts. 
For example, Freese believes the police could handle the task 
of compiling criminal statistics with guidance on statistical 
methodology from SCB. This would not only prevent the 
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transfer of data from the police to SCB, but also limit the 
possibilities of linking criminal data to other information.... 
Some members of the board of DIB along with Jan Freese are 
associated with the view that a democratic society cannot afford 
the risk of the accumulation of large amounts of identifiable 
information in one place , such as at SCB. They argue that such 
centralized date are more subject to abuse than decentralized 
information.251 
The DIB publishes a list of databases and research projects which 
contain or are concerned with personal data. The citizens have 
a right to request what kind of information is stored about them, 
although not more than once a year per database. There appears 
to be no fees for this service. 
The DIB prosecutes actively all those who violates the Data Act. 
Private citizens have of course the right to prosecute those who 
disseminate their private information without their consent or 
who store either illegal or incorrect data. 
Only the transfer (only out of Sweden) of computerized 
personal data needs a license of the DIB. In this respect the 
Data Act includes manual files, and is in this way more strict 
than when internal Swedish transfers are concerned. When a 
license for export is applied for the Data Inspection tries to 
determine if the dataprotection laws of the importing country are 
comparable to the Swedish laws. If that is not the case the 
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license is refused. The import of information is not included in 
the law. 
Summarizing we can say that: 
1. The law includes public as well as private databases, with the 
exception of police, security and databases called for by the 
government of the parliament for special purposes. 
2. Individuals can demand information about data which is stored 
about them in databases, but only once a year per database. 
Periodically a list of databases which contain personal data is 
published. 
3. There is illegal data. Without explicit permission data about 
criminal convictions, race, registration at a welfare agency, 
religion, political affiliation, etc., may not be gathered and stored. 
4. Hence the law prosecutes those databases which store 'illegal' 
data, without a special permission. 
5. The Data Act has established a Data Inspection Bureau (DIB) 
which concerns itself with the distribution of permits to databases 
which store personal information and permits for the transfer of 
data from Sweden to foreign countries. 
6. Prosecution of violation of the Data Act lies primarily with the 
data inspection agency (DIB) and furthermore with the citizen 
whose 'personal integrity' is endangered through this violation. 
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7. The Data Act also concerns itself with data transfer to foreign 
countries, and is in this respect more strict than when internal 
Swedish transfers and data gathering are concerned. It concerns 
itself, among others, also the transfer of manual files to foreign 
countries. 
8. For internal Swedish affairs the Data Act does not concern 
itself with manual files, only with automated files. 
9. There is a registration duty for data gathering and processing 
when personal data is involved. This extends itself also to social 
scientific research. 
The United States of America. 
In the United States the protection of data is regulated in two 
laws, the Privacy Act of 1974, and The Freedom of Information 
Act of 1966 (amended in 1974 and 1976). Both laws are 
specifically directed to federal bureaus and databases.252 However, 
most if not all states have implemented similar legislation as the 
federal government. 
The Privacy Act is concerned with the protection of the citizens' 
right to privacy. In doing so it regulates the "collection, 
management, and disclosure of personal information maintained 
by governmental agencies."253 The collection of data by private 
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organizations is not limited. The dissemination of data by these 
organizations is only limited by the relevant articles in the 
constitution and other laws about libel and slander. 
An interesting example of this freedom is mentioned by Flaherty 
when he discusses the public discussion about privacy measures, 
or the lack of them, in the Bureau of the Census: 
Moreover, critics of the Bureau of the Census seem unaware of 
the amazing variety of personal information on individual 
American adults annually published in city directories by 
R.L.Polk and Company or Detroit. Its 1400 community 
directories list the name and address, marital status, occupation, 
place of employment, telephone number, residence, and 
information about rental or home ownership for individuals in 
the locality. In response to specific requests from its clients, 
Polk can produce geographical selections of information by 
areas as small as postal zones, census tracts, or neighborhoods. 
Yet the company states the "we don't have anything in our files 
that is not available under the law."254 
It seems to me that when the protection of privacy is concerned 
also the development of databases like Polk's should be 
controlled in some respect. 
The Privacy Act gives citizens the right to inquire whether 
information about them is stored in federal databases and 
demand access to these records, in so far as they do not have 
access under the Freedom of Information Act which tries to 
improve the openness of government and public access to data. 
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In contrast to European systems, the US system of data gathering 
about citizens and nationals is much less thorough. It seems that 
the various US governmental agencies, be it on federal or state 
level, do not want to record if anything at all about their citizens. 
The only thorough data gathering and processing is the census 
which is held every ten years, and updated with minicensuses. It 
is therefore that a large part of the concern of the Privacy Act 
was with the Bureau of the Census, followed by the Social 
Security Administration and the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare. Where they could exchange data under 
the Federal Reports Act, in order to improve efficiency and 
decrease redundancy of data, they are now restricted in the kinds 
of information they can exchange. When this information includes 
personal data about identifiable individuals the exchange may be 
prohibited. However, a limited flow of identifiable data among 
federal agencies is permissible, according to the privacy 
Protection Study Commission in their final report of 1977. The 
condition is that there has to be a commensurate increase in 
protection of confidentiality. The Commission in its report 
concerns itself also with social scientific research.255 
There is no definition of explicitly illegal data but the Privacy Act 
stipulates that agencies shall maintain "only such information 
about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a 
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purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or 
executive order of the President." Each Federal Agency, however, 
is responsible for interpreting the Act. There is no Data 
Inspection Commission or any comparable institution, which 
reviews the data concerned. Within the various federal agencies 
there are officers who concern themselves, among other tasks, 
with the implementation of the Privacy Act, although the Act 
itself does not require this. Nothing is known about their 
performance!256 
The Privacy Act requires that all federal agencies publish in the 
Federal Register the properties of their databases. The 
information has to be conform the safeguards which the Act 
imposes on them by requiring "fair record keeping practices."257 
This includes that, although in many cases social scientists have 
access to data, they may not disseminate identifiable data in their 
research reports or otherwise.258 
The Privacy Act does not concern itself with data transfers to 
other countries, nor is there any other law or statute that does 
this. 
The summary of US data protection legislation is quite simple: 
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1. The laws concerned are only directed to the governmental 
level and explicitly not to private databases. 
2. Individuals have the right to demand what information is 
stored about them in federal databases, under the Privacy Act 
and the Freedom of Information Act. They have the right to 
demand correction of wrong data.* 
3. There is no illegal data defined in the Privacy Act, although 
it may be assumed that certain data like political affiliation and 
religion are not registered, since this is not normally done in US 
governmental administrations, except perhaps the Census Bureau. 
4. Hence there is no prosecution of those databases which store 
'illegal' data since there is none. 
5. There is no data inspection agency or comparable institution. 
6. The individuals concerned have the responsibility when 
incorrect data is stored about them or when data is held which 
Compare with point 8 of the recommendations of the HEW quoted above, which 
specifies that the public notice includes: 
1. The name of the system; 
2. The nature and the purpose(s) of the system; 
3. The categories and number of persons on whom data are (to be) maintained; 
4. The categories of data (to be) maintained, indicating which categories are (to be) stored 
in computer-accessible files; 
5. The organization's policies and practices regarding data storage, duration of retention 
of data, and disposal thereof; 
6. The categories of data sources; 
7. A description of all types of use (to be) made of data, indicating those involving 
computer-accessible files, and including all classes of users and the organizational 
relationships among them; 
8. The procedures whereby an individual can (i) be informed if he is the subject of data in 
the system; (ii) gain access to such data; and (Hi) contest their accuracy, completeness, 
pertinence, and the necessity for retaining them; 
9. The title, name, and address of the person immediately responsible for the system.' 
Quoted in De Graaf, 1977, p.205-7. 
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is not in line with the statutory purposes of the agency involved 
to prosecute the agency is all else fails. 
7. US law does not regard data transfers to other countries. 
8. The Privacy Act does not seem to make a distinction between 
automated files and manual files. 
9. All Federal agencies have to register their databases in a data 
register which is published every year. 
Britain. 
On November 11, 1987 the Data Protection Act came into force 
in Britain. As such it is the latest data protection legislation that 
came into power in a western country. The purpose of this act 
is to protect citizens against abuse of data that was held on them. 
Moreover the Act gives them the right to know what is held on 
them. 
The Data Protection Act received Royal Assent in July 1984, and 
is itself the result of a long process of discussion in Britain. The 
ultimate cause for the act to come about was the European 
Convention on Human Rights which came into force in 1953.259 
In the twenty years between the European Convention and the 
adoption of the Data Protection Act things have changed but not 
so much that principles like privacy and the limitations on the 
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right of interference of a government with private life and 
correspondence have disappeared. 
The Act demands organizations and persons processing data on 
computers to register with the Data Registrar. It is a criminal 
offence not to register. The act does not specify how big or how 
small these organizations should be in order to register or 
whether private persons (with an address list in which data about 
friends and relatives is collected) should register or not. 
4. Registration of data users and computer bureaux 
(1) The Registrar shall maintain a register of data users who 
hold, and ofpersons carrying on computer bureaux who provide 
services in respect of, personal data and shall make an entry in 
the register in pursuance of each application for registration 
accepted by him under this part of this Act. 
The Act maintains six data protection principles. "Organizations 
using computers are required to ensure all information is: 
- collected and processed fairly and lawfully 
- held only for lawful purposes described in the register entry 
made by the organization 
- used only for the purposes and only disclosed to the people 
described in the register entry 
- adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes 
for which they are being held 
- accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date 
- protected by proper security. 
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The Act provides the citizens with five rights: 
- to check if any organization keeps information about [him/her] 
on computer [underlining by me] 
- to see a copy of this information subject to certain exceptions 
- to complain to the Data Registrar or the courts if [he/she] does 
not like the way organizations are collecting or using the personal 
information on their computer 
- to have inaccurate computer records corrected or deleted 
- to seek compensation for damage by the misuse of computer 
records.261 
In section 2(3) of the act there is a provision about which data 
may be restricted: 
The secretary of state is empowered to modify or supplement 
by order the data protection principles in matters of a 
potentially sensitive nature, and any such orders once passed 
into law will be included in references to the act and the data 
?rotection principles, his provision derives from Article 6 of the Council of Europe 
Convention which requires that personal dat in respect of -
(a) racial origin 
fb) political opinions or religious beliefs 
(c) physical or mental health or sexual life 
(d) criminal convictions 
may not be passed automatically unless domestic law provides 
adequate safeguards. 
There is no doubt that massive amounts of personal data as 
described above are processed automatically and much of it will 
be exempted from the operation of the act altogether for 
reasons of national security and from the subject access 
provisions for reasons to do with the prevention or crime and 
the collection of taxes.262 
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Still the Act does not provide enough protection against abuse, 
especially when this abuse comes from the side of the Police and 
the various Intelligence and National Security agencies that 
Britain has. In this respect the Act follows other countries, who 
also exclude police and security organizations from their data 
protection legislation. For instance, the British police have access 
for operational purposes to the identifiable records of individuals 
at the Criminal Record Office, which is separate from the Home 
Office.263 These organizations are exempt from registration and 
there is no control on the way they gather information about 
individuals, how they store, for how long they store it and above 
all how they are using it. It is rather disturbing that, in this latest 
example of legislation, this element did not receive more thought 
than it did. 
Another element is that [the Act] does not cover manual records, 
allowing information users to protect their most damaging data 
by retaining them or transferring them to paper. Information once 
held on a computer database need not be disclosed to the data 
subject if it is later processed only on paper. However, in the 
definition section of the act, minimal data (like name and 
address) held on a computer with references to a manual record 
are included in the act. The combination of computer and 
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manual files is seen in the same way as combined computer-
files.264 
Even if data users do not transfer their sensitive data to paper, 
they can evade the Act by processing it in a fashion contrived to 
avoid referring to individuals in their main records.265 
This means that the protection the Act is offering is rather 
superficial. Mail order organizations have large amounts of data 
on people that goes beyond mere name and address information. 
They register information about occupation, neighbourhood, 
activities, race, age and sex. These databases do not only use this 
information themselves, for marketing and advertisement 
purposes, but sell this information to whomever offers a good 
price. The Act does not cover these activities. 
The self-control of the Data Protection Act is almost fully absent. 
The Act demands no supervision of the civil servants working to 
enforce the Act. The registrar is not supervised. And after the 
data-users (the organizations with the databases concerned) have 
registered they can do almost anything they want with it. The 
only case that a violation can be detected is when a data subject 
finds out about it, usually by chance. There is no way that a 
data-subject can, in practice, ensure that data about him/her is 
correct. He or she cannot ask the Data Protection Registrar to 
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find out who has information about him/her. Data-subjects have 
to find that out for themselves, and only then they can ask the 
data-user to inform them about it. The data-user can require a 
fee from the data-subject for searching and/or correcting data 
held on the subject.266 
As I have indicated above intelligence and security organizations 
have been exempted from the act. The further danger is that 
they themselves can use "the Data Protection Register itself as a 
guide to gathering of further personal information."267 These 
security and intelligence organizations have no limitations on 
what they are allowed to register about someone. The Act does 
not even impose limitations on 'normal' data users. There can be 
no doubt that the British Data Protection Act is useless and will 
not effectively protect citizens against possible abuse of data held 
about them. It can only serve as an instrument of legitimation for 
data activities of the government itself and of those connected 
with it. 
Summarizing with the categories mentioned earlier in mind one 
can say, about the British data protection Act that: 
1. The law covers public as well as private databases. 
2. in theory persons have the right to demand what data is held 
about them in various data banks, but they have to go to 
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database holders whom they suspect of having data on them. 
They may be required to pay a fee to the holder for their 
inquiry. 
3. There is 'illegal data' like data about race, health, political or 
religious affiliation, and criminal convictions when not held for 
legal purposes. There are exemptions for this for police, hospitals 
and various other governmental institutions. There is no limit 
concerning the period over which such data may be held on a 
person. 
4. The act will punish those databases which have wrong data or 
data about race, health, political or religious affiliation, and 
criminal convictions for which they have no legal purpose and 
hence exemption from the laws regulations. 
5. There is an institute, the data-register headed by the data 
registrar, which registers databases which hold information about 
individuals. The organization of the database is checked, but no 
further checking is done after registration. 
6. The prosecuting duty lies primarily with the person involved 
and not with the law. 
7. Transfer to other countries is limited in general to those 
countries who are bound by the European Convention to other 
countries a request has to be filed with the Registrar.268 
8. The law does not regard pure manual or paper files. 
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9. The law demands registration when data on individuals is going 
to be held as a computer-bureau which may disclose this 
information to others. 
Unfortunately almost all of the other legislations discussed in this 
chapter are less comprehensive than the British Data Protection 
Act. A possible explanation is probably the strong libertarian 
ideology professed by the present British government. This would 
mean that, at least in theory, individual privacy is seen as such a 
fundamental right, that it is in need of the utmost protection. 
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